

SENLIS AFGHANISTAN

COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN: LOSING FRIENDS AND MAKING ENEMIES



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*See also "Case Study: War Zone Hospitals in Afghanistan:
A Symbol of Wilful Neglect"*

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Farmers working on the dry and difficult lands outside of Kandahar City

Executive Summary

The international community has reached a tipping point in southern Afghanistan. The anticipated major spring offensive by the Taliban against international forces requires an urgent reassessment of the international community's counter-insurgency strategy.

Options for a peaceful settlement of the current conflict in southern Afghanistan are within its grasp, but the international community has yet to reach out to the Afghan people. The military are doing an admirable job in a very hostile environment, but the political, development and counter-narcotics efforts of the international community are not having the necessary positive impact. In some instances those policies are acting to further inflame the insurgency.

What is required is a very frank reassessment of the realities of the current insurgency dynamic, the declining credibility of the international community and an acknowledgment of the legitimate grievances of the Afghan people.

The current insurgency consists of two different types of insurgency: one driven by political and religious concerns, another by economic incentives and legitimate grievances. The latter insurgency – a 'grassroots' movement largely fed by social protest, unemployment and different grievances the people hold against the government and the international community – is significantly larger than the former group. It lacks the political purpose and fundamentalist nature of its counterpart. Structural unemployment, despair and extreme poverty provide an ideal recruiting ground for this insurgency.

The practice of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan has so far predominantly focused on military instruments to fight against the insurgency. By doing this, it has wrongfully left out all the non-military elements that form part of counter-insurgency theory: for example humanitarian aid, economic development, establishing health care and developing the educational system. Five years after the international community committed to stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, these instruments have been insufficiently funded and implemented. Instead, what Afghans in the south see in their daily lives from the international community are mere negative policy instruments. They see military bombing campaigns, where bombs do not distinguish between innocent civilians and insurgents. The policy of poppy crop eradication reinforces poverty and fuels both anger towards the government and the international community, while it also provides the insurgency with an easy recruitment base.

If properly applied, the non-military elements of classic counter-insurgency practice would immediately improve security and create more support for the Karzai government. This report recommends the full matrix of proper counter-insurgency tactics be utilized as a coordinated Emergency Stabilization Process to provide the necessary support for a successful military effort. However, the international community has to realize that it is a matter of urgency. There is no time to waste as the window of opportunity is closing fast. We are losing friends and making many enemies if we do not change course soon.

Conclusions

There has been an evolution of the actual nature of the insurgency

1. There has been an evolution of the actual nature of insurgency since 9/11

In Afghanistan, the international community has opted for a counter-insurgency approach that fails to see the current evolution of the insurgency. The Taliban and similar insurgency groups operating in Afghanistan are perceived outside Afghanistan as part of the *Jihad* and Al Qaeda movements. Although some core Taliban leaders could be seen in this light, most Taliban fighters are local Afghans who have either been attracted by economic incentives or are driven by legitimate grievances. These grievances have resulted in anger, frustration and disillusionment with the government and the international forces.

We divide the insurgency into two dynamics: the Grassroots Insurgency and the Global Jihad Insurgency. Separate from either is the Non-Aligned Local Population.

2. The International Community needs a reality check: we must fundamentally reassess the status of international community counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan

The international community has failed to convince the local population that it is there to help and has failed to increase support for the Afghan government.

This has reinforced a situation in which the local Afghan population sees itself as being alone, faced on the one hand, by the international community and the government, and on the other hand by the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

The support that the international community enjoyed when it first arrived in the country has disappeared and must be rebuilt in order to provide a positive environment for the military to fight in and to build support for the Karzai Government in Southern Afghanistan.

We must acknowledge this reality and take immediate steps to turn around the dynamics between the international community and the local Afghan population. Despite the fact that counter-insurgency theory is normally understood to include many different policy areas, the counter-insurgency strategy used in Afghanistan is dominated by a military approach. The other elements of classic counter-insurgency responses such as humanitarian aid, development cooperation and infrastructure/institution building have been sorely neglected, under-funded and under-prioritized during the five years of international presence in Afghanistan.

This means that despite the significant military success in the south we are not able to establish government control in the south, nor can we establish meaningful security systems.

3. The local Afghan population has legitimate grievances with the international community

We must acknowledge and respond to the legitimate local grievances caused by the both the actions of, and inaction of the international community in Southern Afghanistan. These legitimate grievances are causing people to turn their backs on the Karzai Government, and engender mistrust and anger against the international community. This in turn fuels the insurgency which is gaining in size and support. The majority of the grievances expressed by Afghan people could be dealt with by relatively simple and inexpensive responses which would cause the insurgency to lose momentum.

These legitimate grievances include the following.

- The significant number of civilian deaths, injury and displacement caused by widespread fighting and bombing in the rural areas.
- Forced poppy crop eradication while many farmers are still fully dependent on poppy crops to feed their families.
- The lack of humanitarian aid and assistance following fighting and natural disasters such as floods or drought; people are starving and there is not food aid
- The lack of overall economic development both in cities and in rural areas; more specifically the lack of jobs or decent income opportunities in the area. Southern Afghanistan remains desperately poor.
- The perception that the Karzai government is a puppet regime with foreign countries in control of decision-making.
- The lack of public facilities such as schools and hospitals.
- The perception that the international community does not respect the culture and traditions of Afghanistan and is approaching the country in a Western way, trying to solve its problems through Western approaches and instruments.

Recommendations: Elements of an Emergency Stabilization Process

Recommendation I

Respond to Afghan legitimate local grievances

The international community must rapidly respond to legitimate grievances such as the lack of economic development, infrastructure, humanitarian aid and healthcare. Currently, many Afghans are being lost to the insurgency because of the lack of these very basic provisions.

In addition, military campaigns are responsible for civilian casualties and deaths, displaced persons and loss of livelihood. Provision must be made for those suffering from the consequences of bombing campaigns, to treat the wounded and provide food and shelter for those families that are left without a home. Having more troops on the ground to fight the core insurgency should allow for a reduction in bombing campaigns, which in turn would decrease the number of civilian casualties as military action could be more targeted.

Misguided counter-narcotics must be urgently revised. Current eradication based policies increase poverty and cause social unrest – further undermining development efforts, deteriorating the security situation and widening the gap between the government and the rural communities. Opium licensing for medicine should be pursued immediately.

Economic opportunity must be maximized in order to provide communities with the incentive to support the government instead of the insurgents.

An Economic Stabilisation Process should include:

- Immediate, robust and systematic food aid;
- Emergency plans to assist internally displaced people;
- An end to the strategy of fear and destruction - a full assessment on the nature and extent of the bombing campaigns;
- Compensation to civilian victims of bombings;
- A complete overhaul of failed counter-narcotics strategies – crop eradication must stop;
- An opium licensing scheme for the production of medicines should be implemented in Afghanistan – such a scheme would be preceded by a series of pilot projects; and
- Development interventions must provide support for military strategies.

Recommendation II**Create stability by applying a robust economic response to the Grassroots Insurgency, separating them from the Global Jihad Insurgency**

There is a real chance to build a stability supported by local leaders and their communities if they can be convinced that the international community is there to help. As the nature of the unrest in the Grassroots Insurgency is primarily economic, there must be a robust economic response targeted at this community. This will separate those involved in the Grassroots Insurgency from members of the Global Jihad Insurgency. It will also build support from the local population, who are attempting to stay out of insurgency entirely. A robust economic response targeted at the local population will bring them over to our side.

However, time is running out. Later will be too late.

Recommendation III**Create a shared long term vision of Afghanistan - stop alienating the Afghan population by imposing "Western" ideals, approaches and concepts**

A shared long term vision of Afghanistan must be envisioned and elaborated, one which appeals to all generations. It must incorporate local power holders who have the potential to be partners for peace. As the central government currently has no full control over the country, the importance of local authority must not be underestimated and neglected.

It is a mistaken notion that because it has an elected president and parliament, Afghanistan is a fully functioning democracy. Most Afghans in southern Afghanistan do not perceive our form of democracy as having bettered their lives. The government in Kabul is often far removed from the every day reality of people who identify themselves instead with local centres of power.

Urgent steps must be taken to reshape the democracy towards a concept that Afghans can embrace. We must help Afghans shape their own form of democracy which takes into account Afghan values and culture. Only then will the concept of democracy be valued by the current adult generation enough to pass to the next generation of Afghans.

Part I

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Concepts, History and Current Trends



US corporal guards a Viet Cong, Vietnam (1965)

Photograph courtesy of the US National Archives and Records Administration

Introduction

Modern conflict is defined increasingly in terms of insurgencies. With the end of the Cold War, the occurrence of classic, large-scale conflicts between armies of two or more sovereign nations has significantly diminished. Yet a different kind of conflict has progressively taken centre-stage: insurgency and counter-insurgency.

The current conflict in Afghanistan is clearly of this kind. Though it may appear to be a struggle between two unequal powers, one clearly equipped with greater military might, insurgents have proven to be resilient. In fact they are rapidly gaining ground, especially in the volatile regions of the south, and increasingly in the rest of the country.

In response to the growing insurgency in Afghanistan, the international community has been engaged in a fierce counter-insurgency which has so far worsened, rather than muted, the violence in the south.



The Afghan National Army (ANA) marching on a road

A. Insurgency: a struggle between weak and strong

As old as warfare, insurgency and insurgency tactics have existed and evolved, like war, through the years. Though the manner in which an insurgency is carried out may vary, insurgency is essentially an armed struggle against an established regime by a single or multiple groups unable to attain their political objectives through more conventional means.¹

Because insurgent forces are unequal in military might to those of the established authority, insurgencies are characterised by the use of asymmetrical warfare as a central tool in the overall strategy to undermine and, ultimately, overthrow the established authority. As insurgents have the single disadvantage of being physically weaker than the regime's military forces, it is in their interest to maximise what strengths they do possess and to take advantage of their opponents' weaknesses. In such a way, insurgencies are characterised by; acts of sabotage, rioting, kidnapping, hostage-taking, and attacks on military targets, such as convoys, through remotely-controlled explosives, suicide bombings, shootings and hijackings.

Such asymmetrical warfare tactics aim to destabilise and weaken the government's position as a competent leader and damage its reputation in the eyes of the general population. Though physical attacks on the established regime are central to any insurgency, the defining battle is played out in the hearts and minds of the population as a whole: **insurgencies are wars of perception.**



*Angry, bored and hungry?
A pool of possible recruits for insurgency in
southern Afghanistan.*

A.1. Types of insurgency

"Classical" insurgencies have been identified to be of two natures, and are often a mixture of both "national" and "liberation" insurgencies.² "National" insurgencies oppose insurgents against the national government due to perceived differences of ideology, ethnicity, economic class and other such political issues traditionally addressed within the national political realm.

¹ Metz, S. and Millen, R. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response", Strategic Studies Institute (November 2004)

² Ibid.

“Liberation” insurgencies, on the other hand, target those perceived as occupiers. This was often the case with “classic” insurgencies of the 20th century, as seen in Vietnam and Malaya, for example.

A.2. The local population: backbone of insurgency

Insurgencies will run for as long as there is discontent among the general population which can be tapped and exploited by insurgents for recruits. **As a rule, an insurgency-prone political climate is characterised by low levels of human security for the general population and high rates of economic insecurity. These conditions breed large numbers of unemployed, bored, angry young men who lack purpose – ideal recruits for insurgent groups who seek to fill their lives with meaning and adventure.** Recruitment campaigns are a reflection of Psychological Operations, a central tenet of an effective insurgency.

“Initially, the people were tired of the Taliban government, and welcomed the new government, but with time they become fed up with the corruption of the current government; Pakistan is manipulating such thwarted people, whereas the foreign troops are not actively fighting anymore.”

Farmer
Bolan, 25 January 2007



Afghan men and boys in Lashkar Gah City

Similarly, the support of the population – in the form of funding, intelligence and sanctuary – is the result of an effective Hearts and Minds campaign and of crucial importance to the insurgents who have delivered it.³ Without this backing from the general population, even a well-planned and generously funded insurrection will literally have nowhere to go, take root or develop.

“If the great mass of population knows it will be protected by a strong, just government, it has no reason to cooperate with the guerrillas, and the system of intelligence and supply that sustains all guerrilla movements breaks down. Without popular support the mopping up of the hard-core die-hards is fairly easy.”

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Wilkins, US Army ⁴

Not only can the population provide vital sanctuary and cover for insurgents, they can assist in maintaining the insurgency by encouraging younger generations to join the movement, effectively reproducing and perpetuating the popular support fundamental to the survival of the insurgency.

“At the operational level counter-insurgency remains a competition among several sides, each seeking to mobilise the population in its cause. The people remain the prize.”

David Kilcullen

Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
The State Department, Washington DC

A.3. Mao, the father of classical 20th century insurgency

Although insurgency tactics, in terms of asymmetrical warfare, have existed for centuries, modern-day theories on insurgency have been largely shaped by the tactics extrapolated by classic insurgency theorists such as Mao Zedong, T.E. Lawrence, Vo Nguyen Giap and Che Guevara.



“Let us follow closely Chairman Mao in the storm!”

³ For an extensive analysis on the history, concepts and current application of Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan, see Senlis Afghanistan, *An Assessment of the Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan*: Zroona aw Zehoona, Autumn 2006

⁴ Frederick Wilkins, “Guerrilla Warfare”, in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961*, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962

positional warfare in the Chinese People's Army's ultimate victory over Chiang Kai-shek. The three-phased 'People's War', or a 'protracted people's war', was successfully duplicated later in Vietnam by the Viet Cong. The first two phases consisted of political organisation and guerrilla warfare tactics, and the third was based around conventional warfare to be carried out once the regime's own military strength had been sufficiently diminished through the preceding asymmetrical warfare tactics.⁵

Gaining the support of the general population, especially in rural areas, was fundamental to the success of the People's War. This was accomplished by establishing revolutionary base areas in remote parts of the land which gradually spread into and connected with other revolutionary base areas – a strategy that was particularly effective in surrounding urbanised areas where support may have been more difficult to capture. Introducing land reform in those rural areas in which it enjoyed popular backing allowed the Maoists to ensure long-lasting support from the population and assured its consequent position as the effective and perceived authority in the country-side before reaching out to urban populations.



*Chairman Mao leading the People to victory*⁶

It was of utmost importance that the support gained from the population was not coerced from, but rather willingly given to the Maoist insurgents. Achieved through 'armed propaganda', methods utilised included encouraging the close identification with the people whose support they were trying to gain by collaborating in farm work, for example, and familiarising the population with the insurgents' weapons. Any violent actions from the established authority against the Maoists thus played out in favour of the insurgents: the local population would perceive the regime's actions as excessive and would feel increasingly isolated from it, effectively bringing the population closer to the insurgents.⁷

⁵ Metz and Millen

⁶ Artist unknown

⁷ Ibid.

"I think there will always be some fighting in remote villages, because it is impossible to secure rural areas."

Bazaar worker
Lashkar Gah refugee camp, 27 January 2007



Afghanistan's defence against the current insurgency: an Afghan National Army outpost in southern Afghanistan

Needless to say, support from the population was essential in providing the insurgents with sanctuary, food, supplies and funding for the movement to develop and strengthen itself enough to emerge victorious over the Kuomintang in 1949.

Mao's People's War also made strategic use of the Japanese occupation of China. The Maoists presented their movement as one of liberation, effectively exploiting the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment of the time, launching a national insurgency based on ideology, the Japanese presence and the Chinese government's apparent collaboration with the colonial power.

Perhaps the key strength of Mao Zedong's insurgency through People's War was the insurgent's ability to exploit both the political and psychological elements of the time to their advantage.

This proved to be such an effective method that the People's War model was adapted, to varying degrees of success, in other insurgent struggles, notably Vietnam, Northern Ireland, Peru and Nepal.

B. Counter-insurgency

As its name suggests, counter-insurgency, or COIN, is a reactive strategy by the established regime to quell an insurgency, and therefore its methods and strategies are dependent on the nature of the insurgency itself. Counter-insurgency is thus a fluid strategy which will, or should, adapt according to the insurgency it is addressing.

Counter-insurgency is a mix of offensive, defensive and stabilisation operations conducted along multiple lines of operations, normally as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as propaganda, Psychological Operations (Psy-Ops) and assassinations. A successful counter-insurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive and well-informed force and demands considerable expenditures of time and resources. An effective counter-insurgency campaign must itself integrate unconventional warfare into its tactics to fight the insurgency.

“Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all elements of national power - diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial, and military - to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable national government that can secure itself against internal and external threats.”

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, military assistant to
the US Deputy Secretary of Defense⁸



American infantry troops move to assault a Viet Cong position (1966)⁹

⁸ Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, the University of Chicago Press, 2005 (first published 2002)

⁹ US National Archives & Records Administration

Political power, and who is *thought* to hold political power by the general population, is central to the insurgency. Counter-insurgency, thus, involves controlled application of national power in political, information, economic, social, military and diplomatic fields.

B.1. Classical counter-insurgency theory

The term 'classical counter-insurgency' describes the theory of counter-revolutionary warfare developed in the 1960s in response to the wars of national liberation which took place during the second half of the 20th century. Prominent theorists include David Galula, Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson and Bernard Fall. While these theorists are still influential, many aspects of their 'classic' version of counter-insurgency are less relevant for current conflicts.¹⁰ Indeed counter-insurgency strategies were shaped in response to Mao-type organisation, tactics and objectives.

- As insurgency often stemmed from revolutionary and separatist movements seeking to gain control of the state, counter-insurgency had to confront a guerrilla force which was already organised as a counter-government, aiming to replace the "occupying" government.
- While insurgents from various national liberation movements copied and inspired each other, counter-insurgency was envisaged strictly within a national framework.
- As insurgencies were popular uprisings that were organised through existing social networks, the operational aspect of counter-insurgency consisted in isolating the enemy from its popular base.
- **Counter-insurgency treated sanctuaries as primarily physical, and more specifically rural, spaces in which insurgents would regroup or receive external support.**

¹⁰ Kilcullen, David, *Counterinsurgency Redux* International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

A Thousand Words: the power of imagery in insurgent struggles

General Nguyen Ngoc Loan Executing a Viet Cong Prisoner in Saigon (1968)¹¹

On 1 February 1968, South Vietnamese National Police Chief General Nguyen Ngoc Loan was photographed by Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams executing Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Van Lem in Saigon.

The image became an anti-war icon and came to symbolise the cruelty of war, causing substantial controversy in the US. It was described later by General Westmoreland as “a psychological blow against the South Vietnamese.”¹²

Although Lem had been captured and identified as captain of a Viet Cong assassination and revenge platoon who had previously taken part in numerous killings, General Loan and his family were publicly persecuted for the rest of his life.

¹¹ Adams, Eddie, Associated Press (1968)

¹² Quoted in Seib, Philip (1997). *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*.

Counter-insurgency in the 20th century: two examples

Failed counter-insurgency in Indochina

In Vietnam, the Communists waged a classic, peasant-based, centrally directed, three-stage, Maoist model insurgency, culminating in a conventional military victory. The US Army placed little stress on aspects of counterinsurgency. By the time the United States did develop an organisation to synchronize the military, political, and psychological dimensions of the struggle, the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) programme, it was too late. Even though the Viet Cong were militarily crushed in the 1968 Tet Offensive the shift of power away from the regime was irreversible and carried on by the other elements of the insurgent alliance in the North Vietnamese Army.

Successful counter-insurgency in Malaya

Military strategists frequently consider the successful British counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya, begun in the late 1940s, the model to replicate. Military operations were low-key and limited, undertaken with specific, narrow objectives and not used to intimidate insurgents or their potential supporters. **In Malaya, the British also found that carrots—political and economic development—were more important tools of counter-insurgency than sticks.** These lessons were applied toward the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and had local success, but by then, it was too late to shift the course of the conflict.¹³



Waiting to cross the Pahang River at the Jerantut Ferry point, Malaya, 1949

¹³ Metz and Millen

C. The mutating nature of 21st century insurgency

In the context of globalisation and of the revival of Islamist ideology, the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate how the characteristics of insurgency have significantly evolved in the 21st century.

C.1. From Marxism to Islamism

The content of insurgent ideology has shifted from Marxism to Islamism. This entails a number of strategic changes. First, Islamist insurgents may not seek to achieve practical objectives but rather to fulfil what they consider to be their religious call. As far as strategic objectives are concerned, while some Islamist groups still aspire at instituting an alternative “Islamic state”, which requires the military seizure of the state, most insurgent movements only seek to undermine and harass the government and get rid of foreign presence. Second, religious figures are frequently the motors of political mobilization. Third, as Islamism draws on Islamic concepts of martyrdom and promises of rewards in the after-life, suicide attacks have increased as an insurgent tactic. More generally, the ideologies behind 21st century insurgencies are often the expression of resentment towards the US, seen as the leader and main beneficiary of what is perceived as an unjust and unbalanced process of globalisation.



The heroes of the past: a Taliban graveyard in Kandahar

C.2. Global media and “virtual sanctuary”

Globalisation itself has profoundly transformed the face of insurgency in the last couple of decades. Consequences of the internet revolution include the existence of a global audience, and a rapid means for insurgents to publicize their cause and attract support, creating a “strategic hinterland or ‘virtual sanctuary’ for insurgents”.¹⁴ The internet has proved powerful for insurgents when fund raising and gathering support: the internet can reach not only a local audience, but a global one. Insurgents can post videos of kidnappings and killings almost instantaneously, and international news networks air images of fighting in real time. In terms of psychological support this relatively free publicity is of great consequence – with increased media attention and an immediate audience comes greater exposure, a greater number of possible donors and a larger support network.



*The insurgency will be televised:
French war correspondent Florence Aubenas
pleads for help during her kidnapping in Iraq*

“A problem is that the government doesn’t know and can’t control who is Afghan and who is Pakistani, who is good and who is bad.”

Telecom company manager
Kandahar, 23 January 2007

Because of this global-media factor, a small-scale tactical attack can achieve a powerful strategic impact. Therefore, on the operational field, more diffuse and autonomous cells tend to replace formally organised Maoist-type organisations. Indeed, such formations are more adapted to the strategies of exhaustion and provocation that are characteristic of 21st century insurgency. The mark of globalisation is also apparent in the trans-national character of modern insurgency. Direct cooperation between movements is illustrated by Al Qaeda’s multi-national presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.

C.3. Changing tactics

On a technical level, explosives that were first used in Chechnya rapidly proliferate in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, use of the suicide bomb as a weapon of choice is increasing significantly, even in places where such war tactics had previously not existed. This can be attributed to the increased exposure, through globalised media networks, to other insurgent groups which have traditionally used the suicide bomb.

¹⁴ Kilcullen



The remains of a suicide bomber, minutes after his detonation at the gate of an international NGO in Lashkar Gah City, 26 January 2007. Although this suicide bomb wounded only one Afghan guard, the Taliban quickly claimed that eight Americans were killed in the attack. There were 139 suicide bombings in Afghanistan in 2006.

"When a suicide bomber blows himself up, the soldiers become crazy and they fire at the crowd, killing innocent people."

Public calling office clerk
Kandahar, 23 January 2007

D. Official US counter-insurgency strategy – military operations standard

In 1960, the US Army published a Special Forces manual entitled *Counter-Insurgency Operations*. The term was used by the US Army during the Vietnam War, and the accompanying counter-insurgency manual distributed to American military personnel had, until recently, not been updated.

The turning point in the US strategy in Iraq and the arrival of Secretary Robert Gates at the US Department of Defense signaled the response to increasingly urgent criticism over the US war strategy. As part of that response the Pentagon recently released *Counterinsurgency Field Manual No. 3-24*¹⁵, designed to fill a doctrinal gap and to update this outdated 1960 publication.



D.1. A new approach to counter-insurgency?

The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* provides an overview of insurgency and counter-insurgency characteristics, histories and challenges, emphasising possible successful strategies for US counter-insurgency (COIN) both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based both on the history of US and allied counter-insurgency operations (Vietnam, Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Colombia) and an evaluation of current trends, the *Manual* represents the state of the art of the US debate on counter-insurgency and concludes that in order to be successful a counter-insurgency strategy should:

- **Better integrate development and security concerns;**
- **Mainstream social, political and economic concerns in the overall military strategy;**
- “Learn and Adapt” as much as the insurgency to be successful on the ground; and
- Develop strategies locally and implement strategies in coordination with local stakeholders.

¹⁵ Available online at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>

¹⁶ US Army, Defense Department

The *Manual* raises important issues, but unfortunately there is no evidence that this is translating into concrete actions to overturn the outcome of two of the most significant wars of the new millennium: Iraq and Afghanistan. Stakes in these conflicts are high. The US with all its military might is increasingly regarded by its critics and enemies as a 'paper tiger', incapable of winning against informal yet global insurgency campaigns, and fundamentally unable, both in political and military terms, to face the challenges of contemporary warfare.

Definitions according to the *Counter-Insurgency Field Manual*

Insurgency is an organised, protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken control of an established government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgency control.

Counter-insurgency is a set of military, paramilitary, political, **economic**, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

The definition the *Manual* gives of insurgency and counter-insurgency focuses on the struggle for political power and legitimacy: the campaign to win Hearts and Minds is central to both insurgents and counter-insurgents.

But gaining and maintaining the population's support is a formidable challenge. In order to be successful, a counter-insurgency strategy should first address the security of the people.

A successful counter-insurgency, according to the *Counter-Insurgency Field Manual*, should:

- Emphasise intelligence
- **Focus on the population, its needs and security**
- Establish and expand secure areas
- Isolate insurgents from the populace
- Conduct effective and continuous information operations
- Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support new government
- Provide Host Nation Police with military support and training
- Expand police force
- Train military forces
- Embed Quality Advisors
- Deny sanctuary to insurgents
- Encourage strong political and military cooperation
- Secure borders
- Protect infrastructure



Former warlord, now Police chief of Zari Dasht

As another condition of success, the *Manual* insists on full integration with civilian and military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The planning, carrying out, allocation of personnel, funds and projects should be commonly developed. The *Manual* recommends “Unity of command, Unity of effort, Overall coordination and liaison” with various civil agencies. **The point is for the military to understand its own limits and to act in support of political objectives.**

“Neither military nor civilian agencies can act effectively alone in managing modern conflicts. Joint civil-military efforts are needed, and those efforts must be deliberately planned from the outset of an operation; they cannot be added on as afterthoughts when all else has failed.”

James V. Arbuckle, Member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson
Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre¹⁷

This integration can be a great asset in intelligence gathering, analysis and mainstreaming, which are emphasised as of utmost importance. There is a dire need for grasping the operational environment, devoting as much effort to understanding the population supported as there is to understanding the enemy and the root causes of the insurgency.

¹⁷ James V. Arbuckle, *Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No Job for a soldier?*, Routledge, 2006

D. 2. A flexible strategy and an adaptable execution

But, according to the *Manual*, the most important aspect of countering an insurgency may very well be the appropriate design of the counter-insurgency strategy. Design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process. It should reflect ongoing learning and adaptation and the growing appreciation counter-insurgents share for the environment and all actors within it, especially the insurgents, populace, and host nation. Design should reflect a comprehensive strategy, involve local stakeholders and be based on the ‘Learn and Adapt’ principle, enabling a continuous cycle of design-learn-redesign to achieve victory over the insurgency.

Having properly designed the operation, its execution remains a challenge. The two sides of the same whole cannot really be separated – the counter-insurgents’ view of the environment and how they define success is vital to the execution, as well as the specific design of the strategy; the latter has to be based on a holistic treatment of the environment and remain focused on the commander’s intent and goals.



A crater in the road outside of Kandahar City caused by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

It is worth keeping in mind that the aim of a successful counter-insurgency effort is to establish host nation institutions that can sustain government legitimacy. Thus, developing effective Host Nation security forces — including military, police, and paramilitary forces — ought to be one of the counter-insurgency’s highest priorities.

“The foreign soldiers don’t fight face to face because they are too scared of the Taliban. However, they should fight face to face and not send in the aircraft bombers, because doing so they kill civilians.”

Public writer
Kandahar, 23 January 2007

Of course, all these objectives should be supervised by proper ethical standards and the concern with sustainability of the military efforts. Ethical standards are important to counter-insurgency efforts in order not to undermine its core characteristic - popular support in the host nation. Senior leaders must model and transmit to their subordinates the appropriate respect for professional standards of self-discipline and adherence to ethical values.

D.3. Logistical considerations

Logistic activities are an integral part of counter-insurgency operations. These activities take the traditional form of support to combat and security forces, as well as the unconventional form of providing essential and timely support to many security and stability-enhancing activities that may seem purely civil in character. Initially, uniformed military logistic providers may have to provide this support. However, counter-insurgency logistic objectives should include encouraging and promoting transition of services to host nation providers as soon as security conditions make this feasible.

D.4. Critical Issues

Despite recognising some important elements of successful counter-insurgency the *Manual* does not do well on elements that have been identified by others as key assets in the struggle against insurgents.

“The only way to stop the insurgency would be through sound economics and internal politics. The main focus should be on developing the economy. People will only live in peace when Afghanistan will have a proper education system and an industry to employ its people.”

Taylor
Kandahar City



The remains of ANP car burnt out after an attack of the Taliban

In the Afghan context, the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* fails to identify or emphasise adequately the following issues.

- **Development** The economic and social roots of the insurgency are not acknowledged adequately; more emphasis on poverty relief, job creation, and long-term economic development has to be present at all levels in the strategy. The *Manual* does not acknowledge the level of extreme poverty that often plagues local populations.
- **Unbalanced approach between destruction and reconstruction** Aggressive policies of “might” still outweigh the need to rebuild both in the theory and practice of US military strategy.
- **“Learn and Adapt” to local understanding needs to be more emphasized** Despite much talk, a true understanding and respect of local culture, local stakeholders and customs is underplayed. Without proper knowledge and respect of local tradition no counter-insurgency can be truly successful. A proper ethical approach should be fully rooted in the understanding of local customs and perceptions.
- **Design, integration and sustainability efforts ought to be emphasized at the level of the host nation as well in order to be truly successful** For the moment, these priorities only involve the intervening forces and do not engage adequately with local stakeholders, whose consent and participation appear to be so vital to the counter-insurgency operation. Moreover, the design phase either remains mainly on paper or is too focused on the process, risking delay or deferment to bureaucratic red tape.



The dry land of Pashmul, Panjwai district, Kandahar province



Current counter-narcotics policies predominantly focus on poppy crop eradication. This truck is part of the convoy of the poppy crop eradication forces of Afghanistan, led by the private military organisation DynCorp. The convoy was protected by two military helicopters. (29 January 2007)

However the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* does mark an increasing awareness in the US of the need to shift priorities from occupation to nation building.

But the hiatus between words and acts is strikingly wide, between recommended and enforced policies. In Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, many of the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* imperatives are far from being considered as policy tools. In particular, the recognition of the limits of military power deeply contrasts with the over-militarisation of counter-insurgency operations on the ground. Despite many references to agility and flexibility, US counter-insurgency policy remains much the same – often dogmatic and biased, especially in the counter-narcotics domain. If there is recognition of the relevance of narcotics as a source of revenue for insurgents the manual falls short of acknowledging the deep interconnections between narcotics and insurgency and insists on an artificial separation between criminal and security concerns.

Afghanistan is an obvious term of reference for the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* but there is no direct engagement with Afghanistan's specific insurgency patterns, development needs and issues, in particular counter-narcotics strategy. Here the *Manual* shows its inherent limit: it comes up with broad, general theories that have to be tailored to each local context. Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan differ substantially; they have different roots, consequences and solutions. The counter-insurgency strategies therefore must necessarily differ and be adapted to local conditions. The very principle of this *Manual* underlines the top down approach of US military strategies, an approach that the paper itself comes close to condemning as failing.

The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* provides interesting insights into the current US debate on insurgency and counter-insurgency. It raises important issues and hints towards innovative solutions. These theoretical promises, however, do not develop into more critical stances regarding economic development, local needs and counter-narcotics strategy.

Part II

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency Practice in Afghanistan: Losing the People



A. Afghanistan: Insurgency realities and Counter-Isurgency fantasies

A.1. A recent history of insurgency in Afghanistan

Although the current insurgency in Afghanistan is being carried out by a group described as the Taliban, this has come to loosely mean all anti-government groups which operate somewhat independently of each other, but which continue to be referred to as the Taliban. Today's Taliban can be distinguished from two other groups, with whom they formed a formal or informal alliance. The first group, Al Qaeda, was the main target of Operation Enduring Freedom but has substantially suffered after the removal of the Taliban regime in 2001. The second group is formed by several factions, both political and military, enjoying local support and answering to local warlords. However, neither Al Qaeda nor the political and military factions play a significant role in the current insurgency, and their impact is limited.



Ambulance donated by Pakistan. Flag scratched out.

Current insurgents are Afghan and Pakistani nationals from southern Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan, and are no longer the Arab fighters US-led troops were initially fighting in the Tora Bora caves. Anti-government elements are entrenched in local society, especially in the southern and eastern provinces, the traditional homeland of the Pashtun tribes. Though there is increasing hard evidence that Pakistan is indeed involved in feeding the insurgency, the situation has its complex roots in what is the Durand Line, the

frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This frontier was never accepted by Afghanistan, and neither does it have social or ethnic relevance, as it severs the traditional territories of each of the Afghan Baloch and Pashtun tribes. Afghans have, throughout history, sought sanctuary in this remote tribal area. The particular history of this region explains the fact that, although a significant number of Taliban actually come from Pakistan, recruited from the extensive network of madrassas in Baluchistan, they are Afghan refugees or regular Afghan men recruited in Afghanistan.

More generally, anti-government elements have been recruited from the growing number of discontent, jobless locals who are increasingly fighting alongside the Taliban even though they may not share their fundamentalist values and principles.

Who are the Taliban?

The name 'Taliban' (students) refers to the religious scholars who led the strict Islamist movement that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 and 2001. The Taliban can be described as a semi-spontaneous movement lacking deep ideological roots, whose political purposes derived from a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran. Although small in number at first, the Taliban succeeded in building alliances with local warlords and progressively acquired power. However, although the number of alleged Taliban increased, not all shared the original hyper-conservative beliefs.

A significant number of the original Taliban militants were killed during Operation Enduring Freedom's initial phases, and the Taliban defeat was guaranteed by the defection of the many warlords to the US-sponsored Northern Alliance. Since late 2001, the remnants of the Taliban have been based mainly in Pakistan, and have been supported by a loose coalition comprising Afghans loyal to the former Taliban regime, disenchanted and nationalist Pashtuns, religious conservatives, criminal gangs, opium traffickers, and a new generation of Pakistan and Afghan scholars educated in the madrassas along the Pakistani-Afghan border.

The two insurgencies

The current Taliban insurgency should in fact be understood as two different types of insurgency: one driven by political and religious concerns, another by economic incentives and grievances.


The fundamentalist insurgency

The **first** group consists of the core Taliban leaders and their followers, connected to the old Taliban regime with their links to Al Qaeda and the global Jihad movement, fed by new fighters trained and indoctrinated in Pakistan. This insurgent group shares a common faith in an extreme interpretation of Islam. The cohesion of this Taliban group, and their local support, is based on a common dislike of political leaders such as the warlords of the 1990s, or the current internationally-backed Karzai government. However, the tactics employed by this insurgency differ from those of the Taliban regime in the 1990s. The current group has adopted high-impact terrorist tactics and has indiscriminately targeted civilians, rather than specific groups of people like the teachers, criminals and Hazara people targeted by the Taliban.

The 'grassroots' insurgency

The **second** group currently operating in Afghanistan is significantly larger than the former group. It is a more 'grassroots', opportunistic insurgency, driven not by political or religious concerns but mainly by economic incentives and by grievances held against the government and the international community. As a disparate assemblage of several different groups, this second insurgent movement has no clear political purpose and lacks the fundamentalist nature of its counterpart. However, the strength of the current offensive this group is able to carry out against NATO-ISAF troops indicates an increase in coordination and military preparation between the different factions of this insurgency. Structural unemployment and extreme poverty provide an ideal recruiting ground for this insurgency.

Field research indicates that together, these two insurgent groups expose a *proxy war* dynamic, especially given the well-funded, highly organised and technologically sophisticated nature of parts of the struggle. Apart from these advantages, both the grassroots and fundamentalist insurgency rely on a constant flow of new fighters: Poverty and unemployment in the case of the 'grassroots' insurgency, and madrassa-bred religious extremism in the case of the fundamentalist group. Research shows that the 'grassroots' insurgency driven by economic concerns and grievances significantly overshadows the political and religious insurgency.



*Support for Hezbollah on the walls of
Kandahar City*

The current insurgency in Afghanistan is difficult to define in terms characteristic of classic insurgency theory. For example, the Afghan insurgency could be defined as one of 'liberation'. However, as the insurgents consider the central government as complicit – if not a puppet – of the foreign occupiers, the Karzai administration and all related institutions, though Afghan, are also targeted. Some have identified the current insurgency in Afghanistan, as well as the Iraqi insurgency, as one of 'resistance.'

In fact, the current insurgency is closely linked to the status of the Karzai government as perceived by the general Afghan population. Although officially hailed as an independent, democratic, sovereign state, the reality to which Afghans are exposed every day point to a rather different reality. The international community in Afghanistan is in the country through official invitation from the central government, yet enjoys a disproportionate amount of decision-making power in all policy issues, from the way the counter-insurgency is carried out – who gets bombed? – to what counter-narcotic strategies are used – who gets eradicated?

It has been shown in the past that little heed is taken by the international community to the demands of the central government. In one particular case, President Karzai publicly condemned the number of innocent civilians being killed by bombing campaigns carried out by international forces, but nothing aerial attacks continued and civilians have continued to die in large numbers.

The armed actors of Afghanistan

			
Coalition soldier	Afghan soldier	Afghan policeman	Civilian
NATO-led ISAF, consisting of about 32,000 personnel from 37 nations, has a mandate to help build peace, while Operation Enduring Freedom troops are waging “war on terror”.	The Afghan National Army has been trained by the coalition forces. The Army now counts around 36,000 soldiers, while another 4,000 is currently in training.	The Afghan National Police currently number around 50,000. Police officers have in majority been trained by the US and Germany.	Many civilians have their own weapon –in most cases the usual AK-47– to defend themselves.
			
International private military	Afghan private military	Local militia	Taliban Fighter
Foreign NGOs and other organisations often hire security guards from abroad. Most of these guards are ex-soldiers familiar with guerrilla warfare.	Persistent insecurity has created a widespread need for private protection. Afghan security guards often are former mujahideen.	Local commanders, whether they occupy an official position or not, rely on their private forces. Loyalty to local commanders often prevails on one’s own political views.	Taliban fighters, be they local or from foreign origin, do not have a recognisable distinct uniform and are thus uneasy to distinguish from the local population.

Prices of weapons in Kandahar and Helmand ¹ provinces on January 29, 2007		
Type of weapon (or ammunitions)	September 2006 average prices (USD)	Current average prices (USD)
Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher	\$666	\$1,250
Kalakov (AK74)	N/A	\$1,833
Kalashnikov (AK47)	\$363	\$380
Hard rocket and rounds	\$1,600	\$2,167
TT Pistol (Tokarev)	\$477	\$333
Makarov Pistol	\$625	\$583
Hand grenade	N/A	\$17
Hawan (mortar)	\$40	\$1,000
Single 7.62 round	\$0.32	\$1
Single 5.45 round	\$0.30	\$0.90

Gun shops in Kandahar in and Helmand provinces have been closed down by the government in recent months. As a result, gun prices have largely gone up and more guns are sold on the black market. Only hunting rifles can still be openly bought in shops. The price of ammunition has soared, with bullets costing up to USD1 a piece.



¹ Provincial government in the Helmand province recently banned weapons shops. Thus weapons for the Helmand province are either purchased in the neighbouring Kandahar province, or on the illegal market.

How could Afghanistan's regime be described?	Afghan Reality
Puppet State	<p>The expression "puppet government" or "puppet regime" is used to describe –and in most cases, to deny legitimacy to– a state in which the official government is seen as being de facto controlled by a more or less obvious external element. A "puppet government" is characteristically appointed by an external authority that permanently directs its affairs.</p> <p>In Afghanistan, the entire government system is funded and assisted by foreign governments. For example, staff and minister receive regular media training funded by foreign governments. To a large degree the Ministry for Counter Narcotics depends on the government of the UK. In turn, the US funds and assists the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, policies coming out of these ministries will always be in line with US and UK ideals, objectives and demands. The widely held perception in Afghanistan is that this leaves little room for an independent policy formulation and implementation by the Afghan government itself.</p>
Semi-Colonial State	<p>The expression "semi-colonial regime" was first applied by Marxist theory to countries seen as dependent and dominated by another imperialist country. A semi-colonial state may or may not have been a formal colony; it is a state that has formal independence and sovereignty, but in which the government's policies are serving the exclusive interests of a foreign power and of the ruling class it appointed. Thus the economy of a semi-colonial state tends to be underdeveloped and subordinated to the dominant power's economy.</p> <p>Afghanistan is "formally" independent and sovereign. The international community has helped the country organize its democratically elections, government institutions and draft its current laws and its Constitution. Democracy exists in theory, but in practice, the Afghan people have little or no knowledge about or experience of how their new government and parliament function to improve their lives and country.</p>
Fragile State	<p>A fragile state is a state in which the institutional system is particularly vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional arrangements. Whereas in a "stable state", contestation remains within the boundaries of the reigning institutional system, in a "fragile state", –typically dysfunctional– essential institutions</p> <p>Government institutions have been developed, but have no real influence and power in many of Afghanistan's districts. In many areas of Afghanistan, former warlords, commanders and other power holders determine what happens and rule the land. Traditional authorities, religious leaders and spontaneously risen regional centres of powers compete with</p>

	are likely to be contested and challenged by alternative institutional systems, be they promoted by traditional authorities, violent factions or popular movements. Thus a fragile state often appears as being on the brink of crisis.	the central government for power.
Crisis State	A “crisis state” is a state facing a situation that puts its own existence as a state at risk. The “crisis” possible outcomes are recovery of the state from the crisis, a lasting crisis, or the collapse of the state, in turn leading to war and chaos and/or to the formation of new states. A crisis state is opposed to a “resilient state” that is, a state able to cope with internal crisis so that they do not endanger its own existence.	Afghanistan is currently far from being a stable country – especially in the southern region, where insurgent groups still wield considerable power and exercise psychological control and in some areas informal control over the people. Government institutions are weak, corruption is rife and there is structural unemployment and extreme poverty in many parts of the country.
Failed State	A “failed state” is a weak state which government has partial control over its territory and borders, and can no longer perform its basic security and economic functions. A “Failed States Index”, ranking countries according to 12 determining factors, is published every year in the US journal Foreign Policy.	Afghanistan is ranked the 10th most failed state in the world for the year 2006, up one notch from year 2005. The description of “failed state” seems to fit the current situation in Afghanistan best. It is interesting to note that Afghanistan’s neighbouring Pakistan is ranked 9th.

“The government is really good, but it doesn’t have a free hand. It has to do what the foreigners tell it to do.”

Owner of a mobile phone retail store, 23,
Kandahar City

B. The Afghan perception of the current insurgency

This chapter, based on field research and interviews conducted in the month of January 2007, examines the perception of Afghan people in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

B.1. Methodology

The findings of this section are based on two different research methods: Sampling questionnaires and in-depth epistemological conversations. During three weeks, field research teams applied these two methods with Afghans from all walks of life in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Many interviews and conversations were video-taped. More than 200 interviews were conducted by questionnaire. Another 200 interviews were conducted less formally. In most cases, the questions asked were open-ended to invite the interviewee to express their opinion on the current situation in southern Afghanistan.

B.2. General perceptions

B.2.1. The Taliban



Taliban fighter in the province of Kandahar

When it comes to insurgency, the interviewees still talk about the Taliban. Many interviewees acknowledge the fact that there are currently two different “Taliban” movements. One – in this report called the “grassroots” insurgency – is less ideologically and politically driven and more seen as an opportunistic group of fighters. These Taliban soldiers fight for money or because of grievances they hold against the “foreigners” or the government. The other “Taliban” insurgency is associated with the new fighters coming from or paid by Pakistan.

In this sense, the Taliban is often thought of to be a façade for a new Pakistani-driven movement to destabilize the country or seen in the light of the fundamentalist movement associated with Al Qaeda and the Jihad.

“Pakistan is sending people under the name of “Taliban” to fight in Afghanistan. However, these fighters aren’t really “Taliban”.”

Owner of a mobile phone retail store
Kandahar City, 19 January 2007

B.2.2. The Karzai government in Kabul

Although questions were asked about the Karzai government in Kabul, many interviewees do either not know what this means or have no idea what the government is currently doing against the insurgency. Most people only see two concrete examples of what the government does against the Taliban: the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army fighting the insurgents in the South. For the rest, the political reality of Kabul is for most people to difficult to grasp or simply to far a way to be of any influence in the daily lives of many Afghans in Kandahar and Helmand. The government is mostly associated with the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army. This is logical as those security forces are the most visible elements of the central and provincial government in the lives of ordinary Afghans.

The first 3-5 months of 2007 are absolutely crucial to the entire Afghan effort as the mission has been defined – that is, in bringing security to the southern provinces. The rest of Afghanistan is, of course relatively stable, but if the situation in the south isn't changed dramatically, then we may reach a tipping point where a military solution to the Taliban problem will not be achievable. It might already be too late.²

Sean Kay, security expert and professor of International Relations
Ohio Wesleyan University

B.2.3. Foreign troops

Most Afghans interviewed cannot distinguish between different nationalities of foreign troops operating in Afghanistan. Sometimes the British were distinguished from the Americans, but in most cases, people just talk about the Americans or *Kharjian* (Pastho for foreigner).



Canadian troops in Kandahar Province (January 2007)

² Friel, Terry "Afghanistan faces crunch year, bloody offensive", Reuters, 4 February 2007

B.2.4 Foreigners and the international community

When Afghans in Helmand and Kandahar speak about the international community or foreigners in general, they normally refer to the United Nations or the “foreign countries” excluding the neighbouring countries that are seen as part of the problem.

B.3. Are Afghans aware of the current insurgency in Afghanistan?

Most people interviewed in the south of Afghanistan have either experienced fighting, bombing or have at least seen it from a distance while travelling or while living in the city. Especially the people living in the refugee camps in the province of Kandahar and Helmand have often escaped from the fighting or were forced to leave their villages because of bombardments or the Taliban. Many Afghans mention the effects of suicide bombs or improvised explosive devices (IED) which remain visible on the road or in the cities long after they have occurred. Insurgency is an ever-present reality in today's Afghanistan.

“I have witnessed the explosion of a roadside bomb (IED) on the nearby road five days ago. It didn't cause any civilian casualties but two foreign soldiers were injured or killed.”

Farmer

Naghan, Kandahar Province, 19 January 2007

B.4. Why is there an ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan?

While the northern half of the country is relatively calm and stable, all Afghans in the south are aware of the fact that there is ongoing fighting in southern Afghanistan. Afghans in the city have sometimes not experienced fighting, but a lot of people in the refugee camps have witnessed bombing in the past years. Other Afghans in the north have only heard about the insurgency and the fighting on the radio, on television or through other people.

B.4.1. Who are the insurgents?

In general, the Afghans think the Taliban is leading the current insurgency in Afghanistan. The current Taliban movement is seen as a force that is fighting the government forces and their foreign allies. However, they express different reasons for why the Taliban is currently fighting in Afghanistan.

B.4.2. Why are the Taliban currently fighting in Afghanistan?

Some people say the Taliban are fighting because they disagree with the policies of the current Karzai government. They often see the government as a puppet regime serving the interests of the foreigners or as a bunch of corrupt officials. It is often not specified who those foreigners are, but many times the interviewees refer to them as “Americans”. The Afghans who were interviewed generally do not distinguish between different nationalities.

Others say, the Taliban once again want to establish a government under Taliban rule. This is mainly presented as a struggle for power, whether in order to implement different policies in Afghanistan, or as a means to attain economic benefits and prestige associated with power. Some people stress that the aspiration to become part of the government usually is associated with an expectation of financial gains.



A third option often mentioned is that the core Taliban is fighting on religious grounds. There are two sides to this argument. The Taliban is either seen as fighting a “Holy War” against the foreign occupation by infidel states or as fighting the current Afghan government on the basis that this government is not perceived as being truly Islamic.

The effects of a suicide bomb in Kandahar City (December 2006)

Lastly – and most importantly – the Taliban is currently seen as a movement mostly driven by financial concerns and economic motives. As such, the movement is repeatedly described as using ideological and political rhetoric to conceal economic objectives.

B.4.3. Why are ordinary people joining the current insurgency?

In most cases, interviewees tend to think that the current insurgency is mainly fought by poor, uneducated people – be they Afghan or foreign. Extreme poverty, structural unemployment and the pressing need for a stable income to feed large families are constantly mentioned as the main reasons for people to join the insurgency. Money was quoted by 80 percent of the people interviewed as the single main motivation of insurgent fighters. People either cannot find a job in the current job market or do not make enough money in their current jobs. The Taliban normally pays a fighter between US\$ 200 and US\$ 600 a month, while a policeman or soldier in the Afghan National Army currently earns between US\$ 50 and US\$ 60 monthly – after a pay raise of 25 percent in January 2007. The large difference in income makes it relatively easy for the Taliban to recruit new fighters. The government cannot compete with such salaries given the current state of the national economy.

“Ordinary people have a strong economic incentive to fight for the Taliban rather than for the government, as the government pays 2,000 Afghanis (US\$ 40) a month, whereas the Taliban pays 30,000 Afghanis (US\$ 600) a month.”

Nurse
Marwais Hospital, Kandahar, January 2007



A street scene in Kandahar City

Even though the salary the Taliban is said to pay ranges from 10,000 and 30,000 Afghanis a month (between US\$ 200 and US\$ 600), this still indicates that Taliban fighters earn at least four times as much as regular Afghan soldiers and policemen. It is not clear from the interviews where the bulk of this money comes from, but the idea most people have is that all this money stems from Pakistan – not from the opium trade or other sources.

"The massive demand for work and money in Afghanistan is met by Pakistan's offer to recruit and pay local fighters."

Rickshaw driver
Kandahar City, 23 January 2007



Afghan National Police officer



Easy recruits for the Taliban: hundreds of adult men waiting for hours in line for food aid at an unofficial internal refugee camp in Kandahar City

A second important series of reasons concerns anger and revenge. For different reasons, many people join the Taliban because they feel they have been treated unfairly or have suffered from government action.

A third reason for joining the Taliban is fear. Many young Afghans suffer from the intimidation, blackmail or threats

by the Taliban. Even after the defeat of the Taliban late 2001, the movement still has the capacity to spread fear among the population, especially in the Pashtun areas in the South of Afghanistan.



Fear spread by the Taliban: burnt shops on the outskirts of Kandahar City on the way to Lashkar Gah.

Next to fear, the Taliban propaganda machine is still working at all cylinders. Almost daily, the television shows images of brave Taliban warriors showing their weapons and patrolling through villages or along roads. They also spread word among the population about other conflict of the West against Islam such as the Middle East conflict and the struggle of Hezbollah. This all adds up to a constant and growing psychological effect of the fundamentalist part of the current Taliban movement, spreading the message that a Holy War has to be fought against the West.



Private militia at Zari Dasht Camp, Helmand, January 2007

Surprisingly few people mention religious grounds as a reason to join the current insurgency. Some point at the old ideals of the Taliban regime during the 1990s as a reason why people would be willing to join the ranks of the current Taliban movement:

Iran usually is, like Pakistan, always trying to cause troubles in Afghanistan to take advantage of it, and is sending fighters to the Nimroz and Farah provinces, but obviously at the moment Iran has other priorities

School principal, Lashkar Gah
26 January 2007

The lack of religious motives to join the Taliban seems to provide evidence for the argument that only a few hardliners of the current Taliban movement can be associated with the religious beliefs of the former Taliban regime toppled in 2001. The rest of the members and fighters seem to be purely driven by economic motives: the Taliban is still a powerful employer able to provide jobs, together with a stable and competitive income, to many young people.

B.4.4. “The cow is black, the milk is white” – Who is behind the current insurgency?

Most Afghans interviewed think that Pakistan is behind much of the fighting in Afghanistan. They either say it is Pakistani money funding the current insurgency or express the view that Pakistan-trained fighters are sent to Afghanistan.

"The cow is black but the milk is white. Everyone knows that Pakistan is behind the insurgency. Pakistan is causing the trouble and supporting the fight, training and sending people to fight and to kill in Afghanistan."

School principal
Lashkar Gah, 26 January 2007



Border guard

The reason why Pakistan is mentioned as the main cause of the current insurgency is mainly based on three different pillars:

- 1) The Afghan media often blames Pakistan for the current insurgency;
- 2) The Afghan government officially accuses Pakistan of not doing enough to stem the flow of fighter to Afghanistan;
- 3) Pakistan is generally perceived by people in Kandahar and Helmand as a long-term enemy of Afghanistan, wanting to undermine the unity of Afghanistan or even destroy the country.

"The Taliban are fighting with support from Pakistan to obtain lucrative positions in the government and if possible seize power at a national level and re-establish a Taliab rule over the country."

Engineer
Lashkar Gah, 28 January 2007

The latter comes up most in the interviews with people from Kandahar and Helmand. Pakistan is seen as wanting to destroy Afghanistan, protect or regain disputed territory or increase its influence over the government in Kabul. Literally, Pakistan is accused of training people to fight in Afghanistan or to blow themselves up in the country:



The strategic importance of Kandahar: The huge Pakistani Consulate in Kandahar City

“The insurgency is the result of Pakistan’s policies. Pakistan is training people to fight or commit suicide by blowing themselves up in the name of a Jihad against foreigners, but there isn’t really a case for a Jihad. Besides, suicide bombing is a great sin according to the Koran. However, these groups are under the influence of the Wahhabi doctrine that sees suicide bombings as a legitimate means of fighting a Jihad.”

Mason

Kandahar City Refugee Camp, January 2007

Suicide bombing, martyrdom and Islam

Islam strictly rejects suicide for any reason, as well as murder. The most explicit sentence concerning suicide is Verse 4:29 of the Koran: "O you who believe! Do not consume your wealth in the wrong way, rather through trade mutually agreed to, and do not kill yourselves. Surely God is merciful toward you." The *Haddith* (Muhammad's sayings) further unambiguously prohibits suicide. A tiny minority of Muslim clerics and Islamist militant organisations such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas or Islamic Jihad argue that suicide operations are in the line with Islamic law, considering that the martyr does not act out of despair but out of his faith³. These organisations also insist on the specificity of the struggle against unfaithful occupiers. However, this is far from the mainstream opinion, both Sunni and Shia⁴, which holds that suicide attacks are strictly forbidden.



The result of the suicide bomb attack on an international NGO, Lashkar Gah City, 26 January 2007

Much actually relies on the term of '**martyr**'. Traditionally Muslims respect some famous martyrs, such as Sumayyah bint Khabbab, an old woman who was the first Muslim to die at the hands of the polytheists of Mecca; or for the Shia, Husayn bin Ali, who was murdered at Kerbala by the Umayyad power and whose death is commemorated each year at Ashura. However, martyrdom very seldom appears in the holy texts, and there is no encouragement to become a martyr.

The 'democratisation' of martyrdom, its current dissemination through the shape of suicide-bombing, **is a very recent phenomenon**. It is legitimised by the reference to the '*Jihad bis saif*' (struggle with the sword, holy war). Whilst the majority of official clerics argue that suicide-bombing is in any case against the spirit of Islam, particularly due to its stricture against murder and suicide, some others believe that it must be considered as an act of *Jihad bis saif*.

Jihad has two different meanings. The first meaning is called '*Jihad al Nafs*'. This is the 'struggle against oneself and one's own vices'. The second meaning of *Jihad* is the subject of

³ <http://web.archive.org/web/20041011230417/abdulhaqq.jeeran.com/ruling.html>

⁴ E.g. Ayatollah al-Udhma Yousof al-Sanei's fatwa against suicide bombing in January 2006.

considerable controversy. This is the meaning currently identified with the act of fighting to defend notions such as home, property, family and life against outsiders. This second meaning was previously related to the outdated defence and expansion of the Dar al Islam in the first period of the Islam (7th century AD).

Farhad Khosrokhavar recently explained⁵ how **the icon of the *shaheed* has been exploited by nationalist and Islamist movements since 1979 and turned into something to aspire to, linked more with social, educational, political and economic problems than with religion.** He distinguished between two 'profiles' of candidates to martyrdom: those pushed by a feeling of humiliation and a national cause further sacralised by Islam (Palestine, Chechnya...), and those pushed by a pan-Islamic, abstract ideology rooted both in a multicultural modernity and in the shock of globalisation against the 'threat' of being surrounded by occidental culture. In both cases however, **hatred leads to extremism and attempts to legitimise itself through Islam, and not vice versa.**

Suicide bombing is a very recent phenomenon in Afghanistan. Most Afghans say that this ideology was brought to Afghanistan by Arab extremists and is still carried out not by Afghans but by Arabs.



Religious devotion on the bumper of a car

"Pakistan is training people to fight or to suicide themselves by blowing them up in the name of a jihad against foreigners, but there isn't really the case for a jihad. Besides, suicide bombing is a great sin according to the Koran, but these groups are under the influence of the Wahhabi doctrine, stemming from Saudi Arabia that sees suicide bombing as a legitimate mean of fighting a jihad."

Unemployed man
Kandahar City, 20 January 2007

⁵ Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Allah's New Martyrs*, 2002.

Government billboard in the outskirts of Kandahar City



"Suicide is forbidden in Islam.

God has said in the Holy Koran: do not kill yourself! God is very merciful to you.

If you kill yourself brutally, you are not far from going to hell, and throwing you in hell is very easy for God.

Jihad does not mean killing, the aim of Jihad is self improvement.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan"

For many Afghans, the belief that the Jihad is unrightfully waged and on top of that implemented by tactics that are forbidden by the Koran forms an important argument to be against the current insurgency and to be against the Taliban. However, most people admit that this does not prevent poor and unemployed Afghans from joining their ranks.

Sometimes, the term Taliban is not associated with the former regime from the 1990s, but seen as used by Pakistan as a façade through which it is trying to destabilize Afghanistan.

"The fighting and bombing in Afghanistan are the result of American and Pakistani interference. Destructive American policies are carried out through Pakistan, and Pakistan also has its own political agenda concerning the Durand line."

Construction worker
Kandahar City, January 2007

Border issues are often seen as being at the core of the current conflict with Pakistan. The dispute about the legality of the Durand line is frequently mentioned as both the cause of the current intrusions by Pakistan and as the main problem that needs to be resolved to end the current insurgency.

According to many Afghans, Pakistan wants to expand beyond the Durand line, move this line and extend its influence further and further into Afghan territory. The dispute is mainly related to the provinces of Balochistan and "Suba Zarhad" (Waziristan, former Pashtunistan). Since numerous Afghans are still living in these provinces, Pakistan is very concerned about these territories.

"There are a lot of refugees still living in Pakistan. Pakistan does not want to loose the economic value that the Afghan people in these provinces contribute to that country."

Cleaner
Marwais Hospital, Kandahar, 16 January 2007

B.4.5 Why can the Taliban still fight in Afghanistan?

It becomes clear from the interviews that the Taliban – like any other successful insurgency –



Everybody in southern Afghanistan carries a gun and knows how to use it, making these men easy recruits for insurgents.

can only continue to operate with support from the local Afghan population in Kandahar, Helmand and other provinces in the South. Without this support, the current Taliban fighters who are mostly strangers to the areas they are fighting in, cannot enter villages, get food and other necessary supplies to continue their struggle against the Afghan government. A village elder in a small village in Kandahar province told the research team that there had been no fighting in his village. The reason is simple: strangers were not allowed to enter the village. The

villagers would unite against them and drive them out with every means at their disposal – guns, sticks and brooms that they have in their houses.

“The Taliban are still able to fight in the Panjwai valley because of the people there. That is the problem. They are not fighting the outsiders and strangers that come to their villages. They should even use their brooms and sticks to fight them out. Just take a look at our village. They cannot enter here. This is the most secure area outside of Kandahar City.”

Village elder, shepherd
Kandahar Province, January 2007

Nevertheless, even this village elder sympathized with those poor Afghans that had no other option than to join the Taliban. According to him, poverty and despair were the main reasons for joining the movement. Many Afghans admit that members of their family or people in their villages are fighting for the Taliban. Thus, the Taliban does not only receive support from the local population, but also recruits. Those are the two pillars on which the strength of the current Taliban movement rests. Early in the summer of 2006, this nearly led to the city of Kandahar falling to enemy hands.



Extreme poverty in Afghanistan pushes many to join the insurgency in order to feed their families



Different Afghan National Police outposts on the road between Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. The police officers often abandon these posts during the night, afraid of attacks by the Taliban.



B.4.6. Why is there more and more insurgency?

The increase in fighting and bombing is definitely associated with the return of the Taliban movement. Again, according to many this return of the Taliban has only been possible because of two central factors:

- Increased support from Pakistan and elsewhere;
- Growing support from Afghans because of continued extreme poverty and structural unemployment situation.



Waiting for food at a camp in Kandahar

For many Afghans, more and more insurgency does not immediately mean that the Taliban are winning the current fight. There is belief that the government together with the international forces can stop the Taliban, but only when the root causes in Pakistan are addressed.

B.4.7. The objectives of the current insurgency

As the current Taliban movement is perceived to be primarily a non-religious and non-ideological endeavour, their objectives are generally described as:

- (Political) power and influence for financial gain;
- Well-paid positions;

Sometimes the Taliban is described as wanting to regain power in Kabul, but most Afghans interviewed in Helmand and Kandahar are skeptical about whether they could succeed in taking over the power in the capital.

"The Taliban are fighting us. They are not a religious movement anymore. Now, they are just fighting for power and good positions to make money. They are not really aiming for political power in Kabul as it is very difficult for them to move to Kabul. Here in Helmand, it is a good place for them. This is like their home."

Unemployed city dweller
Lashkar Gah City, 28 January 2007

B.4.8 Successful guerrilla tactics versus Western military power

Afghans raise interesting points when it comes to the current a-symmetric warfare waged by the Taliban. At the moment the movement is seen as avoiding battles with the foreign ISAF troops. They know that they cannot win this fight and therefore resort to guerrilla tactics that demoralize the Afghan security forces, terrorize the villagers and leave the international forces powerless. According to the interviewees, the guerrilla tactics generally used are:

- Short fire fights in villages after which the Taliban disappear again;
- Ambushes and road checkpoints;
- Roadside bombs;
- Rocket or mortar attacks;
- Suicide bomb attacks.



Taliban fighters in the countryside, praying and standing guard

The first result is a status quo in which the Taliban currently does not seem to win a lot of terrain, but remains its psychological control over these territories. The second result is that the fighting continues which causes serious problems for both the Afghan and international security forces which are expected to make progress in the fight against the Taliban.

"Seven days ago, I was fighting the Taliban in Hazar Djud district. There were bombings and there was a lot of fighting going on. The British were fighting the Taliban at the same time. Sometimes they defeat us. Sometimes we are stronger."

Policeman
Lashkar Gah Hospital, 25 January 2007



The results of an air strike by international forces on a village in Helmand Province (January 2007)

B.5. How do the locals position themselves?


Local Afghans in Helmand and Kandahar provinces do normally not identify themselves with the Afghan government or with the foreigner soldiers. As such, they can be considered as **non-aligned Afghans**. They do not openly support the Taliban and even if they do support the Taliban, it is mostly because of their own grievances or because of the fact that they see the Taliban as a legitimate source of employment. **Instead, the allegiance of Afghans lies with their village, neighbourhood, family or local commander.** They do not know enough about the central government to identify themselves with it and they cannot identify themselves with the foreign troops as these are non-Muslims and do not interact much with the local population. As such, the non-aligned Afghans see the government, the foreigners and the insurgents as “the other group”.

The economic stabilisation process


Spectrum of disintegration: Analysis of current alliances in Southern Afghanistan



Application of the economic stabilisation process



Economic stabilisation process results in the isolation of the hardcore insurgency



B.6. Counter-Insurgency – What would be the best way to stop the insurgency?

It is logical that most interviewees generally relate the best way to stop the insurgency to what they mentioned as the cause of it.

B.6.1 Foreign influence from Pakistan, Iran and India

Thus, in those cases where Pakistan is mentioned the following solutions to the problem are mentioned:

- Afghanistan and Pakistan should negotiate and use diplomacy to solve the problem of the current insurgency and its underlying causes;
- The international community (normally associated with the United Nations and the group of foreign countries excluding Pakistan, India and Iran) should do more to pressure Pakistan from interfering with Afghanistan;
- Afghanistan should attack Pakistan and forcefully stop the interference of Afghanistan;

While the latter answer is mentioned the least, it shows that there is a lot of resentment towards the neighbouring country.

“We should first defeat Pakistan and then sign a peace agreement with the remaining Taliban. That would bring peace to our country.”

Sheep trader
Kandahar City Refugee Camp, 19 January 2007

The second answer is heard more often. Since many Afghans think Pakistan can only be stopped by other countries, they appeal to the international community for helping them to stop Pakistan from interfering in Afghan affairs. The Afghan government is often seen as not powerful enough or lacking the necessary resources to counter Pakistan by itself.

“Our elders should talk with foreign countries so that they help us put pressure on Pakistan. It’s all about our border with Pakistan. That country is using Afghan people to reach its own political goals. It should stop its intrusions into Afghanistan.”

Mason
Kandahar City Refugee Camp, 19 January 2007

Many Afghans speak about reconciliation or negotiation as tools to end the current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some even go so far to say that the Taliban should form part of the government:

"The government should negotiate with the Taliban opposition and should give them a place in the Afghan government."

Shopkeeper
Lashkar Gah City, 28 January 2007

The next chapter will investigate ways how negotiation with the insurgents could be possible.



The geo-political importance of southern Afghanistan: Indian Consulate, Kandahar

Motivated by their respective security concerns, Pakistan, India and Iran each seek to maintain influence in Afghanistan, resorting to various means of political, economic or cultural pressure. India fully backs Karzai's government, while Pakistan (despite being a US ally) covertly supports the Taliban and Iran finances both Afghan reconstruction and anti-American militias. The insurgency in Afghanistan can therefore count on multiple allies, the principal one being Pakistan.

Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary and support for the Taliban. This policy reflects its national security interests:

- balancing India and countering its increasing influence in Afghanistan
- avoiding ethnic fragmentation. This entails neutralizing Pashtun and Baluch nationalism, in part by supporting Islamist and Taliban militias among the Pashtun
- securing its western borders. As many expect that when the Americans leave the Taleban will regain power, it is therefore crucial to have good relations with the Taleban.

The post 9/11 alliance with the US did not change Pakistan's interests. Musharraf made sure that the Northern Alliance, which Pakistanis saw as allied with India, would have limited control in the new Afghan government. In order to prevent the United States from allying with India, Islamabad agreed on cutting down in its use of asymmetrical warfare, in return for the safe evacuation of hundreds of Pakistani officers and intelligence agents from Afghanistan, where they had overseen the Taliban's military operations.



*The geo-political importance of southern Afghanistan:
The Iranian Consulate in Kandahar City*

Tension and rivalry with India explain Pakistan's latest refusal to let India move the much-needed military assistance to the new Afghan National Army in Kabul and its campaign against the establishment of Indian consulates in key cities of Afghanistan.⁶ India indeed sees Afghanistan not only as a partner for bilateral trade, but also as an important economic link with all of Central Asia. and is therefore considering joining a proposed project to build a pipeline for natural

gas from Turkmenistan through western Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷

"Some people in the south are against democracy, education for girls or women working or even going outside the house. They get massive support from Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia to fight against the government."

Nurse, 20 years old
Mirwais Hospital, Kandahar City

⁶ Mohan, C. Raja, India's new road to Afghanistan, The Hindu, 07/09/2003
<http://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/07/stories/2003090705570900.htm>

⁷ Synovitz, Ron, "Afghanistan: India Looks To Kabul For Better Ties With All Of Central Asia", February 16, 2005
Radio Free Europe <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/2/6B0C69DD-FBD9-42A2-8583-C12F9736B1F6.html>



The geo-political importance of southern Afghanistan: The Pakistani Consulate in Kandahar City

Afghanistan cannot be stabilised as long as the Taliban continue to build up their forces. So far, neither the US nor NATO have confronted Islamabad with this issue, in part out of the fear that doing so could cause Pakistan to reduce its co-operation on counterterrorism. Yet history shows that few insurgencies with safe havens abroad have ever been defeated.⁸

Meanwhile, Iran is using the political tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan to assert its status as a regional power, by leveraging the fact that Iran is the only route by which Afghanistan can maintain foreign trade. This also limits Washington's options to pressure Tehran as, with a blocked Iranian border, the Afghan economy would very possibly collapse. Iran has taken advantage of the central government's weakness to pursue a strategy based on financing high profile reconstruction projects, conservative Shia schools and anti-American propaganda.⁹

"The fighting is due to neighbouring countries taking advantage of Afghan uneducated people."

Furniture shop keeper, 33
Kandahar City

⁸ Barnett R. Rubin Saving Afghanistan Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007

⁹ David Rohde, Iran is seeking more influence in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 27 December 2007

Iran has always been against the anti Shia-Taliban in Afghanistan and actively supported rival Shia militias in the 1990s. Yet with the US at its doorstep, Iran is now willing to cooperate with all anti-American forces in the region regardless of their religion and language.¹⁰ Insurgent fighters in Afghanistan traditionally opposed to working with Iran have also changed their policy in light of the mutual short-term interest of removing the US. Indeed, Iran considers the US presence in the region a much greater threat than the unorganized Taliban: If both Afghanistan and Iraq are stabilized, Iran will be encircled by two pro-U.S. governments. The escalation in fighting in the bordering provinces with Iran and in the Shiite populated central Afghan provinces is the direct result of the Iranian strategy. The armed groups who have been marginalised by Karzai's government create potential forces for Iran to harness and influence.



B.6.2. Poverty and unemployment

When poverty and unemployment are mentioned as the causes of the sustained and growing insurgency, the best way to tackle these root causes are mentioned in very simple terms:

- Jobs to be able to earn money;
- More development.

Although this would perhaps not solve the problem of foreign interference with Afghanistan, this at least would make recruitment in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere much more difficult. According to most Afghans fighting for the Taliban is strictly an economic issue. Therefore, fighting for the current Taliban is often not seen as a taboo or a bad thing in itself.

¹⁰ Muhammad Tahir, Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, Terrorism monitor, vol 5, issue 1, 18 January 2007. Available at [online]: <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370239>

"The Taliban is giving money to Afghan men to fight. These men have no job. If I would not be working here as a cleaner in this hospital, I would join the Taliban."

Cleaner

Marwais Hospital, Kandahar, 16 January 2007

The negative associations with the Taliban are more related to the old Taliban regime and its harsh and strict laws and policies. **Although most Afghans interviewed in Kandahar and Helmand do not (openly) seem to sympathize with the ideological or political movement of the Taliban, they seem to regard the Taliban in south Afghanistan as a possible employer who is paying its soldiers well.**

B.6.3 Is the government doing a good job to counter the insurgency?

Most interviewees think that although in principle, the Afghan government is trying to counter the insurgency, this struggle is ineffective because the lack of control over the country. Peace is often associated with full control of the government over its territories. As long as the government does not have this control, many Afghans are sceptical about the prospects for peace.

"People can't find money since there are not enough jobs available. Many people join the Taliban only because they have to feed their family."

75 year old man, Kandahar City, Jan 23



Waiting for a job?



The luxury private vehicles of the Governor of Helmand

"We have to look at what is behind the conflict. It is a problem of the government structure. The government is weak. They do not have control over the situation. If they get control, there is not need for fighting and bombing."

Unemployed refugee
Arghandab Refugee Camp, 17 January 2007

The main perceived link between the government and the current insurgency is expressed as the inability of the current government to make sure that ordinary Afghans have a job and money to feed their families.

B.6.4 The Afghan security forces

Many Afghans feel that the Afghan security forces should both increase in number and in effectiveness. Nevertheless, most Afghans think that the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are doing a good job. The only problem raised is their low salary. The real problem, however, lies with a third group of security forces: the (semi)private soldiers that fight for local commanders and often have different employers at the same time.

"The problem is that there are three different kinds of soldiers. First there is the ANA, secondly there is the ANP. Both are doing a good job. The main problem is the private soldiers. They are putting up their own check points. Every commander in the south is trying to increase the number of these private soldiers to fight for his own prestige and power."

Jobless farmer

Boulán, Lashkar Gah Province, 28 January 2007

Several of the people interviewed say that these "private soldiers" are stealing from ordinary people.

"There are also some robbers. These are the private soldiers working for the government, who steal from the people. They are stealing cars, motorbikes, bicycles and cash. Only yesterday, they killed a driver and took his car. They took him from his village to Dilaram. There they killed him and took his car."

Farmer

Lashkar Gah City, 28 January 2007

As these soldiers are primarily fighting for money, this group of soldiers can easily change sides and join the Taliban if their current commander does not pay them enough or no longer has a job for them.



Private militiamen, some working part-time for the Afghan National Police

C. Towards effective responses to the Afghan insurgency

C.1 Understanding and responding to local grievances

The interviews conducted in January in Helmand and Kandahar have revealed a list of local grievances that the local population perceive as legitimate. Whether or not the international community agrees with the validity of all these grievances is not important. If it wants to successfully counter the insurgency in Afghanistan, it has to take all of these grievances into account and respond to them in the best way possible. Only then will it be possible to fully gain the support of the local community. In turn, only with the help of the local community, it will be possible to counter the current insurgency.

“NATO has relied extensively on “close air support” to attack insurgent positions. Although details are not publicized, an indication of the intensity of the fighting is that in June 2006, the United States Central Command reported that it had flown 340 air strikes in Afghanistan, more than twice the 160 carried out in Iraq.”

Human Rights Watch
“Afghanistan: NATO Should Do More to Protect Civilians”
30 October 2006



Children and adults running to a point of food aid distribution (Senlis Afghanistan) in the Zari Dasht refugee camp, Kandahar Province. 19 January 2007

C.1.2 The list of grievances encountered through field research is the following:



Child at a camp in Kandahar

- The lack of jobs or decent income opportunities in the area;
- The lack of public facilities such as schools and hospitals;
- The perception that the Karzai government is weak and ineffective;
- The perception that the Karzai government is a puppet regime;
- The perceived corruption both at the international level and the level of the government institutions;
- The lack of humanitarian aid and assistance following fighting and natural disasters such as floods or drought;
- The lack of overall economic development both in cities and in rural areas;
- The amount of civilian deaths caused by fighting and bombing;
- The perception that the government and the international community have not kept their promises made in 2001 and 2002;
- Poppy eradication while many farmers are still fully dependent on poppy crops;
- The lack of action against Pakistan, especially from the international community; and
- The perception that the international community and the foreign soldiers do not understand the culture and traditions of Afghanistan and are approaching the country in a Western way, trying to solve its problems through Western approaches and instruments.

To say the least, it is surprising that the list is this long more than five years after the international community toppled the Taliban regime and helped install a democratically elected government. **If the international community does not respond urgently to such local grievances – either directly or indirectly by aiding the Afghan government – it risks alienating the local population and losing its support.**

“Afghanistan hasn't really met many of the benchmarks, particularly those addressing the well-being of the Afghan people. Kabul and its international backers have made little progress in providing basic needs like security, food, electricity, water and health care.”

Sam Zarifi, Asia research director, Human Rights Watch¹

¹ Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Afghanistan: Slow Progress on Security and Rights: Kabul, Donors Should Focus on Accountability and the Rule of Law”, 30 January 2007

The importance of local support is integrated in counter insurgency theory, but the benefits from local support are not fully reaped in practice as there are too many local grievances in southern Afghanistan – whether fully legitimate or not. **From a military strategic point of view, counter insurgency practice should gain the confidence and support of the local population by respecting and – as much as possible – responding to the perceived local grievances, which are real in the minds of the people.** The reason for this is straightforward: in a certain area, only the local population knows who the insurgents are. Without their cooperation, neither the local or central government, nor the international community and its soldiers will ever be able to identify who the insurgents are.

Another important problem is that the foreign presence in Afghanistan is often seen by ordinary Afghans as approaching Afghanistan with Western instruments and tools and not involving enough the Afghans in their projects and plans. **For example, in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, normally composed of about 70 to 80 military personnel, Afghan government representatives are generally not included or limited to one Afghan liaison officer.**



Woman protects herself from the elements, Kandahar

The various grievances expressed by the locals are to be addressed with short, medium and long term counter insurgency measures:

Many of the local grievances can be alleviated by taking short term action which will have immediate effect on the lives of the locals and on their perception of the international community implementing these measures. This will not only improve daily lives but will especially create more support for the international community and the Afghan government. The short term approach could target the following grievances:

- Poppy eradication which deprives farmers of their only livelihood;
- Bombing which results in civilian deaths;
- The lack of explicit condemnation from the international community of Pakistan's covert support of the Taliban; and

- The lack of emergency humanitarian aid and assistance following fighting and natural disasters such as floods or drought.

Other grievances require more planning, financing or can only be tackled on the longer term. Although such projects take more time and will only yield results on the medium term, they should start being implemented as soon as possible. These grievances include:

- Disenchantment with the Karzai government, perceived as a weak, ineffective and corrupt puppet regime of the United States;
- Disenchantment with the international community, accused of being corrupt, of capitulating to Pakistan and more generally of having failed to keep promises made in 2001 and 2002; and
- Frustration with the lack of overall social and economic development both in cities and in rural areas, which is reflected in high unemployment rates and insufficient public health and education facilities.

A more positive attitude from the government and the international community towards the poor rural areas and an increase in development aid and rural development projects could take away these grievances.

“The broader issue of security is complicated by a weak national police force and an inability to restore the rule of law in the southern provinces. Into this plays the whole issue of the counter-narcotics policy and eradication of the poppy crop, which has caused tensions between and among local people, the government and the coalition. The removal of farmers' livelihoods, with no significant incentive or replacement livelihood programme, runs counter to efforts to win 'hearts and minds' in many areas. The Taliban capitalise on this contradiction in coalition approaches by championing the cause of the farmers, at the same time protecting those (including themselves) who profit from the opium and heroin trade.”

The Military Balance 2007²
International Institute for Strategic Studies

² The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007 (January 2007) 302, 303.

Osama and Massoud: A tale of two orphans



The next generation:

Massoud (left) and Osama, two orphans living both in the Lashkar Gah orphanage who have to be convinced that the international community is there to help and create peace and stability for Afghanistan

In January 2007, Senlis Afghanistan made two visits to the orphanage in Lashkar Gah where it discovered two four-year old boys called Massoud (after the famous *Mujahideen* leader) and Osama (named after Osama Bin Laden). The names of these two orphaned boys represent the two sides of what the international community perceives as a struggle between the Taliban/Al-Qaeda movement and the Afghan people, threatening stability and peace in Afghanistan. But together these two boys represent Afghanistan's new generation. The counter insurgency strategy applied in Afghanistan must therefore have both short term and longer term objectives in order to reach out to future generations. If the international community fails to convince this new generation that reconstruction, peace, stability and democracy are possible and desirable in the New Afghanistan, it will again become a lost generation – far removed from the ideals and policies of the present government and unwilling to support the international presence in the country.

Finally, considering the demographic dynamics of an increasingly young population in Afghanistan, it is imperative to start thinking now about how the living conditions and perceptions of the children of today will determine their subsequent political views as adults. This new generation should be convinced that peace, stability, democracy and good governance are both desirable and possible. This also means that they should be convinced that the international community is really there to help the Afghan people.

The perception that the international community does not understand Afghanistan's traditional political culture and approaches democratisation in a Western way is deeply alienating for the population.

Conflict resolution in the broader scheme takes a generation. Some would argue it takes two.³

Anonymous NATO officer


³ Ross, Oakland, "The will, and the time, to win", Toronto Star, 28 January 2007

Demographic breakdown


As can be seen from these graphs, the demographic pyramid of Afghanistan has a wide base which will further expand in coming years. A wide-based pyramid, resulting from a larger proportion of younger age-groups in the general population, is characteristic of a traditional, non-industrial community.

For Afghanistan, this can be explained by the predominant existence of rural communities, partly due to the tendency for families to have more children in order to help in the field. The expansive character of this pyramid can be explained by both high birth rates and high mortality. As a result, the Afghan population will get younger and younger.


Afghanistan: year 2000



Afghanistan: year 2025



Afghanistan: year 2050



The future generation of the new Afghanistan



Afghanistan: the next generation

"I have a lot of dreams in my mind and in my heart that I want to realise if peace comes to Afghanistan. I wish peace would come."

Shopkeeper, 19
Kandahar City, Kandahar

C.2. Understanding that current policies are at cross-purposes

In Afghanistan, the policies of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency undermine development aid and are currently at cross-purposes with each other. This section shows how these two policies undermine each other and the reconstruction efforts in the country.

C.3. Counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan

Counter-narcotics is mostly based on interdiction and law enforcement. Poppy eradication, both counter-productive and ineffective, is the main tool to decrease the country's dependence on poppy cultivation and opium production. Provincial governors, district and village leaders and local police are strongly pressured by the central government and the international community to eradicate large areas of poppy. In general, resource-poor farmers with small plots of land have been the principle targets of these programmes. There are two main reasons for this. First, resource-rich farmers have been able to bribe the eradication forces to avoid destruction of their crops. Second, local leaders have shown themselves to be far more willing to eradicate crops belonging to small, powerless farmers rather than those belonging to powerful and wealthy farmers and landowners.



*"Poppies are lethal"
Afghan government campaign
against poppy cultivation,
Lashkar Gah hospital,
Helmand province.*

At the same time, economic alternatives are only very slowly becoming available to poppy farmers. Alternative development projects are spread too thinly over the country and the projects take many years to become self-sustainable and profitable. As such, counter-narcotics policies, focusing at the moment too heavily on poppy crop eradication, undermine development aid and reconstruction efforts as poverty levels are increased. As it increases poverty and removes livelihoods in poor rural communities, it also undermines the counter-insurgency strategy. People left without a job or a stable income are more than willing to

join the Taliban for economic reasons or because of disillusionment with the government. Poppy crop eradication increases the gap between the government and the rural communities.

C.4. Counter-insurgency policies in Afghanistan

In turn, current counter insurgency policies are targeting the Taliban as a homogenous organization with Jihadist motivations. As such, those Afghans who are part of the insurgency because of economic reasons or because they have some legitimate grievances are targeted with the blunt instruments of counter insurgency: bombings and fighting. **No attempt is made to drive a wedge between the hardcore leadership of the Taliban who do have fundamentalist beliefs and the large groups of Taliban fighters who are just involved because of the fact that they have to make a living and feed their families.**



A basketful of opium

The military operations have caused too many civilian casualties, resulting in civilian disillusionment and social protest. Development efforts are undermined because projects cannot start or have to be postponed because of the constant fighting in many areas in the south. People turn their backs on the government as they are fed up with military policies that result in the bombing of their villages and the destruction of their houses. Reconstruction efforts are futile in the midst of fighting and bombing. Again, the gap between the government and the local population is increased.

Indirectly, present counter-insurgency policies even undermine counter-narcotics policies. As counter-insurgency increases both the gap between the government and the people, and as the levels of protest, distrust and disillusionment mount, farmers will be less motivated to follow instructions of the Afghan government to abandon poppy cultivation.

"This fight is not about Taliban, but about poppies. The villagers want to be able to continue growing opium poppies and sell them for a good price, whereas the government outlawed opium. Thus the drug lords are waging war against the government. The real problem is opium."

Public call office shopkeeper
Kandahar City, 23 January 2007

C.5 Understanding the economic nature of the insurgency

It is clear from field research that the root causes of the current insurgency in Afghanistan are mainly economic in nature. **This is especially true at the grassroots level, where the insurgency in Afghanistan seems to have little to do with Al Qaeda or the global Jihad, but more with being able to feed one's family.** Especially on this level, counter-insurgency policy should be targeted towards the economic underpinnings of the phenomenon. At the level of the leadership, however, the situation is different. It is at that level that the more robust military and security instruments of counter insurgency should be applied. At the moment, these are bluntly applied to both types of insurgency, regardless of the difference in nature.

Salaries in Afghanistan: the Taliban as a competitive employer		
Profession	Average monthly earnings, from lowest to highest	
	Afghanis	USD
Workshop worker	1,125	\$23
Nurse	1,500	\$30
Teacher	2,500	\$50
Doctor	2,500	\$50
Afghan army soldier	3,000	\$60
Afghan police officer	3,000	\$60
School principal	3,000	\$60
Bazaar shopkeeper	3,000	\$60
Construction worker	4,500	\$90
Taliban fighter	20,000	\$400
Member of Parliament	40,000	\$800
Minister	50,000	\$1,000

The US counter-insurgency strategy of December 2006 acknowledges the importance of an economic response to insurgency on several occasions.⁴ Nevertheless, in practice it seems

⁴ See Appendix 3 of this report for the most interesting abstracts of this strategy.

that the military in Afghanistan does not seem to have the political support to implement this part of the counter-insurgency strategy. At the moment, the Taliban is reaping the maximum benefit from its economic advantage and therefore able to put up a significant struggle to hinder the stabilization and reconstruction efforts of the Afghan government and the international community.

"Aerial bombing of villages is a reason for normal people to join the insurgency. If someone loses a brother or a son in an air strike led by foreigners, he will join the Taliban to fight against them."

Farmer
Uruzgan province, 16 January 2007



Two policemen in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province.

Whether within or outside of Afghanistan, the current insurgency has an enormous economic advantage: extreme poverty and structural unemployment. This economic reality on the ground makes it relatively easy to increase both its support and recruitment base. If we look at what the Taliban fighters are earning, compared to other professions, the salary is very high. Comparable jobs in the army or in the police force pay at least three or four times less, while the risks in Helmand and Kandahar provinces are similar.

The Afghan government is struggling to attract newcomers to the Afghan police and military force and desertion rates are high. Some studies say there is currently a security gap of 80,000 soldiers. This suggests that there are insufficient forces to contain and defeat the Taliban on the ground. In turn, the serious lack of ground forces automatically leads to more aerial bombing by US and International Security Assistance Forces, creating a higher probability that innocent civilians become victim of these attacks on the insurgency.

“NATO has relied extensively on “close air support” to attack insurgent positions. Although details are not publicized, an indication of the intensity of the fighting is that in June 2006, the United States Central Command reported that it had flown 340 air strikes in Afghanistan, more than twice the 160 carried out in Iraq.”

Human Rights Watch

“Afghanistan: NATO Should Do More to Protect Civilians”

30 October 2006

The failure of the armed forces to distinguish between fighters and civilians is a constant cause of anger and disillusionment for Afghan people.



“Join the organised Afghan police force now”

“The Taliban are cheating the people. They are saying to the people that they will pay them more than the Afghan government and that they will give them more and better weapons. This way, they are in direct competition with the Afghan National Army.”

Teacher

Lashkar Gah City, 26 January 2007

C.6. Possibilities for negotiation with the Taliban

Karzai’s government is in favour of negotiating with the Taliban⁵ and has a reconciliation program that encourages militants to lay down arms.

While NATO officially opposes negotiating with the Taliban, the various countries’ attitudes towards speaking with the Taliban or warlords connected to them range from actively seeking dialogue to categorically refusing any contact.

⁵ Shah, Amir, “Karzai Calls for Talks With Taliban”, Associated Press 29 January 2007

The Dutch are backing Abdul Hakim Munib, the new Governor of Uruzgan, in his efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. This policy is consistent with the Dutch strategy of seeking dialogue. Indeed, when Colonel Theo Vleugels established an outpost on the fringes of Taliban territory in Uruzgan, he built a *qala* – a traditional Pashtun home with mud walls and a large reception room. It was designed not only as a base for Dutch soldiers but also as a place for local people, including those close to the Taliban, to talk politics. It is not certain that the relative stability in Uruzgan is a direct consequence of this strategy; some attribute it to action by the American Special Forces who have pinned down the Taliban in the mountainous north of the province. However, this strategy may have had its part in minimising Dutch casualties⁶. Critics accuse the Dutch of surrendering most of Uruzgan to the Taliban without a fight.⁷



Police car guarding the poppy eradication convoy on its way to Lashkar Gah, 29 January 2007

⁶ The Dutch have lost only one soldier, who committed suicide, and suffered four injuries in combat. Civilian casualties have also been very low. By comparison, British troops lost 36 men in southern Afghanistan in 2006 and the Canadians lost 35 soldiers and one diplomat.

⁷ <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2533123,00.html>

There is a need to distinguish between the hard core Taliban and the more moderate opportunist elements who may have joined Taliban ranks only for economic reasons.

An Afghan government amnesty program could leave open the door for less militant Taliban members to leave and integrate back into the country's democracy.⁸ The following basic strategy elements should be part of a negotiating strategy:

- Identify the legitimate grievances of different groups of Afghan people;
- Identify those groups with legitimate grievances and those that are fighting for economic reasons;
- Separate these groups from the Jihadist elements of the insurgency; and
- Target these groups as partners for peace in a peace process.



At a camp in Kandahar

"The people are fighting for dollars."

Shopkeeper,
Kandahar City

⁸ <http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=8a01eeee-85b3-4cfc-a2bf-e8d205a63625> NATO needs to negotiate with some Taliban Mike Blanchfield, The Ottawa Citizen; with files from The Canadian Press December 18, 2006

D. Five years of failed counter-narcotics policies⁹

Five years of misplaced counter-narcotics priorities have entrenched Afghanistan's opium crisis in almost all facets of Afghan society: drug policy-makers' premature pursuit of counter-narcotics priorities over poverty relief has made opium central to Afghanistan's current security and development crises.



Harvesting poppies

⁹ This section has previously been published in: Senlis Afghanistan, Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban (MF Publishing, Spring 2006).

Even after five years of international aid and presence in the country, Afghanistan continues to face a reconstruction crisis of unprecedented scale. The pressure on the Afghan government to implement untimely and aggressive eradication-based counter-narcotics policies illustrates a failure on the part of the international community to recognise that Afghanistan's opium crisis is not merely a matter of illegal drug cultivation and production. Rather, it is a problem of development and stability. Poppy cultivation is a survival mechanism, and is one of the few means millions of Afghans have of providing basic life necessities to their families. Five years of international aid and presence in Afghanistan have not greatly improved the day to day lives of Afghanistan's poppy farming communities. Rather, militarised counter-narcotics policies have negatively affected many Afghans' perceptions of the international community, and jeopardised stabilisation and development efforts.

Afghanistan's illegal opium crisis is now at the nexus of extreme levels of poverty and violence, locking the country into a vicious circle of deteriorating security and development conditions. Afghan poppy farmers are struggling to understand why the international community says that they are in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people, when international security forces seem intent on destroying their livelihoods.


"The foreigners have brought eradication, but no irrigation and no clinics."

Villager, Kandahar Province¹⁰

The timeline of the various counter-narcotics initiatives pursued by the Afghan government and the international community illustrates the ongoing misdirection of counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan.

¹⁰ Senlis Afghanistan Field Team Investigation, Kandahar province, summer 2006.

Timeline of Failed Counter-Narcotics Initiatives in Afghanistan 2001-2006




¹¹ "The government has smashed 101,614 (40,000 hectares) acres of poppy fields since the beginning of Afghanistan's new year, the year of 1385, over the past five months", Interior Minister Zabar Ahmad Muqbal, during a conference on strengthening security, good governance and the war on illegal drugs, Kabul 20 August 2006. Reported in "Afghanistan destroys over 100,000 acres of poppy fields", Xinhua News Agency, 20 August 2006.

D.1. Failing counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan

Five years of counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan have resulted in very few positive achievements. Although the Afghanistan Compact of January 2006 contained a clear and potentially constructive counter-narcotics strategy for the 'sequenced' reduction of poppy cultivation,¹² earlier this year international security forces were implicated in eradication activities where no alternative livelihoods were available, indicating this policy was not being followed.

It is clear that the economies of many rural Afghan communities hinge on poppy cultivation,¹³ but for the majority of the past five years, eradication has been the chief drug policy pursued in Afghanistan, largely at the behest of the international community.¹⁴ This is despite the policy of eradicating opium poppy having been widely discredited in the absence of any alternative survival measures for farmers,¹⁵ and the fact that eradication has an immediate destructive effect on rural livelihoods and incomes. Although eradication



This Helmand farmer's field has just been eradicated

programmes have been widely implemented, the Afghan government and the international community have largely failed to provide the assistance, compensation and alternative livelihoods necessary to enable rural farming communities to discontinue cultivation. These misplaced priorities are a major source of social tension within rural Afghanistan.

¹² According to this policy, eradication activities will only be implemented when viable alternative livelihoods are available.

¹³ "In 2005, the drug economy was equivalent to 52 per cent of the country's gross domestic product", UNODC, 2005 Afghanistan Opium Assessment Survey.


¹⁴ In a press briefing on 12 February 2002, Ari Fleischer stated that, "the United States wants to work with the Government of Afghanistan to help eradicate their drug crops". Meanwhile, the UNODC stated in their Opium Situation in Afghanistan, 2005, report that, "Eradication of opium fields has been, and remains necessary..."

¹⁵ The aims of opium eradication are clear: to decrease the total quantity of cultivated opium poppy, thereby increasing the market price of opium and its heroin derivative. Theoretically the increased prices will deter and consequently reduce the number of drug users. For more information, The Senlis Council, "Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan and Lessons Learned from Latin American and South East Asia", January 2006.

D.1.1. Afghan rural communities are economically dependent on poppy

Many farmers, field labourers and their families are wholly dependent on the illicit cultivation of poppy, and have been for a significant period.¹⁶ Throughout the 1990s tens of thousands of hectares of poppy were cultivated in Afghanistan, accounting for around seventy percent of global opium production. Although the Taliban's notorious 2001 poppy ban almost completely reduced cultivation,¹⁷ by 2002 cultivation levels had increased again to over 70,000 hectares.¹⁸ Since 2002, poppy cultivation levels have risen steadily, to an estimated 165,000 hectares in 2006. At present, farmers and labourers have limited access to alternative livelihoods that could provide incentives to move away from the illicit trade in opium.

Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan 1996-2006 (1,000s hectares)



D.2. Eradication is a failed drug policy

As a drug-supply reduction tool, eradication has three main weaknesses. First, without sustainable and competitive alternatives already in place, eradication has grave implications on poppy-reliant rural economies. Afghanistan's extreme and deeply entrenched poverty generates and maintains the need for poppy cultivation. As such, the impact of eradication is felt most acutely by the most impoverished elements in Afghan society, namely, resource-poor farmers and labourers.

Another major weakness of eradication is that it tends to force farm-gate prices to rise, which in turn creates strong incentives for farmers to continue cultivating opium poppy while

¹⁶ Kamminga, Jorrit, "Agricultural aspects of Afghanistan's opium economy" in: D. Spivack (ed), Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines, Kabul 2005.

¹⁷ The Taliban achieved this cultivation reduction by threatening poppy farmers with death. Despite the ban's disastrous effects on Afghanistan's farming communities, the UNODC and the international community loudly congratulated the Taliban for their efforts.

¹⁸ UNODC, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002", October 2002.

also attracting newcomers to the industry. Further, successful eradication, in terms of decreasing the areas of cultivated poppy, depends heavily on local government and other local power-holders. Yet in Afghanistan these power-holders are often either linked to the illegal opium economy, or lack the credibility necessary to effectively influence farmers' communities and farmers' behaviour.

D.2.1. Impossible to accurately measure eradication 'successes'

Several key factors make it extremely difficult to judge the effects of eradication in the medium and long-term, even following government (and international community) claims that eradication efforts have yielded short-term results. Claimed short-term reductions in cultivation can be easily masked by other factors.

The opium yield from poppy is not static; rather, each year the average yield of opium poppy per hectare fluctuates considerably. In 2005 for instance, although cultivation decreased from 131,000 hectares to 104,000 hectares, actual opium production decreased by only 2%. Although eradication may impact on the number of viable poppy plants, eradication does not have a direct causal effect on annual production.

A common consequence of eradication is often described as the "*balloon effect*", involving the displacement of illegal production to more remote areas, where it is more difficult to extirpate. This presents a clear danger in Afghanistan, where only three percent of the country's irrigated land is used for opium cultivation and much of the country is suited to opium poppy cultivation. Furthermore, large numbers of itinerant land labourers and harvesters can easily be mobilised.¹⁹



Eradication in progress

The balloon effect and other unintended consequences of eradication efforts preclude the sustainable success of eradication as a supply reduction tool. Successful eradication requires a nationwide, comprehensive eradication programme, carried out for a significant number of years. It also necessitates increased control of the central government over the main opium-growing areas of Afghanistan. Given Afghanistan's rugged terrain, poor infrastructure, limited resources and current political realities, such an operation would be extremely difficult to realise. Moreover, even if a comprehensive, long-term eradication programme could indeed be implemented, the ongoing success of such a programme would depend on parallel stability, economic growth and job creation, over a number of years. As noted at a recent meeting of experts on Afghanistan's opium economy, aerial spraying is not only an inappropriate response, it is not even technically feasible in Afghanistan.²⁰

¹⁹ UNDCP, "Access to Labour: The Role of Opium in the Livelihood Strategies of Itinerant Harvesters Working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan", Afghanistan Strategic Study 4, Islamabad 1999.

²⁰ Discussion at the Century Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Roundtable Lunch "Afghanistan at a Crossroads", New York, 7 December 2005.

A third key factor inhibiting the successful measurement of eradication in Afghanistan is the widespread practice of opium 'stockholding'. In Afghanistan, opium poppy has several advantages compared with other crops; poppy can be grown throughout the country and yields a high-value, easily transported product for which guaranteed markets exist. Further, opium is non-perishable, and can be stored away for several years. This storage, or stockholding, can cause significant time-lags between the implementation of eradication programmes and concrete results in terms of reduced availability.



Bags of opium can be stored for months and converted into cash when needed

The mere announcement of future eradication campaigns can impact the behaviour of actors involved in the Afghan opium economy. The expectation of a smaller harvest will, in turn, generate the expectation that opium prices and expected farm-gate prices will rise. Resource-rich farmers, traders, shop-keepers and traffickers then store opium stocks and wait for the peak moment in time in which to sell it. The effect of this is twofold. First, it decreases the effectiveness of the eradication strategy in terms of decreasing future availability of opium. Second, it causes a net transfer of income from opium growers to drug traffickers who are able to profit from the increased value of opium stocks.²¹ Poor farmers, on the other hand, will only benefit from the inflated farm-gate price if eradication campaigns are announced but not implemented, allowing a normal opium harvest.

Constant prices of opium

Amount of dry opium	September 2006 average price (USD)	February 2007 average price (USD)
4.5 kg	\$640	\$633
1 kg	\$142	\$140

²¹ Dr Barnett Rubin in Sonni Efron, "U.S. Backs Away From Afghan Aerial Spraying", LA Times, 23 January 2005.

D.3. Poppy at the centre of Afghanistan's security and development crisis

It should be remembered that the Taliban rose to power in Afghanistan because of general instability, the lack of an effective central government and dire economic circumstances.²² A number of experts have stated that eradication should never be undertaken in Afghanistan unless and until economically viable alternative livelihoods have been secured. As highlighted by the World Bank, the abrupt shrinkage of the opium economy or falling opium prices without new means of livelihood would significantly worsen rural poverty. However, the crop-substitution centred alternative development strategies advocated by the international community are dependent on the existence of a secure economic environment.



Poppies will be eradicated!

A key element of this is effective regional control by the central government, yet one of the main problems associated with crop eradication is that it creates uncertainty and instability in farming communities, and increases distrust of the central government.

The reconstruction effort in Afghanistan relies to a large extent on the twin pillars of rural development and security. Since the opium crisis lies at the heart of this reconstruction nexus, eradication of the farmer's sole livelihood raises the likelihood of further destabilising the country through social protest, political unrest, insurgency, warlordism and internal migration. Indeed, recent reports indicate that eradication programmes have had an extremely negative impact on security in many parts of the country and further are effectively undermining the Afghan central government, as farmers look to local power-holders (which increasingly include the Taliban) for protection of their livelihoods.



Eradication has a devastating effect on rural communities

D.4. Eradication in practice

Provincial governors, district and village leaders and local police are strongly pressured by the central government and international security forces to eradicate large areas of poppy, either by force or by motivating farmers to voluntarily abandon poppy cultivation. In general,

²² Graham Farrell and John Thorne, "Where have all the flowers gone? Evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan", The International Journal of Drug Policy 16, 2005.

resource-poor farmers with small plots of land have been the targets of these programmes. Local leaders have shown themselves to be far more willing to eradicate crops belonging to small, powerless farmers rather than those belonging to powerful and wealthy farmers and landowners.

In this environment, farmers are left with no alternative but to fight to defend their often sole source of income. In response to opposition, local leaders tend to overstate the amount of hectares eradicated in their reporting or alternately do everything in their power to destroy poppy fields or force farmers to eradicate their own crops. These frictions serve to worsen rural poverty as well as to widen the gap between local communities and local and central government. This, in turn, undermines the establishment of the rule of law and thus any real prospects of long-term rural economic development.



This poppy eradication officer (in blue shirt) has just collected a bribe. His team will not eradicate this field

Aggressive crop eradication operations have effectively accelerated the deteriorating security situation in southern Afghanistan.²³ In the extremely volatile context of Helmand province, eradication operations intensified the local power games and alliances between all power players including the international community, the central government, the governors, the police, the army, local warlords, drug barons, Taliban, and Al Qaeda. Such operations turned the people of Helmand against the international military and the central government, with many locals failing to distinguish between those security forces directly engaged in eradication and those 'providing support' to such operations. In Helmand, eradication operations resulted in foreign troops and the central government being seen as aggressors, thus further alienating the population from the international community's stabilisation and reconstruction efforts.

²³ The Senlis Council, "Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep", June 2006.

The Senlis Council, "Helmand at War: The changing nature of insurgency in Southern Afghanistan and its effects on the future of the country", June 2006.

“Eradication by itself will at best only achieve temporary results.”

Brown Report on Alternative Development
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, 2005

E. Alternatives for poppy crop eradication: poppy as a potential economic resource for Afghanistan²⁴

World shortage of essential opium-based medicines

A number of essential medicines, including morphine and codeine, are made from opium. However, there is currently a world shortage of essential opium-based medicines, particularly in developing countries. According to the World Health Organisation, the international community currently faces 'an unprecedented global pain crisis.' Opium-based medicines such as morphine and codeine play a fundamental role in the treatment of pain, and the overall worldwide need for adequate and sustained pain relief is increasing. Afghanistan has an unprecedented potential for producing a significant part of the missing opium-based medicines.



Poppies ready for harvest in Afghanistan

Research shows that the global demand for morphine and codeine far exceeds supply, and contrary to official reports, there is in fact an unacceptable shortage of these essential medicines in the world today. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has acknowledged the global shortage of essential opium-based medicines: "opioid analgesics are not always available for the people who need them, particularly in developing countries."²⁵ It is clear that millions of people, particularly cancer and HIV/AIDS sufferers in developing countries, live and die in unnecessary pain due to a shortage of essential medicines such as

²⁴ For an in-depth study on the scientific evidence supporting the implementation of an opium licensing system in Afghanistan, see The Senlis Council, Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines, (September 2005).

Available online at http://senliscouncil.net/modules/Opium_licensing/modules/publications/008_publication

²⁵ UN Information Service, "Critical Shortage of Drugs for Pain Relief, Says INCB", 26 May 2005. [online] Available at: http://www.incb.org/incb/press_release_2005-05-26_1.html

morphine and codeine. There are two main causes of the global shortage of opium-based medicines: the under-prescription of these medicines, and restrictions on supply.

E.1.1. Morphine and codeine are widely under-prescribed around the world

The International Narcotics Control Board has noted the three biggest impediments to the prescription of opium-based medicines are: a concern with addiction and misuse of these medicines; restrictive narcotics laws and the associated administrative burden of government regulatory requirements; as well as insufficient imports or manufacture of needed opium.²⁶ According to the International Narcotics Control Board, six of the richest countries - the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and Japan - consume nearly all of the world's supply of opium-based medicines, (77%), leaving 80% of the world's population with little or no access to these vital painkillers. However, researchers at the University of Toronto have found that even in these six rich countries, only 24 percent of the need for opium-based painkillers is being met.²⁷

It is likely that the price of these essential medicines significantly affects prescription levels. In Argentina and Mexico, for example, the monthly cost of opioid therapy can be more than 200 percent of the average monthly income.²⁸ Further, a recent survey on the availability of essential opium-based medicines in Afghanistan found that in Kabul, less than half of patients who require morphine and codeine are actually prescribed these essential opium-based medicines.²⁹



Lending a helping hand

²⁶ International Narcotics Control Board, "Availability of Opiates for Medical Needs", United Nations, New York, 1996.

²⁷ Fischer, B J. Rehm, and T Culbert, "Opium based medicines: a mapping of global supply, demand and needs" in Spivack D. (ed.) Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan, Kabul, 2005.

²⁸ De Lima L., "Opioid availability in Latin America as a global problem: A new strategy with regional and national effects", *Innovations in End-of-Life Care*, 5(1), 2003.

²⁹ Senlis Afghanistan Survey, "Availability of Essential Opium-based Medicines in Afghanistan", January 2006.

E.1.2. Supplies of opium for medicines are severely restricted

The under-prescription of opium-based medicines severely affects the global supply of these medicines. Current supplies are insufficient to meet global pain needs, yet individual supply countries³⁰ - including the UK, France, Turkey, Australia and Spain - are only legally authorised to produce as much raw opium materials and finished medicines as is necessary to meet the total estimated global opium-based medicines requirements.

The global supply and demand of opium-based medicines is a vicious circle: due to endemic under-prescription, governments' official estimated requirements rarely reflect the actual need for opium-based medicines such as morphine and codeine. This under-prescription leads to serious errors when calculating how much morphine and codeine is needed for future years, and as a result, the combined global estimates are cumulatively inaccurate. Given that international manufacture and national imports of opium-based medicines are restricted to these official estimates, global stocks are insufficient to meet any increases in prescription levels.

E.2. An Afghan solution to the global shortage of painkilling medicines

Currently it is estimated that over 24 million people are living with cancer worldwide, perhaps as many as 50% living in pain. Further, the global burden of cancer is expected to double within the next 20 years, and the incidence of cancer will shift to developing countries as the developed world finds more successful prevention strategies against cancer.³¹ In addition, the alarming proliferation of HIV/AIDS in many developing countries will mean that opium-based medications will increasingly be needed to curb the painful symptoms associated with the disease.

E.3. Licensed poppy cultivation can bridge security and development efforts

Given the vast quantities of opium produced in Afghanistan and Afghan farmers' expertise in cultivating poppy, Afghan poppy crops could potentially meet this shortage. Such a scheme would function as a bridge between development and stability; the two central pillars of Afghanistan's reconstruction effort. Poppy licensing for medicinal purposes will promote real ownership of the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, by the real stakeholders, that is, the Afghan nation, its rural communities and the impoverished farmers that currently have no survival mechanisms but poppy cultivation.

³⁰ The countries which supply opium raw materials and/or manufacture opium-based medicines.

³¹ World Health Organisation, "Global Action Against Cancer – updated version", 2005.



Poppies in Afghanistan


Appendices



Senlis Afghanistan field research team: Abhattulah Akbarzad , Aziz Rahib, Aimal Sherzad, Jorrit Kamminga and Arthur Segard (January 2007)



Senlis Afghanistan film crew: Aziz Rahib, Aimal Sherzad, Sayed Agha and Jonathan Persson.



Lead Field Researcher and President of Senlis Afghanistan, Ms Norine MacDonald QC (Kandahar City, 29 January 2007)

Appendix 1

Selected interview transcripts conducted in southern Afghanistan in January 2007

Date: 16 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_4
Place: [REDACTED]		
<i>Introductory Questions</i>		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2
		Age : 60
3	Where do you live? Uruzgan Province.	
4	Where are you from? Idem.	
5	Profession : Farmer.	
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen aerial bombing and suicide bombings in Uruzgan.	
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? My village has been bombed by American aircrafts.	
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I don't know, but I think Islam and greed are common reasons for people to fight.	
<i>Core Report Questions</i>		
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Sadly, there are more and more criminals against which the government has to fight.	
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Criminals are building up the insurgency.	
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Aerial bombing of villages is a reason for normal people to join the insurgency. If someone loses a brother or a son in an air strike led by foreigners, he will join the Taliban to fight against them.	
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? We want peace and the rule of law in all of Afghanistan. They are some special armies that become thieves at night, and the government should stop this. The provincial governments don't punish the thieves because they have alliances with them and they can't do without them.	
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and	

	bombing? Air strikes are a bad thing, as they kill civilians. The foreigners should just arrest the criminals and not bomb the civilians.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We don't know, we are not educated, but the government knows what it should do. It cannot do it however because of the alliances.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? We don't know but we trust in god.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like Afghanistan to be in peace and governed by the rule of law. I would like more and better schools, and more and better hospitals. And for yourself? I have four sons and five daughters; I would like my children to have a good future, and I would like my children to become doctors.
17	Would you like to add anything? I think it is very important for the country to have good doctors and good teachers. Here doctors are not giving appointments to poor people because they want money.

Date: 16 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_5	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 22
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, District 5, Main Airport Road				
4	Where are you from? I came from Pakistan 13 years ago.				
5	Profession : Interpreter				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed several vehicle suicide bombings on the road going to Kandahar Airport. I have also seen an IED being dismantled.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? In my view a lot of fighting is the result of interpersonal conflicts degenerating in vendettas.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The insurgency is growing because people join it for money, by religious conviction, because of the Taliban, or because of hatred against the Americans.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I don't know.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Money might be the main reason to join the insurgency.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think that Karzai is perfect as a leader, and that the Karzai government is doing a good job. Unfortunately, politicians at the level of the provincial government are not as committed, and are mostly trying to stay alive and make money.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers should stop bombing villages and should compromise to solve the problem. They should search the insurgents, put them on trial and punish them.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The problem in Afghanistan is that there are not enough jobs. If the foreigners build factories that provide us with jobs and money, the war will stop.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like Afghanistan to have peace, but also good hospitals and factories to provide employment and wealth to all the people. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? Peace is the most important thing, not only for Afghanistan, but for every country.				

Date: January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_7	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age :
3	Where do you live? Loyawyla Distirict (6).				
4	Where are you from? Khahriz.				
5	Profession : Security Guard.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen a lot of violence. Lately I have witnessed a suicide bombing in Kishlay Jaded.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been an aerial bombing in my village that resulted in the death of 18 civilians.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I think the Taliban are responsible for this.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The Taliban are fighting with tremendous support of Pakistan.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is behind the insurgency.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? I think people are only able to join the insurgency because Pakistan is providing them with training and financial support.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government is not doing well enough. I think it could be able to win over the insurgency if it did really commit itself to it and I don't understand why it doesn't. The government main focus should be to bring peace.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are not doing well either. They make a lot of mistakes that turn the people against them, like for instance climbing on the walls and roofs without permission. Their aerial strikes are eventually attacks on the civilian people.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The best way to stop the insurgency would be to negotiate with the opposing forces.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? The main enemy hiding behind the insurgency in Afghanistan is Pakistan. Pakistan should stop fuelling the insurrection.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? We expect from Karzai and from the United States that they will bring peace and prosperity. We are happy with the Karzai government but it should do more for us. And for yourself? I hope the country will be rebuilt and the fighting put to an end.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 18 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_13	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 40
3	Where do you live? Arghandab		
4	Where are you from? Ghaznee		
5	Profession : Shepherd.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen an IED explosion in Helmand at the beginning of this government's period in office.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I don't know, but perhaps the Taliban are responsible for starting this.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The lack of jobs, money and education are the reasons for continued trouble and warfare in Afghanistan.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I think Pakistan is behind all the fighting. Pakistan is sending fighters in Afghanistan under the name of Taliban, but they aren't really Taliban, they just use the name of the Taliban to wage war into Afghanistan.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Money and discontent towards government are pushing people to join the fight.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? We have no complaint against the Karzai government.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are killing civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? A jirga would be the best way to put an end to the fighting and bombing.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope the bombing will stop and Afghanistan will enjoy peace. And for yourself? I wish I could find a proper job and obtain financial assistance.		
17	Would you like to add anything? No.		

Date: 19 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_16
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 45
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City refugee camp.		
4	Where are you from? Ghaznee.		
5	Profession : Anything I can find, masonry works.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? A few months ago, in the bazaar in Jada (Kandahar City), a suicide bomb exploded and injured one of my sons. My son lost hearing and one of his kidneys had to be removed, through a costly operation; I applied for funding by the governor to pay the hospital bill, but he refused to help us. I had to get a loan from other people in the camp, and I will have to repay it.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Some politicians from foreign countries, and perhaps even some from this country, have started the conflict for the sake of money.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? In my opinion, what is at stake is the Durand line that Pakistan wants to move.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan, through the ISI, is behind the insurgency.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The insurgency is the result of Pakistan's Policies. Pakistan is training people to fight or to suicide themselves by blowing them up in the name of a jihad against foreigners, but there isn't really the case for a jihad. Besides, suicide bombing is a great sin according to the Koran, but these groups are under the influence of the Wahhabi doctrine that sees suicide bombing as a legitimate mean of fighting a jihad.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I am happy with the government, especially with Karzai.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are doing very well against the insurgency. They are only here to fight against the Taliban who have attacked their country, and we understand this. But they should stop making civilian fatalities.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Our elders should talk with foreign countries so that they help us put pressure on Pakistan. It's all about our border with Pakistan. Pakistan is using Afghan people to reach its own political goals. It should stop its intrusions into Afghanistan.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Only god knows when there will be peace in Afghanistan. The main reason for not being peace is Pakistan training fighters and sending suicide bombers, etc...		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? Inch Allah, Afghanistan will find peace, have a good government with a good		

	<p>president, enjoy widespread employment and in general become happy.</p> <p>And for yourself?</p> <p>The above would be enough for me to rejoice.</p>
17	<p>Would you like to add anything?</p> <p>Please, don't show me in the media because we have no protection here.</p>

Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_17	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 28
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City Camp.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar.				
5	Profession : Sheep trader.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? Yesterday, I saw a fight between civilians and the Afghan Army came and opened fire at us. I don't know why they fired at us, but they did and killed one person.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I don't know. Foreigners tell us Afghan people that we are all Taliban, whereas only some of us are.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? I don't know, we would like to ask the same question to the government.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I don't know.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Money, or discontent towards either the government or the Taliban, are reasons to fight for one or the other side.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is good, but is still making a lot of mistakes. It didn't achieve peace, it isn't training its army well enough, and that's why they are shooting on us.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreign armies are presumably coming to help us, but to do so they should engage in peace talks with the Taliban and the government. However, before starting talks, they should attack Pakistan and take it down.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Defeat Pakistan and then carve a peace agreement with the Taliban would bring peace.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope Afghanistan will recover from war. And for yourself? We want to help rebuild Afghanistan, and we hope foreigners will provide us economic assistance.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_18	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 70
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City camp.				
4	Where are you from? Ghaznee.				
5	Profession : Jobless.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan is causing the trouble.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan increased support is swelling up the insurgency.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? As everyone knows, the fighters are people from all over the world trained by Pakistan.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The people coming to fight all belong to the Paki government.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Our government is the best government in the world, but when Pakistan will stop interfering in Afghan affairs, the government will be able to do even better.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreign soldiers have come here to protect Afghanistan, but they are doing bad work killing civilians. This is also the case of the Afghan military.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We are praying to God to destroy Pakistan or to change its government, or to send western Armies to take control over the Paki government like the US did in Iraq.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace only when Pakistan will have been defeated.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? We hope that God will make Afghanistan thrive and will have Pakistan stop its intrusions. And for yourself? This would be enough for us.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 21 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_20	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]		2 Age : 65
3	Where do you live? Zhari Desert Camp.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar, Chanar Too		
5	Profession : Jobless.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? Two months ago, a suicide bomber blew himself up beside the road, killing five foreign soldiers and five Afghan soldiers, and injuring six.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? In Panjwai, I could hear the sound of bombings and fighting from my home.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? There are fighting and bombing because uneducated people are enrolled in fights for government's positions and power.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I don't know.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? NA.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? We receive no help from the government. It has been seven month since the last time we received help from anyone.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? We don't have any problem with the foreign soldiers, but if any were to arise, they would be linked to religion.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? God will know.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? We need economic assistance, schools, doctors, hospitals. And for yourself? We also need clothes for our kids, and food. We can't find any food here.		
17	Would you like to add anything? We don't go to the side of the road because we are scared of suicide bombers and IED.		

Date: 25 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_31
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 54
3	Where do you live? Bolan village, Helmand.		
4	Where are you from? Idem.		
5	Profession : Farmer, but my land is not big enough, so I also take daily jobs.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I haven't personally seen any fighting lately.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? I have heard about air bombing and fighting, especially in Garmser, Sangin, Musa Qala. Every day there is fighting and bombing in these areas.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The main reason behind the fighting and bombing is the intrusive policy of our neighbour country Pakistan, which is training and sending fighters and suicide bombers to destroy our country.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Initially, the people were tired of the Taliban government, and welcomed the new government, but with time they become fed up with the corruption of the current government; Pakistan is manipulating such thwarted people, whereas the foreign troops are not actively fighting anymore.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The various groups involved in the insurgency are: people sent by Pakistan under the name of Taliban, the Hezbi Islami, and Afghan people from areas where the Taliban have gained control. In the areas where Taliban are present, most young men join them.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Illiteracy and poverty, the lack of jobs and the need for money are leading Afghan people to enrol as fighters for the Taliban. For instance, the Afghan Army pays its soldiers 3000 Afghanis (USD 60) a month which is not enough to feed a family, whereas the Taliban pay 10,000 Afghanis (USD 200) a month, for a comparable level of risk. Thus, money is the main reason for people to choose the Taliban.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government hasn't done anything; even in a small district they cannot stop insurgency, so how will it be when Taliban will have gained strength? The government isn't even able to assure the security of its own forces, how could it protect its citizens?		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers were at first working hard to counter the insurgency, but now they are not doing anything. The foreign armies should help to solve the corruption problem in the government, and help pay the government's servants, policemen and soldiers enough. But if you give money to one commander, he will put it in his pocket, thus you have to be able to control what is done with the provided funding. Moreover, the foreign armies should help us put an end to the private armies by merging them all in one National force. A foreign organisation would announce they will hire guards, because they pay more. The well-off don't want to fight, only poor people that have		

	nothing to loose are ready to fight; thus the problem of poverty has to be tackled.
14	<p>What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing?</p> <p>The government should start negotiation with the people that oppose the government; besides, Durand line issue has to be solved with Pakistan. The best way to sort this out would be the United Nations and the international community leading negotiations.</p>
15	<p>When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan?</p> <p>Cooperation between the people and negotiation with the enemy would be the way, but the people and the government of Afghanistan do not have the ability to make peace by themselves. It depends on the foreign troops. If the foreign troops really commit to it, they can achieve peace in one year.</p>
16	<p>What would you like for Afghanistan in the future?</p> <p>I wish we will have schools, hospitals and clinics, and also land and seeds. Education is the key to development.</p> <p>With the current drought, if a farmer works on his land, it involves a lot of expenses that aren't matched by the earnings of the harvest. We need irrigation canals, seeds, tractors and fertilizers.</p> <p>And for yourself? My family is my country, I would be happy if my country is happy. If people want things for themselves, this country will never have peace.</p>
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 26 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_36	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 50
3	Where do you live? Lashkar Gah.				
4	Where are you from? Kabul Province.				
5	Profession : Orphanage principal.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have heard the explosion today. I think it is very bad. Such a thing is illegal in Islam. It kills civilians, destroys civilian houses and property, and it leads its perpetrator to Hell.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There have been quite a few incidents in Lashkar Gah lately.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The cow is black but the milk is white. Everyone knows that Pakistan is behind the insurgency. Pakistan is causing the trouble and supporting the fight, training and sending people to fight and to kill in Afghanistan. Iran usually is, like Pakistan, always trying to cause troubles in Afghanistan to take advantage of it, and is sending fighters to the Nimroz and Farah provinces, but obviously at the moment it has other priorities.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The growing insurgency is all about the Durand line. Pakistani media say that if Afghanistan gives up the Durand line, Afghans will have peace.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? From what I have heard, it seems that the Taliban are partly Afghan people and partly foreigners. Pakistan is mostly involved, through the Taliban, and perhaps is the Hezbi Islami also fighting along with the Taliban.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? In the Madrassa in Pakistan, people are taught an illegal version of Islam and wrong things about Jihad, and then they come to fight what they call jihad in Afghanistan. Another important reason to join the fight is money.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is trying to stop terrorism, but inside the government there is a lot of corruption; perhaps the foreigners will know how to stop the practice of bribery.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Another issue is that government soldiers get paid 3,000 Afghanis (US\$ 60) a month, which is not enough to properly support a family, whereas Taliban fighters are paid at least 10,000 Afghanis (US\$ 200) monthly. If foreigners want to solve the problem, they should give more money to pay the Afghan forces.				

14	<p>What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing?</p> <p>If all Afghan people agreed to work together, there would be peace; however this is made very unlikely by foreign manipulations. Otherwise, there could be peace if the foreign soldiers defeat the Taliban.</p>
15	<p>When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan?</p>
16	<p>What would you like for Afghanistan in the future?</p> <p>For Afghanistan, I wish peace and serenity, and I wish happy lives to all the Afghan people.</p> <p>And for yourself? I wish the same for myself.</p>
17	<p>Would you like to add anything?</p> <p>We are 16 people in my family. I work every day of the week, starting at 5 in the morning, and I earn 2,600 Afghanis (USD 52) per month. My wife works as a teacher, and some of my children also work when they are not at school, so that in total we have a monthly income of around 5,600 Afghanis (USD 112) to feed the 16 of us.</p> <p>Afghanistan has three main problems nowadays. The first problem is terrorism, the second one is corruption of the government, and the third one is opium trafficking.</p> <p>If you can, please talk with people in position of power in Afghanistan or in your country, so that things will change.</p>

Date: 26 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_37	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 18
3	Where do you live? Lashkar Gah.				
4	Where are you from? Helmand province, Naw Zad district .				
5	Profession : Chief of a department in an orphanage.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I haven't seen any recently.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Five years ago, I was living in Greshk district; one morning, airplanes bombarded a Taliban base near my house.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan doesn't want to leave Afghanistan in peace. Pakistan wants to move the Durand line.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is sending people to fight in Afghanistan under the name of Taliban.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, and behind them, Pakistan, are involved.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Some Afghan people join the fight because they need money.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is not fully able to cope with the insurgency, because its Army is too weak. Soldiers are not trained well enough, and the Army at large is not efficient enough.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreign soldiers want to help Afghanistan, and I am happy they are here.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? There could be peace either if Afghanistan is erased from the map, or if Afghanistan manages to gather a large powerful Army and then with the help of the international community, successfully puts diplomatic pressure on Pakistan so that it stops its intrusions in Afghanistan.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know when peace will be attained.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope Afghanistan will have peace and will be better-off in everything. I hope the international community will help make this happen. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? India also has a border issue with Pakistan. India has a very old friendship with Afghanistan.				

Date: 30 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_43	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 31
3	Where do you live? Lashkar Gah.				
4	Where are you from? NA.				
5	Profession : Engineer without a position.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? NA.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Taliban are fighting with support from Pakistan to obtain lucrative positions in the government and if possible seize power at a national level and re-establish a Taliban rule over the country.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Some of the Taliban fighters are Afghans while others are foreigners. All are trained in Pakistan or in the southern regions of Afghanistan under Taliban control, like the Gamser and Dishu districts of the Helmand province. They receive support and take their orders from Pakistan.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Poor jobless people join the insurgency for money.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police should do more to control and secure rural areas, as most of the rural South is not under their control.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are not currently able to win over the Taliban on the ground. If they want to prevail, they have two options. Either they continue to rely on their air force, by which the Taliban are really scared, but that would eventually make more civilian fatalities, or they bring in many more heavily armoured vehicles like tanks to win the battle on the ground. Right now they don't have enough firepower on the ground to take permanent control of the rural areas and defeat the Taliban.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers should be able to defeat the Taliban if they do as described above.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? NA.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_47	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 28
3	Where do you live? Lashkar Gah.				
4	Where are you from? Lashkar Gah.				
5	Profession : Doctor.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been some suicide bombing in the city lately.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Some people fight for themselves and their local interests, some people are real Taliban who want to bring their own version of Islam to Afghanistan, and some are only fighting for the money Pakistan gives them -to pursue its own geopolitical objectives.				
<i>Core Report Questions</i>					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Afghan and Pakistani people are part of the Taliban. Working at the hospital, I have myself seen Pakistani people with war injuries. It is likely that the Hezbi Islami is also involved.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Money is the main motivation for people joining the insurgency. Hungry people are easy recruits for the Taliban.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Impermeably closing the borders to stop Pakistani intrusion is a priority if we want to stop the insurgency. Education of the new generation is the most crucial measure to be taken; we have to teach people how to use a pen instead of a weapon and to make them aware that violence is not a solution.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? Everyone should be able to take his own responsibilities, and not rely on outsiders to fill his duties.				

Date: 18 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_71	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 30
3	Where do you live? Sharee Noo, Kandahar City, district 6.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.		
5	Profession : Shopkeeper.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan and the Taliban are behind the fighting and bombing.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? There is sustained warfare because no one involved really wants peace in Afghanistan.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, Iran, Al-Qaeda and Pakistan are involved in the insurgency.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Since there is a conflict, local commanders try to make use of the situation as a means to enhance their local influence, thus bringing their private loyalty based armies to fight for one side or the other.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't think the government is doing well, since the fighting is still going on.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the foreign soldiers are doing rather well; I have no complaint against them.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We need to establish peace to stop the violence.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? If there is a strong active government, peace will come.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish peace for my country. And for yourself? I hope we will have peace.		
17	Would you like to add anything? We need an active government.		

Date: 18 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_72
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 41

3	Where do you live? Kandahar, Daman district.
4	Where are you from? Idem.
5	Profession : Farmer.
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have heard of the fighting in the Panjwai district in which NATO forces were involved.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I think the Taliban, Al Qaeda and the Pakistan are responsible for the insurrection.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing?
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban are involved in fighting operations.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? People join the fight on the side of the insurgency because they oppose the American government, which they see as always willing to keep troubles in Afghanistan.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't think the Karzai government is doing well against the insurgency, because Karzai and NATO don't really want peace in Afghanistan.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the foreign soldiers are doing rather well, but they should stop bombardments.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai, if he commits himself to stop the fighting, is in the best position to achieve it.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Peace will only be possible if NATO stops bombarding people and let them grow poppies.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope we will have peace. And for yourself? I want peace.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 17 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_75
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 32
3	Where do you live? Loya Wala, district 6	

4	Where are you from? Khakriz.
5	Profession : Night time chief of security
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Yes.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? In my district, I have seen a house with 19 people living in it being bombed. 18 people died and one survived. Do you know why he survived? Because he was at the bazaar.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The main issue is that Pakistan has spent money to raise and train the Taliban, so it is its interest to support them. The other issue is the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, beyond which Pakistan wants to expand itself.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The Taliban are responsible for the increasing fighting and bombing.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban and Pakistan are involved.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan made the Taliban and provided training to fight for
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai and his cabinet are not really dedicated to make Afghanistan a prosperous country.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? If they wanted it, they could prevail in 5 or 6 months. The victory over 20,000 Taliban took just one month, and since that it has been 5 years and they still can't stop 1,000 Taliban.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We should build up peace and stability.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know when peace will come.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I want peace. And for yourself? I want peace and security.
17	Would you like to add anything? We want peace and security.

Date: 23 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_84
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 25
3	Where do you live? Iarkarez, Issin Dant.	
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City, district 3.	
5	Profession : Instar telecom manager.	

6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen some fighting in Kabul and Kandahar when the war started.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been some fighting between the Taliban and the government around where I live, 6 months ago.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Iran and Pakistan started the war.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NATO is bombing in Afghanistan, whereas they should bomb Iran and Pakistan, because this is where the Taliban are. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have their bases in Pakistan.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The groups involved are the Pakistani Taliban.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The reason is money. People join because their sons and families would starve to death otherwise.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government cannot stop this war, because the government is too weak. The international community has to help the Afghan government for this. Corruption inside the government must stop.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The American forces are not working well. They must send their soldiers on every border to control it to stop the Taliban from coming in. Especially, Pakistan doesn't want us to have peace.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? They should give to every Afghan an ID card, so that the government knows every Afghan. A problem is that the government doesn't know and can't control how is Afghan and who is Pakistani, who is good and who is bad. If they do this, everything is going to be fine; because the war is due to the fact that outsider can come here unnoticed. The Pakistan Pashto people can easily come in Afghanistan to fight.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Peace will come, if Pakistan stops sending fighters to Afghanistan.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? If the international community helps the Karzai government, our country will be peaceful and everything will be better. And for yourself? The rest of the world should put pressure on Pakistan and Iran to stop their people going to fight in Afghanistan.
17	Would you like to add anything? All around the world, every country must help Afghanistan until the end.

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_85	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 20
3	Where do you live? Kaltai , Malimin, Kandahar City, district 5.				
4	Where are you from? Arghendab.				
5	Profession : Construction worker.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I don't know, but I think Pakistan is responsible for the fighting and bombing.				
<i>Core Report Questions</i>					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? This is all the fault of the Taliban, and attempts to defeat them.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Iran and Pakistan are manipulating us.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? People fight for money. Extreme poverty is fuelling the insurgency.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is doing its best, but Pakistan doesn't want to end the fight. The government should sack every people from Pakistan.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are doing their best but they don't have enough troops to win the war. They are bombing and killing innocent people.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? If the international community really wants to stop the war, it can stop it. But the world doesn't care enough to stop the war in Afghanistan.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? If the world wants it, everything will be better.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I don't know what will happen. And for yourself? We want to have peace.				
17	Would you like to add anything? We just want a job; the government should help us find some work.				

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_87	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 24
3	Where do you live? Chour Nee, Kandahar City district 6.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.				
5	Profession : Shopkeeper.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I saw the American soldiers when they first came here in Kandahar City and fought the Taliban.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No, I don't know.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan and Iran are the causes of all our trouble.				
<i>Core Report Questions</i>					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The war is the result of Pakistan policy trying to keep the Durand line.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Fighters come from Pakistan and Iran.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? They are fighting because they are hungry and fight for little money.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government can prevail, if NATO helps. The government is doing an excellent job.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreigners are trying, but they are wasting their time. They are not doing anything wrong though.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Pakistan must its intrusions in our country.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when we can get rid of the bad people.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope better, peaceful times will come. And for yourself? I hope there will be peace.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_89	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 20
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 5.		
4	Where are you from? Arghendab.		
5	Profession : Public writer.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I heard the explosion of a suicide bomb aiming at NATO soldiers.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Everything happening is due to Pakistan and Iran.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan and the Taliban are increasing the number of their attacks.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is the only instigator.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan pays the Pakistani Pashto people from Waziristan to fight.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is doing rather well. They should build schools, hospitals and roads, and repair the public lights.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers don't fight face to face because they are too scared of the Taliban. However, they should fight face to face and not send in the aircraft bombers, because doing so they kill civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran should have talks about a peace agreement.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? If God wants, there will be peace.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? If God wants, everything will be fine. And for yourself? We need a good and enjoyable life.		
17	Would you like to add anything? Afghanistan will get better, I hope.		

Date: 17 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_90
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 19
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 2.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.		
5	Profession : Public Call Office Sohpkeeper.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? I have seen some bombings.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan and Iran are behind the insurgency.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The foreign forces coming to stop the war didn't manage to stop it and it is getting worse.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The countries involved are Pakistan and Iran.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? People are fighting for money; most of them are uneducated.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai is not doing well enough, only half of the work is done. They should bring electricity power, and most of all, peace. The governor of the Kandahar Province should be fired.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know. When a suicide bomber blows himself, the soldiers become crazy and the fire at the crowd, killing innocent people.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? This fight is not about Taliban, but about poppies. The villagers want to be able to continue growing opium poppies and sell them for a good price, whereas the government outlawed opium. Thus the drug lords are waging war against the government. The real problem is opium.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I am sorry to say that, but I don't think peace will come to our country.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I have a lot of dreams in my mind and in my heart that I want to realize if peace comes to Afghanistan. And for yourself? I wish peace will come.		
17	Would you like to add anything? Peace must come to Afghanistan.		

Date: 17 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_102
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 35
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, Kabul Shah		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City		
5	Profession : Tailor		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed a suicide bombing explosion not long ago in the street next to the Bazaar.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Neighbouring countries are fuelling the insurgency against the Afghan government.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The reasons behind the trouble in Afghanistan are the lack of jobs and money and the lack of education.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I don't know.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The lack of jobs and the need for money are pushing Afghan people into the arms of the Taliban.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the government is really trying to stop the insurgency.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't think the foreign soldiers are doing a good job since they are killing civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The only way to stop the insurgency would be through sound economics and internal politics. The main focus should be on developing the economy.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? People will only live in peace when Afghanistan will have a proper education system and an industry to employ its people.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope Afghanistan will succeed in everything. And for yourself? We would like to have schools for our children, so that they can receive a good education.		
17	Would you like to add anything? Fixing the economy is the key to peace in Afghanistan.		

Date: 19 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: M_110
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 23

3	Where do you live? Kandahar.
4	Where are you from? Kabul.
5	Profession : Owner of a mobile phone retail store.
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen a suicide bomber blow himself two months ago in Durahee.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan has long been our worse enemy and is triggering insurgency in Afghanistan.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is sending people under the name of "Taliban" to fight in Afghanistan. However, these fighters aren't really "Taliban".
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is the real enemy.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? NA.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is really good, but it doesn't have a free hand. It has to do what the foreigners tell it to do.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? What is very wrong is the fact that they are firing at civilians.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Negotiation with the local forces and successful confrontation with Pakistan shall bring peace to Afghanistan.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know; it has been 45 years we are living in war.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish Afghanistan will enjoy a fair peace. And for yourself? I want peace.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_111	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 32
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 5.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.				
5	Profession : Driver.				

6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed the explosions of 3 different suicide bombers lately: one here in Kandahar city in Durahee, one in Panjwai and one in Cafton Maddat Chauk.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been some bombing 5 months ago.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan, and only Pakistan, is to blame for the fighting and bombing.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is swelling an insurgency usurping the name of Taliban.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is sending to Afghanistan fighters that pretend to be Taliban.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan convinces people to join the insurgency.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government is excellent and perfectly duties.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? It looks like they are not even trying to bring peace to Afghanistan.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? There will be peace when the foreigners will leave the country and Pakistan will have been stopped from trying to destroy our country.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Never. I have no hope.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I don't know. And for yourself? I don't know.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: M_116
Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 43
3	Where do you live? London, UK.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.		
5	Profession : Employee of a mobile phone company in London.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen the explosion of a suicide bomber in the Bazaar.		

7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been a suicide bomb just in front of my home in Durahee.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The fighting and bombing are due to economic problems, and also to destabilisation instigated by Pakistan or maybe even America.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The intensification of the conflict is the result of Pakistan's policies to undermine Afghanistan's development.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? There are no Taliban fighting, there are only groups of fighters sent by Pakistan.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan is sending the insurgents, on behalf of China and America.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government is successful. All evil comes from Pakistan.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know, but they are killing civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know. If you compare Japan and Afghanistan, both countries were suddenly granted with freedom but only Japan did develop successfully from that time on		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when Pakistan and other countries will stop interfering in Afghanistan.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? We would like a good law abiding government and the opportunity for everyone to have a good life And for yourself? The above is all I wish.		
17	Would you like to add anything? No.		
Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_117
Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]		2 Age : 39
3	Where do you live? New York City, USA.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar, Afghanistan.		
5	Profession : Construction worker.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed several suicide bombings lately. I have seen one of them in Hazrat Ji Baba, another one in Sahree Noo, and a third one in Durahee.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There have been quite a		

	few suicide bombings in district 5, about 3 months ago.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The fighting and bombing in Afghanistan are the result of American and Pakistani interferences. Destructive American policies are carried out through Pakistan, and Pakistan also has its own political agenda concerning the Durand line.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan trying to move across the Durand line is increasing its support to the insurgency.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan, the United States and Britain are involved in the fighting.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan is convincing and training men to fight in Afghanistan.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai and its cabinet are good, but many people working for the government, like the provincial governors and their subordinates, are doing very badly because they maintain and fuel conflicts between ethnic groups.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers could stop the fight and change the situation in Afghanistan, but they don't intend to. Indeed, they didn't come here to help Afghanistan but to serve the interest of their own governments.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Any way to stop the war would be welcomed. Peace, however, doesn't seem likely, because some foreign countries wouldn't allow reconciliation in Afghanistan, and are making their own plans for the country. For instance, Pakistan and America have started a war between religions. This isn't new: Christians fight against Jews, Jews fight against Muslims, and so on.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't have such hope.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I have no hope for the future of Afghanistan. And for yourself? NA.
17	Would you like to add anything? I have already said enough.

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_126	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 75
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City district 6.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.				
5	Profession : Retired.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? The past two years have been marked with incidents everywhere: in Kabul, in Heart, in Kandahar.				

7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? I have myself witnessed a suicide bomb explosion in Kandahar City.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan, through the ISI, is causing the insurgency. God will ruin it.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is responsible for the rising level of violence.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan and the Taliban are involved in the insurgency.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? People can't find money since there are not enough jobs available. Many people join the Taliban only because they have to feed their family.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai is an outstanding man. God will protect him and grant him a long life.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know if the foreign soldiers are doing a good job, but they are firing at civilians.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Reconciliation would be the right way to build a stable peace.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? God only knows.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope everything will get better in Afghanistan. And for yourself? I wish myself a good life.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_127	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 64
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 5.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.				
5	Profession : Jobless.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? In 40 years I have a lot of fighting and bombing. Nowadays, there are conflicts between nationalities and war between the government and Pakistan.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There have been 8 suicide				

	bomber explosions in district 5 so far. In total, 70 people were killed.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The absence of a stable peace, the persistent lack of jobs and the intrusive policies of Pakistan are causing the fighting and bombing in Afghanistan.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The step up in violence is due to Pakistani intrusions.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting?
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan is taking advantage of the high unemployment and poverty rates in Afghanistan to recruit fighters.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai is doing good and we wish him a long life. God save him.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are fighting well, but they are going really wrong sometimes by killing civilians.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The best way to end the conflict would be to ally with the foreign countries against Pakistan.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when Pakistan will be defeated.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish for Afghans a good government and peaceful lives. And for yourself? I hope I will have a good life.
17	Would you like to add anything? I have said enough.

Date: 18 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_131	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 24
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahahr City.				
5	Profession : Student.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan's support to the Taliban is the cause of durable insurgency.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The lack of jobs				

	is fuelling the insurgency.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The conflict involves the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Hezbi Islami.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Insurgent fighters are led by extremist convictions acquired in Pakistani Madrasas.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the government is doing well to make peace possible, especially by building roads and other facilities.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are fighting well, but they make considerable mistakes due to their lack of knowledge about the local culture. They are bombing innocent people and entering people's houses without permission.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Convincing the United States and the European Union to put pressure on Pakistan so that it stops sending Taliban to Afghanistan would be the best way to bring peace.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I think peace will come to Afghanistan some day.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. And for yourself? I want to graduate in my University.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 18 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_132
Place: [REDACTED]		
<i>Introductory Questions</i>		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 20
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, Loya Wala	
4	Where are you from? Kandahar, Khakriz	
5	Profession : Student	
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.	
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No there hasn't been any.	
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Ignorance is the single most important factor explaining the fighting and bombing.	
<i>Core Report Questions</i>		
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The lack of jobs is fuelling the insurgency.	
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The conflict involves Hazbi Islami and Pakistan.	

11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The main reason for people to join the insurgency is money.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the Karzai government has not done enough to deal with the insurgency. It hasn't managed to enhance job opportunities for Afghans.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the foreign soldiers are not doing well at all; they even destroy houses of civilian people.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? There could be peace and security if the government negotiated with the Taliban and reached an agreement with them.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Peace is not possible now.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish there would be peace but if the situation stays like it is I am not hopeful. And for yourself? I would like to see peace coming to Afghanistan.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 18 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_133
Place: [REDACTED]		
<i>Introductory Questions</i>		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 18
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, Loya Wala.	
4	Where are you from? Kandahar, Kakriz	
5	Profession : Student.	
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen some bombing in my life.	
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.	
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is the reason of the insurgency.	
<i>Core Report Questions</i>		
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is paying Taliban fighters and sending them to Afghanistan.	
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban and Pakistan are contributing to the hostilities.	
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Ordinary people have a strong economic incentive to fight for the Taliban rather than for the government, as the government pays 2,000 Afghanis (USD 40) a month, whereas the	

	Taliban pays 30,000 Afghanis (USD 600) a month.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? No. The government and Karzai pledged heaps but eventually did not provide anything. What Karzai did well was bringing the Loya Jirga.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? No. The foreign soldiers destroyed people's houses and ruined the whole village.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? More responsibilities should be given to the elders and to the popular leaders.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Peace will come when Pakistan's hands will be cut from Afghanistan.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? I want to live a good life.		
17	Would you like to add anything? No.		
Date: 18 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_137
Place: [REDACTED]			
<i>Introductory Questions</i>			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 28
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, Loya Wala.		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar, Panjwai.		
5	Profession : Shoe store shopkeeper.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There have been aerial bombings in Panjwai this year.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The infidels are here, that is why there is fighting. Islam and the infidels will not get together.		
<i>Core Report Questions</i>			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? I don't know.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Everyone is involved: Pakistan, Iran, America, Canada...		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Some people join the fight because of Islam, while some others join because they have no work.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't know.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are bringing the fighting, not stopping it.		

14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We should work hard.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when God orders so.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like to see peace in Afghanistan. And for yourself? NA.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Date: 16 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_1	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 40
3	Where do you live? Danand District, Kandahar Province.				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: Driver.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I saw a bomb blast, just before Eid last year. It was here in Kandahar City.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No, I do not think so.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Karzai government has a different policy from the Pakistan government. That is the main cause of the current fighting in the south.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The main problem is the border. The people who are doing the fighting are coming in large numbers over the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Pakistanis are against the Karzai government and against the Afghan people. Pakistan is supporting the Taliban. That is what is causing the fighting.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? If you just look at my family, I would say that half of them would be willing to join the Taliban. The other half would not. The reason is simple. They are very poor people.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? No. Although Karzai wants to solve the current situation through attacks and on the other hand organizing meetings and jirgas, the Taliban does not want to stop fighting. That means that organizing meetings does not help.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Yes, they are trying to help us. That is a good thing.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I do not know that.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like the violence to stop in Kandahar province. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 16 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_6	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 33
3	Where do you live? District 6, Kandahar City.				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: Cleaner at Kandahar Hospital				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? There was a bomb blast in Kandahar City three months ago.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Yes, but not in recent months.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan is behind the fighting.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is training people to fight here.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The Taliban is giving money to Afghan men to fight. These men have no job. If I would not be working here as a cleaner in this hospital, I would join the Taliban.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai is trying to stop the fighting but it seems to be impossible with the continuing support the Taliban receive from Pakistan.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Yes. Foreign soldiers are doing a good job in Afghanistan.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We should speak with Pakistan and discuss the problem.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when Pakistan stops fighting Afghanistan.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? We need roads, schools, good education to have a better future. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? No.				

Date: 16 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_7	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 30
3	Where do you live? District 2, Kandahar City.				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: Cleaner at Kandahar Hospital				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen nothing.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? NA.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan is fighting the Afghan government through the Taliban.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The problem is that Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to fight over the provinces of Balochistan and Suba Zarhad (Waziristan, former Pashtunistan). There are a lot of Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan. Pakistan does not want to lose the economic value that the Afghan people contribute to their country.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, the government and the United States.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Afghans need money.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? No. Pakistan and the Karzai government should get together and work together to solve this problem. This is very easy to do, but still they are not doing it. I cannot understand why.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We should work together with Pakistan. That is the only way.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? NA.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I would like to see good electricity, roads, clean water. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? Kofi Annan has never said anything about Pakistan supporting the Taliban. That is a big problem.				

Date: 17 January		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_8	
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2007			
Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name: [REDACTED]	2	Age : 40
3	Where do you live? In the summer, I live in the Arghandab camp. In the winter, I move to Mokur, Ghazni province.		
4	Where are you from? I am originally from Mokur, Ghazni province.		
5	Profession: I have no specific job in the camp. I just do the daily tasks that I have to do.		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have only seen some bombing in the distance, some time ago near our home district in Ghazni Province.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No, but close by.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? I don't know. We are just nomads moving from place to place. I have no idea why they are fighting.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? NA.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? NA.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I have not seen any foreign soldiers around here. Your group is the only group that has been here once before. For the rest, nobody is coming here and helping us.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The government has no control. That is the main problem. It should take more control over those areas where the problems are.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Only God knows. It is in his hands.		
16	<p>What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? Before the past 7 or 8 years of drought, we actually had a good life. We had food and could take care of ourselves. Now, everybody is just thinking about himself and looking for ways to get his own food.</p> <p>And for yourself? There is no treatment for my son who is sick. I also would like a good life.</p>		
17	Would you like to add anything? We need tents and food. Please give us a job so that we can earn money by ourselves. We do not need more.		

Date: 17 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: JK_12
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name: [REDACTED]	2	Age : around 35
3	Where do you live? I am not from this camp. I am from another camp close by. I have been living in that camp since 2002. In the summer we stay here in this district. In the winter, I travel to Ghazni.		
4	Where are you from? I am from Ghiri district, Kandahar.		
5	Profession: I am doing all sorts of things in the camp.		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? We have experienced a lot of fighting over the past years. This has forced us to move from district to district, ahead of the fighting.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Yes. When the fighting started in Ghiri district, we all fled from there to Chaman, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now, most of the Taliban live in the Ghiri district and it is difficult for us to go back.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The problem is that the government cannot control the Taliban. They are still in my district. Nothing has changed. They are still walking around there and in control.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The government is fighting against the Taliban in Ghiri district. I do not know who is doing the bombing, but they are foreigners.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The Taliban recruit normal young people without a job. If we give these people a job, the Taliban would be the real Taliban, the foreigners would be the foreigners, the Afghans would be the real Afghans. It would be much simpler.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? When the foreigners started fighting the Taliban, I saw a lot of tanks coming. However, I do not know if they are doing a good job. The Taliban is still here. In the camp, there have never been any foreigners or foreign soldiers.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? We have to look what is behind the conflict. It is a problem of the government structure. The government is weak. They do not have control over the situation. If they get control, there is no need for fighting and bombing.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Poverty is the main obstacle to peace. The jobless people are behind the attacks. If they would have food for their families, they would not need to attack other people.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? The main problem is water. We need water. And for yourself? I need drinking water, food and a tent.		
17	Would you like to add anything? We need livestock to feed the families in the camp. At the moment, we can only survive with your assistance.		

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: AS_127	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name : [REDACTED]			2	Age : 64
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 5.				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.				
5	Profession : Jobless.				
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? In 40 years I have a lot of fighting and bombing. Nowadays, there are conflicts between nationalities and war between the government and Pakistan.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There have been 8 suicide bomber explosions in district 5 so far. In total, 70 people were killed.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The absence of a stable peace, the persistent lack of jobs and the intrusive policies of Pakistan are causing the fighting and bombing in Afghanistan.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The step up in violence is due to Pakistani intrusions.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting?				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan is taking advantage of the high unemployment and poverty rates in Afghanistan to recruit fighters.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Karzai is doing good and we wish him a long life. God save him.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign soldiers are fighting well, but they are going really wrong sometimes by killing civilians.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The best way to end the conflict would be to ally with the foreign countries against Pakistan.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when Pakistan will be defeated.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish for Afghans a good government and peaceful lives. And for yourself? I hope I will have a good life.				
17	Would you like to add anything? I have said enough.				

Date: 19 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_16	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : more or less 45
3	Where do you live? I was born in this area. In this area, there were no houses before. These houses were built during the first years of the Taliban regime.				
4	Where are you from? Naghan.				
5	Profession: I am the village elder here. I mostly work with livestock.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? No, recently there has been no fighting here. There have only been a few suicide bombs in Kandahar City, but we have little dealings there.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? In this area there has been no fighting. The reason is simple: strangers do not enter here. We unite against them. Even if we do not have guns, we use sticks and whatever we have at our disposal to fight them. We would fight them with the sticks that we have in our houses.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Taliban is getting stronger and stronger in some areas. A few days ago, American soldiers came to the village. One of their commanders called John told me that they were going to help us in case there was any trouble with the Taliban. He gave me his phone number. A few people in this village have a mobile phone so they could help me out there. He asked me to call them when I would see strangers. He said we should try to fight them first and if that did not help, he would send soldiers to fight them. I thought it was a good idea, but I think it is not necessary. We would fight them ourselves with every thing we have.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban are still able to fight in the Panjwai valley because of the people there. That is the problem. They are not fighting the outsiders and strangers that come to their villages. They should even use their booms and sticks to fight them out. Just look at our village. They cannot enter here. This is the most secure area outside of Kandahar city.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Poverty and despair is the main reason for joining the Taliban.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government is doing nothing at all to stop the fighting.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? We like foreigners, but we do not want them as enemies for our people. We want them to keep the peace.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The government should provide the poor with a job. They would not join the Taliban if they had to eat and could work in the field or in the city.				

15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? If the situation remains like this, there will be no peace. There are two main problems at the moment: 1) Some people give shelter to Arabs and Talibs. 2) The government takes first some money out of the foreign assistance money and keep that for themselves. They distribute it among themselves and only then give the rest to us.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? The first thing is peace. It does not matter if we are hungry, thirsty or are dying. We need peace first as that is the backbone of every thing else.. And for yourself? I would like peace, drinking water. The well that was dug is too far from my house. I would like a second well closer to my house. I would also like to have more shelter and houses in this village. We also need at least one school, so that our children can study. Lastly, we would need a clinic for medical attention.
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.

Date: 21 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_26	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 36
3	Where do you live? I have been living here for five, six years. I don't know exactly. I lost my right arm in a car accident 15 years ago.				
4	Where are you from? I am from Jwazjan, the north of Afghanistan. When I came here these tents were already here. When we arrived we were given 10 liters of oil, rice and beans. However, one year ago, they stopped the aid activities here. The organization running this place was the World Food Programme and Intersos (a combined programme). Last year March the camp was closed and we have not seen them around since. Before there were about 10 to 12 thousand families. Now we are around 8,000 families here in this camp.				
5	Profession: I do daily work, I do not have a fixed job. I cannot do a lot since I have only one arm.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? No, not around here.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? In our district there was constant fighting with the Tajiks. We fled here because of Dostum. We have family in Iran and Pakistan but cannot go there because we have no money. That is why we are stuck here.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? It is because of all the different tribes living in Afghanistan.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Currently, the fighting is with the Taliban.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban is supported by foreigners, especially by Pakistan.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? I think it is about poverty. People have so little options and they have to feed their families.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I heard the Americans are bombing in Panjwai. That is wrong. They are not solving the problem as the problem is in Pakistan. Why are they not bombing in Pakistan?				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when war ends.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? Nobody helped us after we had to flee our homes. We only had help from the NGOs here, but no that they have left as well we are on our own. We thank you for your aid, but we would like to be provided with alternatives. That is what we expect from our President. It does not matter from				

	<p>which tribe our President is, but when he is elected, we expect that he provides us with a job so that we can save money to go back to our own region.</p> <p>And for yourself? We need to build factories here so that we have a place to work in. Then we need to build schools for our children so that they can learn something, get a job and save our future.</p>
17	<p>Would you like to add anything? I need shelter for my family. I have four children. We are farmers. We want land to cultivate something for ourselves. But first, we need peace. With peace, every thing else will be all right.</p>

Date: 22 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_32	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 40
3	Where do you live? I have been living in this camp for eight months. Because of the fighting I came to this camp.				
4	Where are you from? I come from Pashmul				
5	Profession: NA.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Yes, the whole summer there has been fighting in the Panjwai.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Yes, the fighting in Pashmul has been very bad.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Taliban and Pakistan are fighting with the Afghan government.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, Pakistan and the Afghan government.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Some Pashmul people are fighting for the Taliban. We do not know why. However, most new Taliban are not Afghans but they are foreigners coming over the border.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? There are foreigners around here, but I do not know if they are winning the fight against the insurgency. I see their vehicles drive by on this road here, but they have never stopped and taken a look in this camp.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? I think that Pakistan should be stopped interfering with Afghanistan. The UN and our own government must help stop Pakistan. However, they should speak with Iran and Pakistan, not fight them.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? NA.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I want peace in our country and				

	in our city. And for yourself? I would like to go back to Pashmul. That is my country.
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.

Date: 25 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_35	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 30
3	Where do you live? Zariz, Ghalad district.				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: I am a police officer with the ANP.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Seven days ago, I was fighting the Taliban in Hazar Djud district. There were bombardments and there was a lot of fighting going on. The British were fighting with the Taliban at the same time. Sometimes they defeat us. Sometimes we are stronger.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? There are a lot of new Taliban fighters coming from Pakistan.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Most of the foreign countries do not want Afghanistan to be rebuild and to be stable.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban. They are supported by Pakistan.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? There are no jobs. They have no income. They are bored.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is just trying to fight them. Two of my brothers got injured in that fight against the Taliban.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Honestly, the British have done nothing here. They have only given us some weapons. Other things like the road in our village we had to build all by ourselves. We are not happy with them. In fighting the Taliban, two of my brothers were injured by an IED. Nobody has helped them. One lost his eyes, one lost his hand.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? To stop the fighting, we have to stop the foreign countries from interfering with our affairs. We also have to stop people from crossing the border. I do not think the current fight against the insurgency is effective. The current struggle will not be solved through negotiation.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Thirty years of war in Afghanistan has only happened because of our neighbouring countries. We will now only have peace in Afghanistan if Iran and Pakistan stop supporting the insurgency.				

16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I want Afghanistan to be rebuilt. To have roads, electricity, power and facilities. And for yourself? I want to have a good and relaxed time to do my prayers five times a day. That is all I need.
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.

Date: 26 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_37	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 40
3	Where do you live? Kartelagan				
4	Where are you from? Helmand – Washir				
5	Profession: Teacher				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Four months ago, a suicide bomb in Khano killed around 20 people in the centre of the city.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? In our school, two people were killed, one student and a watchman. This was about one month ago.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The people are uneducated and on top of that, many are against education.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? These are enemies of Afghanistan. While we are trying to promote education and teaching students, they are trying to do something wrong to disrupt our educational system.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? These are Taliban insurgents supported by Pakistan.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The Taliban are cheating the people. They are saying to the people that they will pay them more than the Afghan government and that they will give them more and better weapons. This way, they are in direct competition with the Afghan National Army.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Officially, it looks like the Karzai government is doing every thing right to counter the insurgency, but we know there is too much corruption.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreign troops are doing very well. They cooperate with the ANA and the Afghan security forces. If they were not here, the Taliban would do cruel things to our security forces. They are a positive contribution to Afghanistan.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? National unity is needed. The public should agree with the government and all the Afghans must be honest towards their country and serve the country. We should remove corruption.				

15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace when there will be good relationships with our neighbouring countries. A stable and trustworthy government is needed to pay attention to security. Every Afghan should serve his country to be soldier. They should start to see it as something compulsory..
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? First of all, for Afghanistan we need an Islamic government. The government should pay attention to the martyrs and the handicapped of this country and should pay attention to the nation, the mines, the treasury and the historical treasures of the country. It should provide a peaceful life for every Afghan. And for yourself? NA.
17	Would you like to add anything? Being Muslims, all Afghans should have sympathy for each other and unite. These who are not happy with the current situation in Afghanistan should not fight but instead should work hard to achieve unity.. That is all.

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_40	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 31
3	Where do you live? My whole life I have lived in Lashkar Gah City.				
4	Where are you from? I was born in Kajakee district.				
5	Profession: I am a shop keeper.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I did not see anything, but I heard from my relatives who came from Kajakee that there was a fight between the Taliban and the government about 15 days ago, and after that a war plane came and bombed the Zamendawar village.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Yes, as I have mentioned before.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? There is fighting because the people say they do not want non-Muslims in this country. Another reason is that the Taliban lost the power and they are now trying to get it back.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The people of the districts are unhappy with this government. They say that even in the time of the Taliban, they were secure and safe. Now there is a lot of cruelty and corruption.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, the British and the government are fighting. Pakistan and Iran are supporting the Taliban.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Ordinary Afghans are joining the Taliban because of poverty and the fact that they have no job. A farmer cannot get enough income from his field and his lands to support his family.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is doing a lot but in fact there has been fighting and war in Afghanistan for 30 years. That means it will take a lot of time to fix these problems.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Maybe they did a lot of good things. The wrong thing is that they have bombed innocent people. I really hope that whenever they need to do bombardments, they are making sure that they are not killing innocent civilians.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The government should negotiate with the opposition of the Taliban and should also give them a place in the Afghan government.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? If the government will work has they have done up to now, there will be no peace in Afghanistan. The government made a lot of promises with the people but they were not loyal to the people.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish to have peace in the country. After that we need support for our educational system and have more development for our country.				

	And for yourself? I want my children to live in peace and that they will have facilities such as education.
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.

Date: 23 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_64	
Place: [REDACTED]					
<i>Introductory Questions</i>					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 19
3	Where do you live? Lawala				
4	Where are you from? Kandahar.				
5	Profession: I am a driver.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Yes, in the Panjwai district because my uncle is living there. The bombing has killed my uncle and my brother.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? It is because of the Taliban and Pakistan through the ISI. It is because of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.				
<i>Core Report Questions</i>					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The Taliban and related groups do not want the present government.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? It is Al Qaeda.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Our problem is with the Pakistani government, with the Taliban and with Al Qaeda.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I do not know.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Yes, if they know how to stop the fighting and bombing.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? I think that the Americans, the Afghan government and the British army should let the Afghan people grow poppy.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don not think there will be peace in Afghanistan if we continue to fight for peace with an army.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope peace. And for yourself? I just want peace in Afghanistan.				
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.				

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_41	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name: [REDACTED]	2	Age : 35
3	Where do you live? Boulan		
4	Where are you from? Yes I was born in Boulan.		
5	Profession: I have no job. I am repairing my own house at the moment. It is a small house for a very big family. I have 40 family members.		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? There was no bombing. I have just seen some fighting, about three months ago. It was the Taliban versus the government.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? Idem.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Every one has different goals and objectives. It is a big power struggle for every body.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban and the government soldiers.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? NA.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The problem is that there are three different kinds of soldiers. First there is the ANA, secondly there is the ANP. Both are doing a good job. The main problem is with a third group of soldiers. These are the private soldiers. They are putting up their own check points. Every commander in the south is trying to increase the number of these private soldiers to fight for his own prestige and power.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Before, foreign soldiers were doing a good job in fighting the Taliban, but now they are not going out any more. They are not doing any missions any more. They only leave their base when they are doing something for their own benefit.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreigners should help to remove the Taliban. Now some countries are even helping the Taliban while others are helping the government. The ones helping the Taliban are Pakistan and the friends of Pakistan.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace if the foreigners take their hands off of Afghanistan. If they want peace there will be peace in this country.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? I would like to have peace, a peaceful life. Poverty is a big problem for us. Now, there is robbing, killing, bombing that is really harming us.		
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.		

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_42	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : around 50
3	Where do you live? Boulan district				
4	Where are you from? I was also born there.				
5	Profession: I am a farmer.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? The Taliban is coming to our towns to fight there. There are also some robbers. These are the private soldiers working for the government, who steal from the people. They are stealing cars, motorbikes, bicycles and cash. Only yesterday, they killed a driver and took his car. They took him from Boulan and took him to Dilaram. There they killed him and took his car.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? NA.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? NA.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban are Panjabi/Pakistani. Some Afghans are also joining the Taliban.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? People are joining them because they are told that the fight is because of religion and the Islam. However, this is not true. They are just being paid and trained in Pakistan to fight here in Afghanistan.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Taliban is still powerful. We do not have a good ANA and ANP so the Taliban are in control. They have enough power at the moment and are winning the fight with the government. The main reason is that this is not a normal war. The Taliban are not really fighting. It is a guerilla war, one shot here, one shot there. They are not fighting face to face and therefore the ANA and the ANP are powerless against them.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreigners can help to cut off the hands of Pakistan that are reaching for Afghanistan.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The foreigners should help us. Afghans alone cannot defeat the Taliban. Only with foreign help it can be done.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? NA.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I want peace in Afghanistan. And for yourself? I want a peaceful life, to enjoy working for my family. At the moment, the Taliban are threatening us not to work for the government or any NGO. They threaten to kill us if we do so.				

17	Would you like to add anything? NA.
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Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_43	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 26
3	Where do you live? Boulan district				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: I have no job.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have not seen any fighting or bombing.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? I have only heard about fighting.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Taliban, supported from Pakistan is anti-government.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? NA.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban is fighting us. They are not a religious movement. Now, they are just fighting for power and good positions to make money. They are not really aiming for political power in Kabul as it is very difficult for them to move to Kabul. Here in Helmand, it is a good place for them. This is like their home.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Most people come from Pakistan. That is where their support comes from. The main problem is that there are no borders. The insurgents can easily travel from Pakistan to Helmand.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The British are sometimes doing beneficial things for the security situation. Sometimes they are patrolling, but the majority of the time they are not doing anything.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Our Afghan National Army should be increased in number and should get better in fighting. Otherwise the Taliban will win.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? NA.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.				

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_44	
Place: [REDACTED]					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: [REDACTED]			2	Age : 55
3	Where do you live? Boulan district				
4	Where are you from? Idem.				
5	Profession: I have no job.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? No.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? The Taliban is sporadically fighting and there is a lot of robbing going on. If you get a new motorbike, it is being robbed by the private soldiers working for the government or by people connected to these soliders.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The fighters are uneducated. They are smoking hashish. They do not get paid very well. That is why private fighters start stealing and fighting for the Taliban.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The Taliban is coming from Pakistan where they are trained and guided.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban. It is not a religious movement. They are just doing it for power, positions and for their own benefits.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Afghans join the Taliban to get money, to have power, and to get a position inside the Taliban.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The ANA and ANP are doing a good job but not the local soldiers who are working as private fighters.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? NA.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? If we can prevent Pakistan from helping the Taliban there will be peace.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Idem.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? I just want a peaceful life. If nobody feeds us, that is no big problem. We will enjoy working hard to feed ourselves. That is our tradition. But we need to get some help and food distribution. We are very poor people.				
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.				

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_50	
Place: Lashkar Gah City					
Introductory Questions					
1	Name: Mohammad Sadiq			2	Age : 35
3	Where do you live? I live in this city.				
4	Where are you from? I come from Laghman Province.				
5	Profession: I am a teacher.				
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have not seen anything lately.				
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.				
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Fighting and bombing do not have any benefits.				
Core Report Questions					
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The Taliban is fighting with the government because the Taliban want to take over the government. They want to rule Afghanistan again.				
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban and the Pakistani are involved in the fighting.				
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Ordinary Afghans join the insurgents because they are given a lot of money. If the government would be giving a lot of money to these Afghans, they would not have to join the insurgency.				
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? If Karzai stops the fighting and bombing, it is a very good thing. He is not doing anything wrong.				
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? Foreign soldiers are doing very well. If there are no foreign soldiers, the Taliban would take Afghanistan back again. Afghans must defend their country and the foreign soldiers with creating security.				
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Our government should try every thing they can to stop the fighting.				
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be no peace in Afghanistan. There is no unity and our people are uneducated.				
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? For Afghanistan, I would like to see freedom. I would like to be an educated person in the future. And for yourself? NA.				
17	Would you like to add anything? I would like to see schools and factories in Afghanistan for the new generation.				

Date: 28 January 2007		Interviewer: [REDACTED]		Interview n°: JK_54	
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Place: [REDACTED]			
Introductory Questions			
1	Name: [REDACTED]	2	Age : 38
3	Where do you live? I live in the town here.		
4	Where are you from? I am from Kabul		
5	Profession: I am a shopkeeper.		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen some bombing, but recently, I have not seen anything like that.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There was fighting and bombing in the time of the Taliban, but not now. That was in Karabagh district.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Because now there is more and more Taliban an they are coming another country. Every body knows that.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Idem.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? In my view, there are mercenary groups in Pakistan and here, fighting for money.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? If they join the Taliban, it is because of money. That is the same for all sides of the conflict. Every body is fighting for money, not for anything else.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think Karzai is doing a good job, but it is the wrong policy that people have no work and poverty is a big issue. When they are bombing, they do not look at who they are bombing – is it a fighter or a local?		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think they can stop the fighting if they ask the local people and the Afghan government for support. Then, they can be the best in this conflict.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The best way to stop the fighting is stop the foreign support for the Taliban.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I cannot tell anything about that, because only Allah knows, but I think there will be peace.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? In the future, I would like that there will be peace and all the kids can go to school. And for yourself? NA.		
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.		

Date: 30 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: JK_68
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		

1	Name: [REDACTED]	2	Age : 33
3	Where do you live? I live in Pashmul, Kandahar Province		
4	Where are you from? I am from there as well.		
5	Profession: I am a farmer but currently I have no land to work on.		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? Yes, there were bombardments of our villages.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? An air bomb was dropped on the gate of our house in Pashmul. It destroyed half of our house, killing two of my relatives. The rest of the village is also destroyed. There is nothing there anymore.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? The Canadians are bombing the Taliban who are in our village.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? There is more and more fighting because the Taliban continues to be able to fight the Canadians. They are still around and they are hiding in our village. Too many villagers are supporting the Taliban and even fighting for them in the Pashmul area.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? The Taliban, the Canadians and the government forces.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The Taliban is a combination of people from Pakistan and local Afghans. These are people from our district and from Helmand province. People from Pashmul have also joined the Taliban. They oppose the government because of its poppy eradication policies. Many farmers in Pashmul are cultivating poppies to survive.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is winning against the Taliban, but the Taliban continues to fight a guerrilla war with mortars and gunfights.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? No. They are fighting the Taliban, but they are not defeating them. They can never defeat them as long as local Afghans are still willing to join them.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The Taliban should be defeated. There should be more and more outposts of the army in the villages. Also, people should be able and allowed to go back to the villages that they have fled from because of the bombing.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? There will be peace in Afghanistan when the Taliban is gone.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? NA. And for yourself? NA.		
17	Would you like to add anything? NA.		

Date: 17 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_102
Place: [REDACTED]		

Introductory Questions			
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 35
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, Kabul Shah		
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City		
5	Profession : Tailor		
6	Have seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed a suicide bombing explosion not long ago in the street next to the Bazaar.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Neighbouring countries are fuelling the insurgency against the Afghan government.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? The reasons behind the trouble in Afghanistan are the lack of jobs and money and the lack of education.		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? I don't know.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? The lack of jobs and the need for money are pushing Afghan people into the arms of the Taliban.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I think the government is really trying to stop the insurgency.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? I don't think the foreign soldiers are doing a good job since they are killing civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? The only way to stop the insurgency would be through sound economics and internal politics. The main focus should be on developing the economy.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? People will only live in peace when Afghanistan will have a proper education system and an industry to employ its people.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I hope Afghanistan will succeed in everything. And for yourself? We would like to have schools for our children, so that they can receive a good education.		
17	Would you like to add anything? Fixing the economy is the key to peace in Afghanistan.		

Date: 19 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: M_110
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		

1	Name : [REDACTED]	2	Age : 23
3	Where do you live? Kandahar.		
4	Where are you from? Kabul.		
5	Profession : Owner of a mobile phone retail store.		
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have seen a suicide bomber blow himself two months ago in Durahee.		
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? No.		
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan has long been our worse enemy and is triggering insurgency in Afghanistan.		
Core Report Questions			
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is sending people under the name of "Taliban" to fight in Afghanistan. However, these fighters aren't really "Taliban".		
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is the real enemy.		
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? NA.		
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The government is really good, but it doesn't have a free hand. It has to do what the foreigners tell it to do.		
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? What is very wrong is the fact that they are firing at civilians.		
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? Negotiation with the local forces and successful confrontation with Pakistan shall bring peace to Afghanistan.		
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? I don't know; it has been 45 years we are living in war.		
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I wish Afghanistan will enjoy a fair peace. And for yourself? I want peace.		
17	Would you like to add anything? No.		

Date: 19 January 2007	Interviewer: [REDACTED]	Interview n°: AS_111
Place: [REDACTED]		
Introductory Questions		
1	Name : [REDACTED]	2 Age : 32
3	Where do you live? Kandahar City, district 5.	
4	Where are you from? Kandahar City.	
5	Profession : Driver.	
6	Have you seen any bombing or fighting lately? I have witnessed the explosions of 3	

	different suicide bombers lately: one here in Kandahar city in Durahee, one in Panjwai and one in Cafton Maddat Chauk.
7	Has there been any fighting or bombing in your district? There has been some bombing 5 months ago.
8	Why do you think there are fighting and bombings? Pakistan, and only Pakistan, is to blame for the fighting and bombing.
Core Report Questions	
9	Why do you think there is more and more fighting and bombing? Pakistan is swelling an insurgency usurping the name of Taliban.
10	Which groups are involved in the fighting? Pakistan is sending to Afghanistan fighters that pretend to be Taliban.
11	What would be the reason for an ordinary Afghan to join the insurgency? Pakistan convinces people to join the insurgency.
12	Do you think the Karzai government is doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? The Karzai government is excellent and perfectly performs its duties.
13	Do you think the foreign soldiers are doing well to stop the fighting and bombing? It looks like they are not even trying to bring peace to Afghanistan.
14	What do you think would be the best way to stop the fighting and bombing? There will be peace when the foreigners will leave the country and Pakistan will have been stopped from trying to destroy our country.
15	When do you think there will be peace in Afghanistan? Never. I have no hope.
16	What would you like for Afghanistan in the future? I don't know. And for yourself? I don't know.
17	Would you like to add anything? No.

Appendix 2

Selected video interviews conducted in southern Afghanistan in January 2007

Interview n°1: Haji Akbar Khakrizwal, Kandahar

Interviewer: Haji can you please introduce yourself?

Mohammad Khakrizwal: My name is Mohammad Khakrizwal I am from Kandahar khakriz district.

I: How old are you?

MK: I am around fifty six or fifty seven years old.

I: Can you tell me if you have seen any bombing or fighting recently?

MK: Yes I have seen various hostilities in the Panjwai and Zhari districts of Kandahar.

When the Taliban penetrated into these districts the NATO forces bombed villages; many houses have already been destroyed, Taliban and civilians, including children and women, were killed and this is obvious to reporters and to the world; huge damage occurred.

I: Can you tell me how many civilian casualties there have been?

MK: In this fighting, I think, in some places twenty people, in other places fifty people, and in one place ninety people were killed so I reckon the total number of casualties in two districts is around four hundred people, including children, women, and men.

I: In your opinion, how can the Afghan government stop this fighting?

MK: I have expressed my view on this to other foreign journalists, Canadians and Americans. If you want to reduce the number of civilian casualties you must get precise intelligence about

where the Taliban and Al-Qaida are located and the second thing is, if there isn't a fundamental change in the government, the foreigners won't avoid trouble; we need pragmatic people to work hard to destroy the Taliban. If you look at it, the Taliban and Al-Qaida are not more powerful than the Army and police. The problem lies in the fact that the police are not sufficiently trained. The police hire men from the streets and after five or ten days training these men join to the police forces.

Moreover because their salary is too low, these people do not fight, so the coalition forces are making most of the fighting, whereas they are not used to the geography of our country. Besides, the Taliban propaganda denounces the coalition forces as invading foreigners. The Taliban have TV cameras and show to the people films of oppression by the coalition forces, destroyed houses and bulldozed gardens. The government should bring professional people to the administration and take the responsibility of the fighting inside the country while the coalition forces would take action against any threat from foreigner forces. This way the police and army could expand their control inside the country.

I: Which groups are involved in these fighting?

MK: In this fighting, Al-Qaida is involved, though not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq and other countries, where it plans suicide attacks and explosions. The second element involved is the Taliban which was controlling Afghanistan. The third, and main, party involved in the conflict is Pakistan. Pakistan says "during the Soviet era I was training the Mujahideen and the whole world were funding me and I was giving it to Mujahideen but now Afghanistan has to be under my influence, otherwise I will sent fighters to Afghanistan". In such case if Pakistan is not satisfied, the fighting will continue.

Pakistan is now funding and commanding the fighting, while the Taliban and Al-Qaida act as armed organizations.

I: Where are the groups that are involved in the fighting training?

MK: Before they were getting their training in Pakistan; when former pupils became trained teachers, Pakistan sarterd camps inside Afghanistan in each province. In 2004, 2005, and 2006 they began training in places like Qalat, Zabul, Helmand Mountains and Uruzgan Mountains. They have foreign teachers who give them training and they receive explosives from Pakistan.

I: Can you please Haji point to these places on the map?

MK: Yes definitely, bring a map and I will show you where.

Two years ago they were getting their training in the north of the Zabul Province, in the Mizan district, in the Miyana Nishin Mountains, which are between Uruzgan, Zabul and Kandahar. It is a very mountainous place.

I: And how about Helmand can you show me?

MK: In Helmand, two or three years ago they were getting training in Baghran, Baghnai, and Nawzad. They receive their explosives from Pakistan and distribute them in other provinces. They also have camps in the west of Helmand province in Hazar Choft.

As I have heard from my relatives, they have seen foreign fighters in Garmser; these fighters are Arabs, Chechens and Pakistani. The Pakistanis are the instructors and are in command, especially men from the ISI.

In Kandahar they have camps in Khakriz district Chenary Manukhal village, Lam mountains ready to explode themselves.

I: You told me they intend to explode themselves, is suicide acceptable?

MK: In our law, in Islam and holy Quran, it is unlawful and forbidden as a sin against all humanity. Nowadays there are many uneducated people in the world and these people are unaware of Islam law and Quran so they hire these people and tie explosive onto them and send them for suicide.

I: Why are ordinary Afghans joining the Taliban lines?

MK: The first reason for joining is that Afghans are poor and the Taliban are giving thirty thousand rupees [USD 500] for their family and thirty thousand for their own expenses. Thus for a total of sixty thousand rupees [USD 1000], they join the Taliban. A limited number of people join, I think in each province they will have one thousand people joining, all driven by poverty.

I: Who are responsible for the fighting?

MK: In my idea it is all Pakistan, because Pakistan wants fighting in this region. If Pakistan stops fuelling the fighting, there will be no place for the fighters to stay or to hide. And who is making explosive, the locals? No, the locals can not make explosives, so it is clear to everyone that Pakistan makes the explosives and gives them.

I: In your opinion, will we have more and more fighting in Afghanistan or not?

MK: I think in spring 2007, fighting will intensify, as I know Pakistan has prepared forces to fight and to put pressure on the coalition forces so that they abide by Pakistan demands.

I: What is Pakistan's intention?

MK: Pakistan's intention is to ensure that any future government in Afghanistan will be under Pakistan's influence.

I: My next question is, when will there be peace in Afghanistan?

MK: Peace can't come if the foreigners don't put pressure on Pakistan so that it stops sending Al-Qaida and terrorists to Afghanistan, besides, if fundamental changes don't happen in the government or if the administration is not passed to real honest Afghans... Look, even Governors are connected to ISI, the communists do not want Americans or Mujahidine to come to power as they think the Mujahidine and Americans were the ones who have deposed their government, so if fundamental changes do not occur, peace can not come to Afghanistan.

I: What is your wish for Afghanistan and your family?

MK: Security is the first wish for Afghanistan not just in Afghanistan but in the whole world. We do need security, peace and work to find food.

I: What is your wish for your own family?

MK: For me and my family I also wish security; last year my twenty five year old son and my brother who was Kabul police chief Mohammad Akram Khakrizwal were martyred, along with forty

other people, while seventy people were injured by terrorists. So my wish is security for my family.

I: Can you tell me how poor are the people of Afghanistan?

MK: Outside the city, in the villages there are people who haven't seen meat or bread in months. If in one family there are nine youths, in general only one is working and the eight others don't have any work, so as I told you the people of Afghanistan are so poor that they join the Taliban. The government's salary is three thousand Afghanis, which is about fifty [sic] dollars, whereas the Taliban pay two hundred or four hundred dollars. The victims of this situation are the poor police that are dying by the hand of Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

I: Haji, where do the Taliban get this money from?

MK: Pakistan's government gives money and I think Chinese, Russians and Iranians are also helping, besides an important source of the income is the opium business. Pakistan and the Taliban are trading opium from Afghanistan to Pakistan and via Karachi to Europe. Before they were taking it to Iran and Europe, but now they use Pakistan's route and all of the smugglers are free to go to Pakistan.

I: Thank you very much, Haji.

MK: Thanks to you for asking about our life situation.

I: What do you and the people think Afghanistan was better before or is it better now?

MK: It was better before because before poppy was free to be cultivated and every one had work and good income. The farmers, poppy harvesters, and every one had good income, in that time people were making one thousand dollar. Today it is fifteen dollars a month, we used to have widespread employment, which obviously we don't have anymore.

Now the NATO forces come and destroy poppy crops and they do not give anything in exchange. The NATO forces are just saying words they have not undertaken any action; they enter peoples houses and use bombs to open their gates and this is against our culture.

I: Isn't there any other crop that people can grow?

MK: There are crops like wheat but we do not have water, we use a water pump to get water and it is expensive so the only crop that is worth more than what it costs in pumped water is poppy. When it is time for harvesting pomegranate and grapes Pakistan and Iran both block their border and it all gets rotten. We beg the world to find markets for our fruits but the world does not put pressure on Pakistan and Iran, nor does it buy the fruits of Afghanistan or give us freezers, so that it doesn't rot while we slowly sell it.

The world is neither letting us cultivate poppy nor buying and finding market for our other crops, so we are in trouble; it looks like the world wants our fruits to rot.

Interview n°2: Amanullah, Lashkar Gah

Interviewer: Could you please introduce yourself, what is your name?

Amanullah: My name is Amanullah. I am originally from Musa Qala.

I live in the Darvishan village in the Garamser district. I came here to visit my relatives, my in-laws live here.

How long have you been living in Garamser district?

In fact we have our own land and house in Garamser and I have been living in Garamser for about 27 years.

I: What do you do in Garamser (what is your profession)?

A: I am a farmer and I have my own land.

I: Do you have enough income from your crops to feed and take care of your family?

A: Yes, it is not bad, Insha'allah.

I: Can you get by with your income?

A: Yes, it is not bad, we survive.

I: How is the security situation in there?

A: The security situation is not good in there because it there is recurrent bombing; a few days ago there was bombing really close to our home and the bombardment was targeting the Taliban, but a lot of the civilians also died, I even saw with my own eyes that seven persons from a single family died.

I: Were they local people and civilians?

A: Yes I saw them on my own eyes they were children and women and all of those seven persons were from one family.

I: When did that happen, how long ago?

A: This bombing took place about 12 or 13 days ago, it was devastating bombing. In fact there is a place by the name of District governor Abdullah Jan Camp and there were some Taliban and the bombing happened in there, during which 13 prisoners also died, these prisoners were arrested by the Taliban in those areas, one of my cousins was also among those 13 prisoners and he also died.

I: Were those 13 people arrested by the Taliban?

A: Yes they were arrested by the Taliban and seven Taliban also died in that bombardment.

I: Who was bombing?

A: The Americans were bombing.

I: Who is involved in the ongoing fight?

A: It is clear and visible that Pakistan is involved and Pakistan is interfering in here.

I: My question was about which exact groups were fighting in there?

A: The fight was between the Taliban and the Americans.

I: Has the government of Afghanistan done anything to stop the fight and solve the problems?

A: The government of Afghanistan has tried to solve these problems and stop the fight. The local elders are trying to stop the fight and solve the problems, but the problems will never be solved. The fight will never be stopped as long as Pakistan doesn't stop interfering in Afghanistan; the world should put pressure on Pakistan to stop its intrusions in Afghanistan and definitively solve the problem.

I: You mean that Pakistan is behind this fight?

A: Pakistan's ISI is behind this fight; Pakistan is pushing people to fight, it is not only me saying this in fact each Afghan knows about this, the whole world, the Tribal elders and all the people of Afghanistan know about this – that Pakistan is interfering in here.

I: The Taliban who are fighting, are they Afghans, or are they foreigners such as Iranians, Pakistanis or other people?

A: Perhaps there were Pakistanis among them but then they wore Afghan clothes, and generally looked like Afghans.

I: So apparently they looked like Afghans?

A: Yes apparently they looked like Afghans.

I: You said that there may also be Pakistanis among the Taliban.

A: They wear clothes like the Afghans but sometimes when we talk to some of them they don't even understand our language, Pashto.

I: So you mean that those who don't understand Pashto are foreigners.

A: Of course they are.

I: What would be the best way to stop the fight and solve the problems?

A: The best thing to do would be for Afghans to get together and make a peace and help each other, and another thing would be Pakistan to stop interfering; if Pakistan carries on interfering in Afghanistan, there will be no peace; we will never have peace in Afghanistan unless the foreign countries put pressure on Pakistan, since all of these problems are because of Pakistan interfering in Afghanistan.

I: Have it ever happened or have you ever heard that ordinary young Afghans joined the Taliban and fought against the government?

A: Yes I have heard of a lot and I see a lot of them.

I: What is the reason for them to join the Taliban and to fight against the government?

A: The main reason is Pakistan telling them that there are foreigners in their country, which foreigners are here to invade Afghanistan, and that they have to Jihad (struggle) against the foreigners; in fact they are young boys and it is easy to brainwash them.

I: You mean these young men are recruited by others to fight?

A: Pakistan is recruiting them.

I: What do you hope for the future of Afghanistan?

A: We hope we will have peace in Afghanistan, all the Afghans are our brothers and we wish that they will be united and will help each other to make peace and stop and finish the fighting.

I: What do you wish for yourself and for your family in the future?

A: I wish that the fighting will end and that we will live in peace; this is all I want for us.

I: Do you have anything else to tell us or particular message?

A: My message to all the elders and to all the people of Afghanistan is “get together and make peace, and unite to stop foreign interference in Afghanistan, especially from Pakistan, because we don’t have any other enemy in the world; Pakistan is the only one.”

I: Thank you very much.

Appendix 3
Three extracts from the US Army official
Counterinsurgency Manual

Extract 1: Extract (Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operation & Summary) from Chapter 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency¹**PARADOXES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

1-148. The principles and imperatives discussed above reveal that COIN presents a complex and often unfamiliar set of missions and considerations. In many ways, the conduct of COIN is counterintuitive to the traditional U.S. view of war—although COIN operations have actually formed a substantial part of the U.S. military experience. Some representative paradoxes of COIN are presented here as examples of the different mindset required. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on a sense of the local situation and, in particular, the state of the insurgency. For example, the admonition “Sometimes, the More Force Used, the Less Effective It Is” does not apply when the enemy is “coming over the barricades”; however, that thought is applicable when increased security is achieved in an area. In short, these paradoxes should not be reduced to a checklist; rather, they should be used with considerable thought.

¹ Counterinsurgency, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, December 15, 2006, available [online] at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>

Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be

1-149. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed against the effectiveness of using larger unit bases. (FM 90-8 discusses saturation patrolling and operational support bases.) These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is

1-150. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. As noted above, the key for counterinsurgents is knowing when more force is needed—and when it might be counterproductive. This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents' actions.

The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

1-151. This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.

Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction

1-152. Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit—for example, opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting.

Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot

1-153. Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not involve killing insurgents (though, again, killing clearly will often be necessary). Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people's minds; hence synchronizing IO with efforts along the other LLOs is critical. Every action, including uses of force, must be "wrapped in a bodyguard of information." While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when "money is ammunition." Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts. Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.

The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well

1-154. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of

their own forces and government. General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, recognized this fact when he said, "There's very clear evidence...in some things, that we helped too much. And we *retarded* the Vietnamese by doing it....We can't run this thing....They've got to run it. The nearer we get to that the better off *they* are and the better off *we* are." T.E. Lawrence made a similar observation while leading the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1917: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them." However, a key word in Lawrence's advice is "tolerably." If the host nation cannot perform tolerably, counterinsurgents supporting it may have to act. Experience, knowledge of the AO, and cultural sensitivity are essential to deciding when such action is necessary.

If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next

1-155. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful COIN practices and rapidly disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a COIN tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no "silver bullet" set of COIN procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential.

Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing

1-156. As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in COIN. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives. Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the host nation's essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain.

Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

1-157. Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines at all levels. Indeed, young leaders—so-called "strategic corporals"—often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders' intent.

SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY PRACTICES

1-158. Table 1-1 lists some practices that have contributed significantly to success or failure in past counterinsurgencies.

SUMMARY

1-159. COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population's support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN agencies in a comprehensive approach.

1-160. Designing operations that achieve the desired end state requires counterinsurgents to understand the culture and the problems they face. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents are fighting for the support of the populace. However, insurgents are constrained by neither the law of war nor the bounds of human decency as Western nations understand them. In fact, some insurgents are willing to commit suicide and kill innocent civilians in carrying out their operations—and deem this a legitimate option. They also will do anything to preserve their greatest advantage, the ability to hide among the people. These amoral and

often barbaric enemies survive by their wits, constantly adapting to the situation. Defeating them requires counterinsurgents to develop the ability to learn and adapt rapidly and continuously. This manual emphasizes this “Learn and Adapt” imperative as it discusses ways to gain and maintain the support of the people.

1-161. Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence necessary to identify and defeat insurgents. Designing and executing a comprehensive campaign to secure the populace and then gain its support requires carefully coordinating actions along several LLOs over time to produce success. One of these LLOs is developing HN security forces that can assume primary responsibility for combating the insurgency. COIN operations also place distinct burdens on leaders and logisticians. All of these aspects of COIN are described and analyzed in the chapters that follow.

Table 1-1. Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices

<i>Successful practices</i>	<i>Unsuccessful practices</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasize intelligence. • Focus on the population, its needs, and its security. • Establish and expand secure areas. • Isolate insurgents from the populace (population control). • Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous information operations. • Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government. • Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits. • Expand and diversify the host-nation police force. • Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. • Embed quality advisors and special forces with host-nation forces. • Deny sanctuary to insurgents. • Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing. • Secure host-nation borders. • Protect key infrastructure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace. • Conduct large-scale operations as the norm. • Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection. • Focus special forces primarily on raiding. • Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host-nation forces. • Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military's image. • Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures. • Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines.

Extract 2: extract from The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations, in Chapter 5: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations

THE NATURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

5-1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions. Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions. Military forces can compel obedience and secure areas; however, they cannot by themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful COIN efforts include civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces. These efforts purposefully attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just its fighters and comprehensively address the host nation's core problems. Host-nation (HN) leaders must be purposefully engaged in this effort and ultimately must take lead responsibility for it.

5-2. There are five overarching requirements for successful COIN operations:

- U.S. and HN military commanders and the HN government together must devise the plan for attacking the insurgents' strategy and focusing the collective effort to bolster or restore government legitimacy.
- HN forces and other counterinsurgents must establish control of one or more areas from which to operate. HN forces must secure the people continuously within these areas.
- Operations should be initiated from the HN government's areas of strength against areas under insurgent control. The host nation must retain or regain control of the major population centers to stabilize the situation, secure the government's support base, and maintain the government's legitimacy.
- Regaining control of insurgent areas requires the HN government to expand operations to secure and support the population. If the insurgents have established firm control of a region, their military apparatus there must be eliminated and their politico-administrative apparatus rooted out.
- Information operations (IO) must be aggressively employed to accomplish the following:

- Favorably influence perceptions of HN legitimacy and capabilities.
- Obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN operations.
- Publicize insurgent violence.
- Discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative.

5-3. COIN operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for effective governance, essential services, and economic development. The focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct stages that can be envisioned with a medical analogy:

- Stop the bleeding.
- Inpatient care—recovery.
- Outpatient care—movement to self-sufficiency.

Understanding this evolution and recognizing the relative maturity of the operational environment are important to the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of COIN operations. This knowledge allows commanders to ensure that their activities are appropriate to the current situation.

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”

5-4. Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security. During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common operational picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed. Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”

5-5. The middle stage is characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability. Counterinsurgents are most active here, working aggressively along all logical lines of operations (LLOs). The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces. As civil security is assured, focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened. These relationships increase the flow of human and other types of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations in conjunction with the HN security forces. The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

LATE STAGE: “OUTPATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY”

5-6. Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces. The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership. In this stage, the multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Quick reaction forces and fire support capabilities may still be needed in some areas, but more functions along all LLOs are performed by HN forces with the low-key assistance of multinational advisors. As the security, governing, and economic capacity of the host nation increases, the need for foreign assistance is reduced. At this stage, the host nation has established or reestablished the systems needed to provide effective and stable government that sustains the rule of law. The government secures its citizens continuously, sustains and builds legitimacy through effective governance, has effectively isolated the insurgency, and can manage and meet the expectations of the nation’s entire population.

LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

5-7. Commanders use LLOs to visualize, describe, and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance. (See figure 5-1.) LLOs are appropriate for synchronizing operations against enemies that hide among the populace. A plan based on LLOs unifies the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and HN forces toward a common purpose. Each LLO represents a conceptual category along which the HN government and COIN force commander intend to attack the insurgent strategy and establish HN government legitimacy. LLOs are closely related. Successful achievement of the end state requires careful coordination of actions undertaken along all LLOs.




Figure 5-1. Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency

5-8. Success in one LLO reinforces successes in the others. Progress along each LLO contributes to attaining a stable and secure environment for the host nation. Stability is reinforced by popular recognition of the HN government's legitimacy, improved governance, and progressive, substantive reduction of the root causes of the insurgency. There is no list of LLOs that applies in all cases. Commanders select LLOs based on their understanding of the nature of the insurgency and what the COIN force must do to counter it. Commanders designate LLOs that best focus counterinsurgent efforts against the insurgents' subversive strategy.

5-9. Commanders at all echelons can use LLOs. Lower echelon operations are nested within the higher echelon's operational design and LLOs; however, lower echelon operations are conducted based on the operational environment in each unit's area of operations (AO).

5-10. The commander's intent and vision of resolution, expressed as LLOs, describe the design for a COIN operation. Commanders and staffs synchronize activities along all LLOs to gain unity of effort. This approach ensures the LLOs converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state.

5-11. LLOs are directly related to one another. They connect objectives that, when accomplished, support achieving the end state. Operations designed using LLOs typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-, mid-, and long-term goals. These operations combine the effects of long-term operations, such as neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure, with cyclic and short-term events, like regular trash collection and attacks against insurgent bases. (See figure 5-2.)




Figure 5-2. Example goals and objectives along logical lines of operations

Extract 3: extract from Logical Lines of Operations in Counterinsurgency, in Chapter 5: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations

ESTABLISH OR RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

5-42. Essential services address the life support needs of the HN population. The U.S. military's primary task is normally to provide a safe and secure environment. HN or interagency organizations can then develop the services or infrastructure needed. In an unstable environment, the military may initially have the leading role. Other agencies may not be present or might not have enough capability or capacity to meet HN needs. Therefore, COIN military planning includes preparing to perform these tasks for an extended period. (Table 5-4 lists considerations for developing the essential services LLO.)

Table 5-4. Considerations for developing the essential services LLO

- Make this effort a genuine partnership between counterinsurgents and host-nation authorities. Use as much local leadership, talent, and labor as soon as possible.
- Plan for a macro and a micro assessment effort. Acknowledge early what is known and not known—and honestly appraise what needs to be accomplished. The macro assessment concerns national-level needs; it is long term in focus. The micro assessment focuses on the local level; it determines, by region, specific short-term needs.
- Appreciate local preferences. An accurate needs assessment reflects cultural sensitivity; otherwise, great time and expense can be wasted on something the populace considers of little value. Ask, How do I know this effort matters to the local populace? If there is no answer, the effort may not be important. Host-nation authorities are a good place to start with this question. A local perception assessment may also be useful. (See appendix B.)
- Establish realistic, measurable goals. Establish ways to assess their achievement.
- Form interagency planning teams to discuss design, assessment, and redesign. Recognize and understand other agencies' institutional cultures.
- Meet with representatives from organizations beyond the host-nation government team. Many nongovernmental organizations do not want to appear closely aligned with the counterinsurgency effort. Encourage their participation in planning, even if it means holding meetings in neutral areas. When meeting with these organizations, help them understand mutual interests in achieving local security, stability, and relief objectives.
- Be as transparent as possible with the local populace. Do your best to help people understand what counterinsurgents are doing and why they are doing it.
- Consider the role of women in the society and how this cultural factor may influence these activities.
- Discourage the attitude that counterinsurgents have arrived to "save the day"—or that their arrival will only cause greater problems. Helping the populace understand what is possible avoids frustrations based on unrealized high expectations.

5-43. Counterinsurgents should work closely with the host nation in establishing achievable goals. If lofty goals are set and not achieved, both counterinsurgents and the HN government can lose the populace's respect. The long-term objective is for the host nation to assume full responsibility and accountability for these services. Establishing activities that the HN government is unable to sustain may be counterproductive. IO nested within this LLO manage expectations and ensure that the public understands the problems involved in providing these services, for example, infrastructure sabotage by insurgents. Figure 5-4 shows an example of common essential services categories. Accomplishing objectives in each category contributes to achieving the higher commander's desired end state.




Figure 5-4. Example of essential services categories and objectives

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF BETTER GOVERNANCE

5-44. This LLO relates to the HN government's ability to gather and distribute resources while providing direction and control for society. These include regulation of public activity; taxation; maintenance of security, control, and essential services; and normalizing the means of succession of power. Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy for the HN government. Activities related to it include the following:

- Controlling military and police activities.
- Establishing and enforcing the rule of law.
- Public administration.
- Justice (a judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections).
- Property records and control.
- Public finance.
- Civil information.
- Historical, cultural, and recreational services.
- An electoral process for representative government.
- Disaster preparedness and response.

5-45. Sometimes no HN government exists or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for governance. In those cases, this LLO may involve establishing and maintaining a military government or a civil administration while creating and organizing a HN capability to govern. In the long run, developing better governance will probably affect the lives of the populace more than any other COIN activities. When well executed, these actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation. (Table 5-5 (page 5-16) lists considerations for developing the governance LLO.)

Table 5-5. Considerations for developing the governance LLO

- Encourage community leaders to participate in local governance. If no local council exists, encourage the populace to create one. Ask teachers, businesspeople, and others whom the community respects to form a temporary council until a more permanent organization can be formed.
- Help (or encourage) the host-nation government to remove or reduce genuine grievances, expose imaginary ones, and resolve contradictions, immediately where possible. Accomplishing these tasks may be difficult because—
 - Genuine grievances may be hard to separate from unreasonable complaints.
 - Host-nation leaders may be unable or unwilling to give up the necessary power to local governments.
- Make only commitments that can be fulfilled in the foreseeable future.
- Help the host nation develop and empower competent and responsive leaders and strengthen their civil service and security forces. Doing this is often difficult; however, backing an incompetent (or worse) host-nation leader can backfire. Do not be afraid to step in and make a bold change where necessary. A corrupt official, such as a chief of police who is working for both sides, can be doing more harm than good. You may be forced to replace him. If so, move decisively. Arrange the removal of all officials necessary to solve the problem. The pain of the affair may be acute, but it will be brief and final. Wherever possible, have host-nation authorities conduct the actual removal.
- Be accessible to the populace to facilitate two-way communication. Establish rapport for the host-nation government and counterinsurgents.
- Encourage the host nation to grant local demands and meet acceptable aspirations. Some of these might be driving the insurgency.
- Emphasize the national perspective in all host-nation government activities. Downplay sectarian divides.
- Provide liaison officers to host-nation government ministries or agencies. When possible, use an interagency team approach. Structure teams based on function.
- Once the legal system is functioning, send someone to observe firsthand a person moving through the legal process (arrest by police, trial, and punishment by confinement to a correctional facility). Ask to see the docket of the judges at the provincial courthouse. If there is no one on the docket or if it is full and there are no proceedings, there may be a problem.
- Create a system for citizens to pursue redress for perceived wrongs by authorities. Rule of law includes means for a citizen to petition the government for redress of government wrongs. The ability to petition the counterinsurgency force for redress of wrongs perpetrated by that force (intentionally or otherwise) is also required.
- Build on existing capabilities wherever possible. Host nations often have some capability; counterinsurgents may only need to help develop greater capacity.

SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

5-46. The economic development LLO includes both short- and long-term aspects. The short-term aspect concerns immediate problems, such as large-scale unemployment and reestablishing an economy at all levels. The long-term aspect involves stimulating indigenous, robust, and broad economic activity. The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people's economic situation and its adherence to the rule of law. However, a nation's economic health also depends on its government's ability to continuously secure its population.

5-47. Planning economic development requires understanding the society, culture, and operational environment. For example, in a rural society, land ownership and the availability of agricultural equipment, seed, and fertilizer may be the chief parts of any economic development plan. In an urban, diversified society, the availability of jobs and the infrastructure to support commercial activities may be more important. Except for completely socialist economies, governments do not create jobs other than in the public bu-

reaucracy. However, the micro economy can be positively stimulated by encouraging small businesses development. Jump-starting small businesses requires micro finance in the form of some sort of banking activities. So then, supporting economic development requires attention to both the macro economy and the micro economy.

5-48. Without a viable economy and employment opportunities, the public is likely to pursue false promises offered by insurgents. Sometimes insurgents foster the conditions keeping the economy stagnant. Insurgencies attempt to exploit a lack of employment or job opportunities to gain active and passive support for their cause and ultimately undermine the government's legitimacy. Unemployed males of military age may join the insurgency to provide for their families. Hiring these people for public works projects or a local civil defense corps can remove the economic incentive to join the insurgency. The major categories of economic activity include the following:

- Fossil fuels, mining, and related refining infrastructure.
- Generation and transmission of power and energy.
- Transportation and movement networks.
- Stock and commodities exchange.
- Banking.
- Manufacturing and warehousing.
- Building trades and services.
- Agriculture, food processing, fisheries, and stockyard processing.
- Labor relations.
- Education and training.

5-49. Table 5-6 lists considerations for developing the economic development LLO.

Table 5-6. Considerations for the economic development LLO

- Work with the host-nation government to strengthen the economy and quality of life. In the long run, success depends on supporting people's livelihoods.
- Create an environment where business can thrive. In every state (except perhaps a completely socialist one), business drives the economy. To strengthen the economy, find ways to encourage and support legitimate business activities. Even providing security is part of a positive business environment.
- Work with the host-nation government to reduce unemployment to a manageable level.
- Seek to understand the effects of military operations on business activities and vice versa. Understand the effects of outsourcing and military support on the local economy and employment level.
- Use economic leverage to enter new areas and reach new people. Remember that in many societies, monies are distributed through tribal or clan networks. For instance, giving a clan leader a contracting job may lead to employing many local men. Those employees are less likely to join the insurgency. It may be necessary to pay more than seems fair for a job; however, the money is well spent if it keeps people from supporting the insurgency.
- Ensure that noncompliance with government policies has an economic price. Likewise, show that compliance with those policies is profitable. In the broadest sense, counterinsurgency operations should reflect that "peace pays."
- Program funds for commanders to use for economic projects in their area of operations from the beginning of any operation. No one appreciates the situation better than those "on the ground." Creating these funds may require congressional action. (Appendix D contains a description of relevant funding sources.)

Appendix 4

Classic counter-insurgency theorists

*Expulse insurgents, protect territories and population, hold free elections***David Galula (1919-67)**

David Galula was born to French parents in Tunisia. He fought World War II in North Africa, Italy, and France and then served in China (1945-48) as an officer in the French colonial army's marine infantry. His later experience as a colonel in Algeria who saw not only Algerian uprising against the French but also rebellion inside the French army inspired him the book *Pacification in Algeria*. He has also been a military observer for the United Nations in Greece and a military attaché in Hong Kong.

Most of all, Galula is famous for ***Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice***. This book, written in 1964, promotes a strategy with the following three steps:

- the expulsion of insurgent forces from populated territorial units
- the development of static unities protecting and controlling the population of freed units
- the replacement of defeated enemy political structure through free but properly controlled elections

Galula's book is repeatedly quoted and cited as a reference on counter insurgency warfare in the Army's recent *Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24)*. The US Military now heavily supports this approach and uses such a strategy in its operations in the campaign in Iraq.

*Don't bomb villages, "war will be won by brains and on foot"***Robert Thompson (1916-92)**

Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson was a high ranking British civil servant and a counter-insurgency expert.

He served in the 1950's as Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya and was a major player in the defeat of the communist insurgency during the Malayan Emergency.

In 1961 he was appointed head of the newly established British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam. Thompson became an enthusiastic supporter of the "strategic hamlets initiative". In 1969 he was appointed special advisor on "pacification" to President Nixon.

In ***Defeating Communist Insurgency***, he developed a strategy in four stages "clearing, holding, winning and won":

- Clearing: area to be secured (mostly, urban areas) are cleared from guerrillas by the military and police
- Holding: guerrillas must be kept away from the people and its political infrastructure must be eliminated
- Winning: the reestablished government must focus on providing social and economic improvements
- Won: people's support has been won to the government while the guerrillas have been pushed away

He opposed the US advocacy of air supremacy and bombing and wrote extensively about the use of commandos and counter-insurgency operations in asymmetric warfare. Although President Kennedy was receptive to these views, the US military establishment was reluctant to implement them, and Thompson's ideas eventually had little effect in Vietnam.

*Subversion, stealth and fraud; Low Intensity Conflict***Frank Kitson (born 1926)**

General Sir Frank Kitson is a retired British Officer and military expert on low intensity operations. Based on his experience fighting insurgencies in Kenya 1953-55, Malaya 1957, Cyprus 1962-64, and Northern Ireland 1970-72, he describes the way officers have to resort to deviousness, **stealth, deception and fraud** in order to outwit their opponents. In *Gangs and Counter-gangs* (1960), he brought to the mainstream the concepts of pseudo gangs and pseudo operations. This consists in government forces and guerrilla defectors portraying themselves as insurgent units and conducting fake insurgency attacks with the two-fold objective of gathering human intelligence and discrediting the real insurgency. His strategies are still relevant today: in September 2003 a *San Francisco Chronicle* article by John Arquilla, defence analyst, advised the Bush administration to transpose the British strategy against Kenyan Mau-Mau insurgency to Iraq.

*Predicted French and American losses in Vietnam if strategy remained unchanged***Bernard Fall (1926-67)**

Bernard B. Fall was a political scientist and historian famous for his expertise on Indochina. Born in Austria, Bernard Fall fled to France when it was annexed by Germany. He joined the French resistance in 1942 and gained experience on guerilla warfare fighting the Germans in the Alps. He developed a strong interest in insurgency studies and traveled seven times to Vietnam, where he conducted field research as an embedded war correspondent. He died as an acclaimed expert on Vietnam in a landmine explosion.

He described extensively the counterinsurgency warfare he had witnessed during his first trip to Vietnam in *Street Without Joy* (1961-reprint 1989). He also wrote on the French campaign in *Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu*.

His field experience and theoretic thinking led him to criticise successively both French and US strategies. He was an early, insightful and powerful voice warning Americans that the chosen strategic options could only lead to failure in Vietnam.

Guerrilla warfare, mobilising unrest through raids, multi-front guerrilla strategy, more rural than urban

Che Guevara (1928-67)

Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, commonly known as Che Guevara, El Che or El Comandante, was an Argentine-born Marxist revolutionary, political figure, and leader of Cuban and internationalist guerrillas. Having adopted Marxism during his trip throughout Latin America, he had a prominent role during Castro's Cuban Revolution and early government, and then fought communist guerrilla wars in Congo and Bolivia before being captured and executed. His life and death made him an icon of socialist revolutionary movements worldwide.

Guevara summed up the findings of his experience during the Cuban revolution in his 1961 book *Guerrilla Warfare*. He stressed the importance of creating a revolutionary situation by starting a *foco*, which acts as a catalyst for revolution: instead of establishing a large communist party, small armed groups launch attacks from rural areas to mobilize unrest into a popular front against a sitting regime. Only when the *foco* has gained momentum should a massive party emerge. Strong leadership and audacious raids are expected to foster general uprising. Guevara was a strong proponent of a multi-front guerrilla war to create "two, three, many Vietnams."

Though his death may have been interpreted as the failure of his theories and his focus on rural area has been criticised by other revolutionary tacticians advocating urban insurrection, his thinking has been widely used in later communist revolutionary wars. Up to today, rural-based campaigns have remained a common feature of guerrilla warfare.

Power of determination, common people as a military force, guerrilla warfare

Võ Nguyên Giáp (born circa 1912)

As the commander in chief of the Viet Minh forces fighting French colonial rule, **General Võ Nguyên Giáp** organised them into an efficient and powerful army, that was capable of defeating the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1953. Acting as Minister of defence of the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam, he led his army during the subsequent war against US forces.

He believed in **the power of determination and "the military force of the common people"**, and has theorised his experience in line with Clausewitz's "people's war".

He elaborated a **three-phase strategy of insurgency**:

Phase I: conduct of guerrilla and terrorist operations in order to control the population.

Phase II: consolidation into regular units which attack isolated government outposts.

Phase III: formation of large units which establish full military control, thus encouraging civilian population to rise up in support of the revolution.

*People's War, confuse and draw enemy into interior and bleed dry with mobile and guerrilla warfare***Mao Zedong (1893-1976)**

Mao Zedong was Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from 1945 until his death in 1976. He instigated several major socio-political programmes (some through collectivisation), including the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, though these have been widely regarded as failures.

A controversial figure, some regard Mao as a great revolutionary leader who led the rise of 20th Century China, while others have blamed him for the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese, as well as causing severe damage to Chinese culture, society, economy and foreign relations. Mao has also been seen as a hostile figure for instigating several international conflicts. While officially still held in high regard in China, he is rarely mentioned by the current Chinese government, whose policies have diverged greatly from those of Mao, and his influence on Chinese politics has greatly diminished since his death.

He is, however, generally considered to be the father of 20th Century insurgency through his invention of **People's War**, or protracted people's war. Its basic concept is to **maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the interior where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of Mobile Warfare and Guerrilla warfare**. The term is used by Maoists for their strategy of long-term armed revolutionary struggle, and has been adopted around the world by other Marxist insurgent groups, notably in Cuba, Vietnam, Peru, Nepal and Northern Ireland.

*Economic development as a counter-insurgency tool, the "social role" of the soldier***Louis Hubert Lyautey (1854 - 1934)**

Hubert Lyautey was a French general who made his career by serving as a cavalry officer in the colonies of Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar. He was the first Resident-General in Morocco. He is one of the first strategists to understand the necessity to gradually and permanently remove the insurgent's "deep area",² that is the physical depth which provides logistics and refuge to insurgents within a contested population or space.

He advocated combining **"progressive occupation" and economic penetration with the use of military force in order to permanently change the condition of the insurgent's deep area**. In Indochina this consisted for example in using military posts as markets to exchange goods with the local population. The rationale was that **increased prosperity would enhance cooperation**. Military strength was to be used more as a threat than in actual strikes. Lyautey also defined the "social role" of the colonial officer, who was to be not only a simple soldier, but also "an administrator, a farmer, an architect and an engineer."³

² Maj. Grubbs L.K and Forsyth M.J., "Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?", *Military Review*, July-August 2005 [online], available at : http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/january_2006/1_06_4_pf.html#5#inI

³ Colson B, « La culture strategique francaise » [online], available at : http://www.stratisc.org/strat_053_Colson.html

*Guerrilla warfare based on 3 factors: Proper calculation, strategic raids, psychological effect***T.E. Lawrence (1888-1935)**

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, most famously as "Lawrence of Arabia," gained international renown for his role during the Arab Revolt of 1916-18, in which he fought against the Ottoman empire troops with Arab irregulars under the command of Emir Faisal till the capture of Damascus in 1918. His intimate knowledge of the Arab people made him the ideal liaison between British and Arab forces and he successfully co-ordinated their revolt with British interests. Based on his assessment of the situation that Arab forces had to face, his strategic writings constitute a comprehensive doctrine of insurgency. Elements of it essentially lie in his memoirs *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1926) – which General Giap called his "combat Bible"- and in an article entitled "The Evolution of a Revolt" (*Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, October 1920). He criticised the Western preconceived idea that a war should aim at annihilation of the enemy, and produced a theory of guerrilla warfare based on **proper calculation, strategic raids, psychological effect. He sets six preconditions for a successful insurgency:**

- The guerrilla movement must have a strong, unassailable, basis.
- The guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy: the more the enemy relies on complex logistics, the more vulnerable he is.
- The enemy should be too weak to be able to occupy the territory in depth.
- The guerrilla does not require an active participation from the population but at least its passive support.
- Irregular forces must be quick, enduring and logistically independent.
- Irregular forces must have sufficiently sophisticated weapons to strike the enemy neuralgic points in terms of logistics and transmissions.

Force the guerrilla to fight a conventional war. Attitude must be offensive. Must completely obliterate enemy.

C.E. Callwell (1859-1928)

Sir Charles Edward Callwell was a British army officer and a military historian. He notably served in Afghanistan (1880) and in South Africa (both Boers wars) where he eventually commanded the mobile column. He refused a promotion and retired early in 1909. He was recalled at the beginning of World War I and served as Director of Military Operations & Intelligence and retired as a Major General in 1919.

In 1896 he wrote *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, which summed up his military conceptions and laid out the blueprint for a new strategic approach to counter insurgency warfare. Recognising that the insurgent, owing to his mobility, enjoys a strategic advantage over the regular force, Callwell warned that **"in a guerrilla situation, the guerrilla is the professional, the newcomer the amateur."** He asserted that the counterinsurgent's objective in a "small war" is **to force the insurgent to fight so the regular force's tactical advantages of firepower and discipline could prevail:** the best attitude, according to him, is the offensive. But once the battle is forced, "mere victory is not enough. The enemy must not only be beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly." This is the essence of what Callwell teaches, for the "mere expulsion of the opponent from the ground [he occupies] is of small account; what is wanted is a big casualty list in the hostile ranks." Counterinsurgent forces are victorious only when the enemy "recognise[s] that the forces of civilisation are dominant and not to be denied".

In its 1940's *Small Wars Manual*, the US Marine Corps borrowed much of Callwell's heavy-handed, attrition-based strategy.

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London

17, Queen Anne's Gate
SW1H 9BU London, United Kingdom

Paris

29, rue des Pyramides
75001 Paris, France

SEN LIS AFGHANISTAN

سنلیس افغانستان

Ottawa

78 George St
K1N 5W1, Ottawa, Ontario

Kabul

Baghe Bala Road
Kabul, Afghanistan

Brussels

Residence Palace – Rue de la Loi 155
1040 Brussels, Belgium

Afghanistan Field Offices

Kandahar - Lashkar Gah - Jalalabad