Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff“Halleck originates nothing, anticipates nothing, to assist others; takes no responsibility, plans nothing, suggests nothing, is good for nothing.” Lincoln’s secretary of the navy Gideon Welles’s harsh words constitute the stereotype into which Union General-in-Chief Henry Wager Halleck has been cast by most historians since Appomattox. In Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff, originally published in 1962, Stephen Ambrose challenges the standard interpretation of this controversial figure. Ambrose argues persuasively that Halleck has been greatly underrated as a war theorist because of past writer’s failure to do justice to his close involvement with three movements basic to the development of the American military establishment: the Union high command’s application—and ultimate rejection—of the principles of Baron Henri Jomini; the growth of a national, professional army at the expense of the state militia; and the beginnings of a modern command system. |
Contents
I The Formative Years | 3 |
II From Chaos to Order | 11 |
III Give Me Command in the West | 23 |
IV The Siege of Corinth | 41 |
V Consolidating Recent Gains | 55 |
VI McClellan Pope and Second Bull Run | 64 |
VII The Guillotine for Unsuccessful Generals | 79 |
VIII Burnside and Rosecrans | 94 |
X Concentrate on Important Points | 123 |
XI Gettysburg and Vicksburg | 137 |
XII Responsibility and Odium | 150 |
XIII Chief of Staff | 162 |
XIV Total War | 181 |
XV Victory | 196 |
Bibliography | 213 |
219 | |