PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND TEC HNOLOGY PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 brill.com/pgdt Levels of Subjective Globalization: Ideologies, Imaginaries, Ontologies Manfred B. Steger University of Hawai’i-Manoa and RMIT University, Australia E-mail: manfred.steger@rmit.edu.au Paul James RMIT University, Australia E-mail: paul.james@rmit.edu.au Abstract The subjective dimensions of globalization have not received even close to the level of attention that has been paid to the objective dimensions of global interchange and extension. Seeking to rectify this neglect, we argue that the subjective dimensions of globalization can be conceptualized in terms of three dimensions or levels: ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies. The Occupy Movement in several global locations seeks to challenge global capitalism as the dominant system of economics. At the ideological level, activists connected to Occupy tend to engage in ijierce contestation of the global structuring of greed, thus exhibiting clear signs of global rebellion. However, the terms of debate and critique tend to become increasingly uncontested as we go deeper into examining the dominant social imaginary and the ontologies of modern time and space that underpin this general sense of the global. Occupy is clearly an important variant of “justice globalism” that has inspired scores of young activists to protest against increasing inequality and the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. Still, we suggest that this important alter-globalization movement often works within many of the same subjective frameworks and precepts as the market-globalist world that it criticizes. Keywords Globalization, market globalism, justice globalism, ideology, global imaginary, ontology, resistance, Occupy Movements, modernity, postmodernity, global capitalism Introduction Objective phenomena of globalization, their patterns and processes, have been studied in extraordinary detail. Scholarly publications abound describing the flows and nature of global ijinancial interchange, the movement of goods and people, and even the spread of global culture. By comparison, the subjective © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/15691497-12341240 18 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 dimensions of globalization have not received even close to the level of attention that has been paid to these objective dimensions of global interchange and extension. Seeking to rectify this neglect, we argue that the subjective dimensions of globalization can be conceptualized in terms of three dimensions or levels: ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies. We suggest that ideologies are the most rapidly changing and febrile of these levels. Social imaginaries tend to settle after initial contestation into a relative taken-for-granted commonsense—except when they come up against other deep-seated background understandings. Normative contestations also continue at the deeper levels of subjective engagement associated with conjunctures of ontological difference. Usually, such contestations add substantially to the intensity of concurrent ideological struggles. However, apart from contestations that move across ontological boundaries—for example, uprisings across the boundaries of modern and traditional understandings of authority and power as we have seen in the so-called “Arab Spring”—dissent and rebellion within the dominance of a single ontological frame tend to leave basic questions unasked. This is the case even in relation to the contemporary Occupy Movement in several global locations as it seeks to challenge global capitalism as the dominant system of economics. At the ideological level, activists connected to Occupy tend to engage in ijierce contestation of the global structuring of greed, thus exhibiting clear signs of global rebellion. However, the terms of debate and critique tend to become increasingly uncontested as we go deeper into examining the dominant social imaginary and the ontologies of modern time and space that underpin this general sense of the global. Occupy is clearly an important variant of “justice globalism” that has inspired scores of young activists to protest against increasing inequality and the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a tiny minority. Still, we suggest this important alterglobalization movement often works within many of the same subjective frameworks and precepts as the market-globalist world that it criticizes. Setting Up the Steps in the Analysis The overwhelming focus of research into the phenomenon of globalization has been on the patterns of objective relations. Major works have been written on aspects of objective globalization from the consequences of containerization for global trade to the redeijining effects of the global intersection of biotechnology and genomic sequencing of DNA (see Levison 2006; Thacker 2005). Digital devices like tablets and smartphones, shipping containers, DNA sequences, M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 19 human body parts, secondhand clothing, the English language, news cartels and pineapples, have all become increasingly part of global systems of production, trade, communication, and inquiry. In a relatively short time, thousands of books and articles have now been devoted to the economics and technologies of globalization, the politics of globalization, and only secondarily the culture of globalization. However, globalization involves both the objective spread and intensiijication of social relations across world space, and the subjective meanings, ideas, sensibilities, and understandings, associated with those material processes of extension. Moreover, objective and subjective relations and meanings are bound up with each other. It is this ever-present dimension of “the subjective” that remains strangely neglected in globalization research (see, for example, Robertson 2009:121). This is not to suggest that subjective questions are not there in the background to many studies. Most interestingly, there is a small emergent series of studies on the culture of economics that have begun to bring the subjective dimension into contention. For example, an anthology called Frontiers of Capital has begun to document ethnographically the new subjects of ijinancial capitalism, including the rise of symbolic risk-analysis as part of the social assessment work of the big banks (Fisher and Downey 2006). Another volume, Savage Economics, explores what it calls “the cultural constitution of political economy” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). They take forward the pioneering work of Angus Cameron and Ronan Palan in The Imagined Economies of Globalization, where they suggest that the narrations and stories about global economic relations are constitutive rather just secondary or superstructural (Cameron and Palan 2004). The same can be said in the domains of politics and culture. This is our starting point, then, and our aim is to understand why subjectivities carried in narratives, stories, descriptions, ideas and claims about meaning are sometimes contested and sometimes embedded in relatively taken-for-granted, long-run cultures of meaning and practice. The ijirst step in our analysis begins with the theme of ideologies—patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts. Ideologies of globalization now pervade social life almost everywhere across the globe. At the end of the ijirst decade of the twenty-ijirst century, this might be a relatively uncontentious claim, but there is still much to do in mapping the clusters of ideas that feed into various globalisms in the contemporary world and tracking the lines of historical development involving the globalization of ideas, values, and culture (Steger 2009). This is the level at which contestation is most often analyzed, but there are ways of doing this more systematically. The second step involves taking seriously what happens to ideologies as they become embedded in the dominant commonsense of a period or a place. 20 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 This is what might be called a “social imaginary.” During the last three or four decades, political ideologies articulating a global imaginary have become part and parcel of intensifying discursive networks enveloping our planet. Ideologies of globalization have been used to rework, rethink and reframe various older “isms” such as capitalism, cosmopolitanism, internationalism, imperialism, and colonialism, which themselves have, in different ways, and for signiijicant spans of time, shaped the contested terrain in different places of what it means to reach out and speak across the world. All of these thought-systems generated conflicting normative claims. Nevertheless, over the course of the twentieth century and into the present, these various -isms have become reinterpreted in terms of an emergent and changing global imaginary. At least within the West—although increasingly also dominant globally—these dynamics have remained ijirmly tied to the framework of modernity. Here we understand “modernity” as a (contingent) periodizing term, which names not the totality of a period within a particular spatial setting, but rather the uneven dominance of subjectivities and practices of “the modern” within and across overlapping spatial settings.1 This brings us to the third step in our analysis. The animating problem is invoked by the concept of “the modern.” If the concept of an “imaginary” names the most general way in which we imagine the social whole, then what issue does a concept such as “the modern” present us with? The concept is not an integrative term that names the social whole or captures the subjective projection of meanings and values like that of the “imaginary,” but it is still generalizing and it does have a compelling subjective dimension. In the terms of the present approach, it requires us to extend the analysis to the categories of existence that deijine such a condition of being—categories such as time, space, embodiment, knowing, and performance. In order to understand the subjective power of the modern, we need to gain a historically sensitive understanding of the modern as an ontological formation, including how it has come into intersection with other formations from the tribal-customary and traditional to the postmodern. Changing Imaginaries and Competing Ideologies: The Dominance of the Modern The codiijication of political ideologies developed in tandem with both the master concept of “modernity” and the speciijic attributes of what it means to be 1 Thus, we agree with the impulse of recent studies emphasizing “multiple modernities” without necessarily accepting the way in which the unevenness of modernity is theorized. See, for example, Eisenstadt 2003. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 21 modern following the French and American revolutions.2 The Enlightenment dichotomization of the sacred and the profane greatly aided this development. The carving out of a distinct secularizing space for politics buttressed liberalism’s successful assault on the Church’s monopoly on shaping ideational structures of order.3 Competing with religious belief systems over political legitimacy, the principal ideologies of modernity evolved hand-in-hand with what John Stuart Mill called the “sentiment of nationality”.4 As has been well documented, the new conceptual framework of the nation constituted a powerful modernizing force. At the same time, the social form that the nation-state took was founded on a modern sense of spatiality, temporality and embodied. Modern spatiality framed the landscape in terms of demarcated bounded territories. Modern temporality allowed the nations to move forward as communities of fate in calendric time, with or without God. Nationhood found its embodied political expression in the transformation of subjects and into abstract modern citizens who laid claim to equal membership in their imagined community and institutionalized their autonomy within the modern nation-state. These became relative ontological “certainties” about what a nation was. Although the national imaginary had risen to dominance by the ijirst decades of the twentieth century, this did not spell the end of political ideologies. Quite to the contrary, questions about who really counted as part of this citizenry and what, exactly, constituted the essence of the nation became the subject of ijierce ideological debates and social struggles. Issues of where the boundaries of each territory lay became the bases of violence and war. Seeking to remake society according to the rising national imaginary, a restless citizenry exhibited a forward-looking attitude that became hallmark of modernity (see Anderson 1991). What this narrative from contemporary history evinces is that ideologies tend to move in and out of contestation. Imaginaries move at a deeper level and, in different ways, enter the commonsense of an age. Ontologies—such as how we live temporally or spatially—constitute the relatively enduring ground upon which we walk. In order to be legitimate within the expanding webs of Western (and increasingly globalizing) modernity, political communities had to be nation-states. Even the tribal and traditional communities at the edge of empire—still in signiijicant ways constituted through other ontological forms than the modern—took on a layer of the modern, and sought themselves to become 2 For a detailed exposition of this argument, see Steger 2008. 3 It would be a mistake to accept ideology’s self-conscious image as “secular.” As Mark Juergensmeyer has pointed out, there are signiijicant structural and functional similarities between political and religious belief systems as both represent “ideologies of order” imparting coherence and authority on social life. See Juergensmeyer 2008:20. 4 For a discussion of J. S. Mill’s reflections on the “sentiment of nationality”, see Steger 2008:44-57. 22 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 nation-states. The national gave the post-revolutionary social imaginary its distinct flavor in the form of factual and normative assumptions and takenfor-granted understandings in which the nation—plus its afijiliated or to-beafijiliated state—served as the necessary framework of the political. By the end of the nineteenth century, the national imaginary had acquired alluring banner headlines and truth claims that resonated with people’s interests and aspirations. It thus bound them to speciijic ideological vision of community. Like-minded individuals were organizing themselves into clubs, associations, movements, and political parties with the primary objective of enlisting more people to their preferred vision of the national. The ethico-political translation of the national imaginary occurred in terms of competing ideologies. Liberalism, for example, articulated the national imaginary as concrete political programs and agendas valorizing the proijitoriented production of mass commodities and the generation of meaning primarily on the basis of industrialization, consumption, individualism, and rational legalism. This is not to say that discursive frameworks of early modern periods did not generate narratives, metaphors, and framings of the global. Going back as far as the early sixteenth century, for example, an emergent class of intellectuals—cartographers, philosophers, and writers—used cosmographic images of the globus in competing narratives. One lineage used spherical images to associate the early Atlantic empires to the past cultural glory of Imperial Rome. Another saw mapmakers projecting early forms of cosmopolitanism with cartouches of cultural difference that might be considered as stylized precursors to the “Family of Man” (Cosgrove 2003).5 But the difference in the early twentieth century was that the national had come to frame the sense of the social whole. Today, competing ideologies of globalization articulate a tangled, but generalizing, social imaginary, which, more readily than ever before, cuts across national, class, gender, race, statebased, geopolitical and cultural differences, postcolonial divides, and other social boundaries. This degree of generality and self-reflexivity was inconceivable in the nineteenth century or earlier. We do not mean to suggest that the latest phase of globalization processes has become uncontested, homogenous, or totalizing. Nevertheless, for all the debates, and for all the emergence of new localisms, a global imaginary is now on the rise (see Robertson 1992).6 5 The “Family of Man” was a photographic exhibition ijirst displayed at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, in 1955. It comprised photographs of the human condition from 68 countries. It toured the world for eight years. 6 For a book-length discussion of contemporary social formations using the metaphor of a “global matrix” of interconnected relations, see Nairn and James 2005. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 23 Deijining Ideologies, Imaginaries and Ontologies How then can we better understand globalization’s powerful subjective dynamics? As we have begun to outline, the thickening of global consciousness can be theorized by analyzing social life across three interrelated dimensions or layers: 1. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjectivities as contested and decontested by various ideologies; 2. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjectivities as felt in largely taken-for-granted social imaginaries; and 3. ideas, meanings, sensibilities, and subjectivities as embodied in relation to deepseated social ontologies. Each of these three layers of lived subjectivity is constituted in practice at an ever-greater generality, durability, and depth. They can of course only be separated out as an analytical exercise, but our argument is that as analytical concepts they provide a useful way of tracking the changing, contradictory and overlapping nature of subjectivities. Globalization has been changing—at times, even at revolutionary speed— across all of these three layers and in turn contributing fundamentally to basic social change. The deeper the process of change, however, the slower the tendency for the new pattern to take hold as dominant and encompassing. At the risk of oversimplifying our three principal concepts, we like to offer the following minimal deijinitions: 1. Ideologies are patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts, including particular representations of power relations. These conceptual maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe and carry claims to social truth. 2. Imaginaries are patterned convocations of the social whole. These deepseated modes of understanding provide largely pre-reflexive parameters within which people imagine their social existence—expressed, for example, in conceptions of “the global,” “the national,” “the moral order of our time.” 3. Ontologies are patterned ways-of-being-in-the-world that are lived and experienced as the grounding conditions of the social—for example, linear time, territorial space, and individualized embodiment. Before we go on to talk about each of these three dimensions of the social in more detail, let us plot them schematically. As Table 1 shows, by shifting our attention from analyzing ideas to ideologies to imaginaries to ontologies, we move each time to a more abstract level of analysis. The ijirst level, empirical analysis, is foundational to making any claims about the world (and it keeps coming back every time we want to make any claims). This requires collecting information and attending to the detail of change. However, to understand the 24 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 complexity of the patterns of those ideas, our analysis moves to study ideologies as embedded in conjunctures of history and relate these ideologies to patterns of practice and meaning in terms of “ways of acting.” But to study ideologies in the context of patterns of subjective inter-relationship, we must examine broader patterns of social meaning—our focus on social imaginaries. This works at a more abstract level of analysis again, where the analysis attempts to map ways of relating. Finally, to understand questions of human being is to study ontologies or foundational categories of existence: time, space, embodiment and so on. Table 1 Levels of the Social in Relation to Levels of Theoretical Analysis Levels of the social Doing Acting Relating Being Levels of analysis I. Empirical II. Conjunctural III. Integrational IV. Ontological Objects of analysis I Ideas Beliefs Intuitions Ideologies Imaginaries Ontologies Objects of analysis II Particulari- Patterns of ties of practice and practice and meaning meaning • Production • Exchange • Communication • Organization • Enquiry Patterns of interrelationship Patterns of categorical projection General Modes and subjecpatterns of tivities of practice practice and and meaning meaning Modes and subjec- Modes and tivities of integra- subjectivities tion and of Being differentiation • Tribal-customary • Traditional • Modern • Postmodern Objects of analysis III • • • • Face-to-face Agency-extended • Corporeality Object-extended • Temporality Disembodied • Spatiality • Performativity • Epistemology M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 25 This analytical contextualization helps to put our three levels of subjective globalization into a larger perspective. Indeed our discussion below moves from examining ideologies of globalization to arguing that these ideologies can be understood more broadly as contributing to the emergent dominance of a global social imaginary. Then in the last section of the article we link these aspects to questions of the ontological dominance of the modern. This allows us to draw conclusions about the strengths and limitations of current alterglobalization movements such as Occupy as activists ijind themselves conijined to the dominant frameworks of the world they criticize. Ideologies Like other major social phenomena, globalization is associated with patterns of ideas related to and about forms of material practice. As we have already expressed in various ways, the relationship between those practices and ideas are extraordinarily complicated and mutually constitutive. Just as the formation of nations is associated with the ideologies of the national imaginary— that is, politically contested ideas about who should achieve the desired end of forging the “natural” connection between nation and state—processes of globalization are associated with ideologies expressing the global imaginary that both influence and make sense of practices. Here our key notion is that fullblown ideologies are patterned and conceptually thick enough to form relatively coherent and persistent articulations of the underlying social imaginary. One or two statements of contention do not an ideology make. Ideas, values and statements of contention must come together into a mature conceptual constellation to count as “ideology.” But when does a political belief-system warrant the designation of a separate ‘ideological family’? What criteria should be used to determine that a relatively enduring constellation of ideas constitutes an ideology? Political theorist Michael Freeden suggests that political ideologies display unique features anchored in distinct conceptual morphologies. Resembling large rooms containing various pieces of furniture uniquely arranged in proximity to each other, ideologies are assembled around “core concepts,” “adjacent concepts,” and “peripheral concepts.” The resulting conceptual patterns constitute the unique “ijingerprint” of political ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Freeden then introduces three useful criteria for determining the degree of “maturity” that sets a full-blown ideology apart from a fledgling ideational cluster: ijirst, its degree of uniqueness and complexity; second, its context-bound responsiveness to a broad range of political issues; and, third, its ability to 26 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 produce effective claims in the form of conceptual chains of decontestation. “Decontestation” is the process by which ideas are taken out of the contest over meaning and thus are seen as truths by many people. In other words, these ideas become naturalized through attempts to reduce the indeterminacy and multiplicity of their linguistically expressed meanings to ijixed, authoritative deijinitions and statements. Crucial in the formation of thought systems, such decontestation chains thus arrange core concepts in a pattern that links them to adjacent and peripheral concepts (Freeden 1996, 2003:54-5).7 In this sense, the elite codiijiers of competing globalisms generate pressing and contested claims about what it means to live in a globalizing world. It may sound counter-intuitive to suggest that ideologies of global interconnection were prevalent even before the overt and contested recognition (the naming) of the importance of globalization as a condition of our age. But that is just to emphasize that ideas are not always directly expressed in relation to a selfreflexively named set of practices. What we can say, however, is that today’s competing globalisms, like the previously dominant ideologies of the national imaginary, remain always contingent, arguable, and in tension with each other. Thus, they resist any easy analysis of their affective power. The most effective ideologues—we use this term in a neutral way referring to elite codiijiers—sometimes reach across different ideologies simultaneously in order to articulate broadly appealing political visions. At the same time, they also draw deeper down into the imaginary and ontological foundations of the social. For example, when, in July 2008, the then-American presidential candidate Barack Obama spoke as a self-declared “world citizen” in Berlin, he oscillated between the national and global imaginary in his call to nations to work together for global progress. Consequently, he struggled to bring together into a singular vision various ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, justice globalism) from both the national and global imaginaries: Now is the time to build new bridges across the globe as strong as the one that bound us across the Atlantic. Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacriijice, and a global commitment to progress, to meet the challenges of the twenty-ijirst century. It was this spirit that led airlift planes to appear in the sky above our heads, and people to assemble where we stand today. And this is the moment when our nations—and all nations—must summon that spirit anew. (Obama 2008) 7 The ideological function of “ijixing” the process of signiijication around speciijic meanings was discussed as early as the 1970s by the French linguist Michel Pecheux and intellectuals associated with the French semiotic journal, Tel Quel. See Eagleton 1991:195-7. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 27 Many strands of the Occupy Movement work within the same intersection of ideologies: justice globalism, liberalism, social democracy and so on. As a 2011 declaration of the Occupy Wall Street assembly puts it: As one people, united, we acknowledge the reality: that the future of the human race requires the cooperation of its members; that our system must protect our rights, and upon corruption of that system, it is up to the individuals to protect their own rights, and those of their neighbors; that a democratic government derives its just power from the people, but corporations do not seek consent to extract wealth from the people and the Earth; and that no true democracy is attainable when the process is determined by economic power. (USLiberals.com 2012) Applying Freeden’s three criteria to the ideational constellations we call “globalisms,” we ijind that some variants have over the last couple of decades come to form coherent and durable formations. Speciijically, the following four variants are conceptually thick enough to warrant the status of mature ideologies. Market globalism constitutes today’s dominant ideology. Its chief codiijiers are corporate managers, executives of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, high-level military ofijicers, journalists and public-relations specialists, intellectuals writing to large audiences, state bureaucrats, and politicians. These global power elites assert that, notwithstanding the cyclical downturns of the world economy, the global integration of markets along laissez-faire lines is not only a fundamentally good thing, but also represents the given outcome and natural progression of the human condition. The morphology of market globalism is built around a number of interrelated central claims: that globalization is about the liberalization and worldwide integration of markets (neoliberalism); that it is powered by neutral techno-economic forces; that the process is inexorable; that the process is leaderless and anonymous; that everyone will be better off in the long run, and that globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world.8 This is the ideology that has been fundamentally attacked by the Occupy Movement, but it is clear that the presence of articulate people camping in the ijinancial districts of the world’s global cities is not enough to bring down such a dominant ideology. Sustained contestation requires the lived and debated projection of powerful alternative ideological clusters, in this case most obviously, justice globalism. Justice globalism, by comparison to market globalism, can be deijined by its emphasis on equity, rights, sustainability, and diversity.9 Championed by forces of the political Left, it articulates a very different set of claims suggesting 8 For a sustained discussion and critical analysis of these claims that draws on hundreds of examples, see Steger, Globalisms, Chapter 3. 9 For a comprehensive treatment of justice globalism, see Steger et al. 2013. 28 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 that the process of globalization is powered by corporate interests; that the process can take different pathways; that the democracy carried by global processes tends to be thin and procedural; and that “globalization-from-above” or “corporate globalization” is associated with increasing inequities within and between nation-states, greater environmental destruction and a marginalization of the poor. Although the alter-globalization movement argues for an alternative form of globalization, it is globalization nevertheless. And as such, more than just another description of the world, the core concepts and central claims of justice globalism constitute, we suggest, one lineage in a family of contesting ideologies. That makes justice globalism akin to its main competitors in the sense that it draws upon a generalizing, deep-seated imaginary of global connectedness. Justice globalism is the main contesting constellation to market globalism, to the extent that the language of justice globalism, particularly around human rights discourses, has been incorporated into the heart of market globalism rhetoric. The third constellation includes various religious globalisms—usually, but not always, associated with the political Right. Evident in some variants of all three monotheistic religions, its most spectacular strain today is jihadist Islamism. Based on the populist evocation of an exceptional spiritual and political crisis, jihadist Islamists bemoan the contemporary age of jahiliyya (ignorance and pagan idolatry) and call for a renewed universalism of a global umma (a reworked meaning of a global Islamic community). One of the deijining features of religious globalisms is that they draw on the intersection of two ontological formations—the modern and the traditional. It has been this contradictory intersection of grounding forms that has given religious ideologies their extreme intensity. Less radical forms of ‘moderate’ Islamist globalism, often linked to the “Turkish model” have gained ground during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, where political movements search for new combinations of Islamism and modern democracy. A fourth variant, imperial globalism, has been weakening over the last two years as a result of various changes including the Obama administration’s renewed multilateralism and the fracturing Washington Consensus in the wake of the Great Recession. Developing out of market globalism and still retaining some of its central features, imperial globalism is the publicly weakest of these ideological clusters, even though for a time it informed the socalled “Global War on Terror” and the joint actions of the Coalition of the Willing spearheaded by the unilateralist Bush administration. Despite the waning influence of these hawks since the election of Barack Obama, imperial globalism still operates as a powerful background force to the extent that its central claim—that global peace depends upon the global economic reach M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 29 and military assertiveness of an informal American Empire or NATO-based zone of extension—is still taken for granted within many governing and elite circles. But imperial globalism cannot be conijined to a single nation. Indeed, some commentators believe that a Chinese version of it might be just around the corner (see, for example, Halper 2010; Jacques 2009). For all their complexity as ideologies, and despite the obvious tensions between them and the differences across different settings, these four globalisms are part of a complex, roughly-woven but patterned, ideational fabric that increasingly ijigures the global as a deijining condition of the present while still remaining entangled in the national. People who accept their central claims— whether from the political Right or Left—internalize the apparent inevitability and relative virtue of global interconnectivity and mobility across global time and space. However one might seek to understand global history, and whatever reversals we might face in the future, the perception of intensifying social interconnections have come to deijine the nature of our times. Even though proponents of justice globalism strenuously insist that “another world is possible”, they hardly question that growing global interdependence remains a central part of most, if not all, alternative futures. Indeed, one unmistaken sign of a maturing ideological constellation is that it comes to be represented in discourse as “post-ideological.” Another pitfall is to equate the death of one ideology of globalization either with its massive contestation, its changing rhetoric, or the spectacular rise of another opposing global ideology. The dominant sense over the last decade seems to be that we are now simply globalized and the question is what we are going to do about it at home and abroad. In Angela Merkel’s terms, “International terrorism and the socalled asymmetrical threat posed by individuals who care nothing for their own lives—this is one of the darkest sides of globalization. But as little as we can abolish globalization—which I do not want to do, and which would be impossible even if one should desire—we must not slacken our efforts to ijight the threats to our country’s law, security and freedom where they rise” (Merkel 2010). National security is thus global. With the realization that the global ijinancial system was in danger of collapsing, the language subtly changed again and the emphasis shifted. As the “Global Financial Crisis” stretched far beyond Wall Street and Paternoster Square, the salience of again defending “good forms” of globalization was renewed. Barack Obama, in particular, has sought to convince his global audience that, “Not only is it impossible to turn back the tide of globalization, but efforts to do so can make us worse off ” (Obama 2008). From a justice globalism perspective, the idea of inevitability tends to be put more tentatively and critically. Still, the acceptance, albeit reluctantly, of the broader “reality” of a globalized world reflects the powerful framework of the 30 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 global imaginary. As Peter Raven put it in his 2002 Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Globalization appears to have become an irresistible force, but we must make it participatory and humane to alleviate the suffering of the world’s poorest people and the effective disenfranchisement of many of its nations”. Similarly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) recently emphasized that globalization forms the basic context of productive life. In parallel terms, its 2008 Declaration on “Social Justice for a Fair Globalization” begins with a sentence that frames all others: “Considering that the present context of globalization . . . is reshaping the world of work in profound ways” (International Labour Organization 2008:5; Raven 2002). Social Imaginaries As we noted in the Introduction, the various ideologies associated with globalization have come to coalesce around a new sense of a global social whole—a global social imaginary of profound, generalizing, and deep impact. A number of prominent social thinkers have long grappled with the notion that this is more than an ideologically-contested representation of social integration and differentiation. Claude Lefort, for example, argues that, “In this sense, the examination of ideology confronts us with the determination of a type of society in which a speciijic regime of the imaginary can be identiijied” (Lefort 1986:197).10 Cornelius Castoriadis takes the concept of the “imaginary” in a different direction that provides, nonetheless, a useful means of indicating how we are not using the term in this article. For Castoriadis, the imaginary is that which expresses the creative excess of our human condition. It always exceeds the possibilities of the material conditions of life (Castoriadis 1991). Our use of the term is more akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the pre-reflexive habitus—that is, “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations” (Bourdieu 1990:53). And yet, the concept of the habitus is too normatively driven while the concept of the “social imaginary” has a stronger sense of the social whole or the general “given” social order. What is important to take from Bourdieu, however, is a sense of how patterns of practice and ideas can be seen to be objectively outside of the particular practices and ideas of persons, even as those patterns were generated subjectively by persons acting in and through the habitus. 10 He is quoted here without our endorsement of the position that frames his approach. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 31 Charles Taylor provides perhaps the most useful way forward in deijining the social imaginary as, “The ways people imagine their social existence, how they ijit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”. These set the common-sense “background” of lived social experience (Taylor 2004:23).11 In Taylor’s exposition, the modern social imaginary has been built by three dynamics. The ijirst is the separating out of the economy as a distinct domain, treated as an objectiijied reality. The second is the simultaneous emergence of the public sphere as the place of increasingly mediated interchange and (counter-posed) the intimate or private sphere in which “ordinary life” is afijirmed. The third is the sovereignty of the people, treated as a new collective agency even as it is made up of individuals who see self-afijirmation in the other spheres. These are three historical developments, among others, that are relevant to what might be called a modern ontological formation (of which more later), but listing such factors neither help us to deijine a social imaginary in general or to understand what we are calling the “national imaginary” and the “global imaginary.” Our deijinition of the social imaginary contains another crucial insight, namely, that it constitutes patterned convocations of the lived social whole. The notion of “convocation” is important since it is the calling together—the gathering (not the self-consciously defending or active decontesting activity associated with ideologies) of an assemblage of meanings, ideas, sensibilities—that are taken to be self-evident. The concept of “the social whole” points to the way in which certain apparently simple terms such as “our society,” “we,” and “the market” carry taken-for-granted and interconnected meanings. This concept allows us to deijine the imaginary as broader than the dominant sense of community. A social whole, in other words, is not necessarily co-extensive with a projection of community relations or the ways people imagine their social existence. Nor does it need to be named as such. It can encompass a time, for example, when there exists only an inchoate sense of global community, but there is today paradoxically an almost pre-reflexive sense that at one level “we” as individuals, peoples, and nations have a common global fate. Put in different terms, the medium and the message—the practice of interrelation on a global scale and the content of messages of global interconnection and naturalized power—have become increasingly bound up with each other. As recently as forty years ago, notions of the social whole—including “the market”—were stretched across relations between nation-states and would, 11 This formulation dovetails to some extent with Antonio Gramsci’s (1978) notion of “cultural hegemony”. 32 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 therefore, have been seen as co-extensive with the nation-state. Hence, the then widespread use of the term “international relations.” When most sociologists and political scientists analyzed “society,” they tended to assume the boundaries of the nation—in the relevant literature this is referred to “methodological nationalism” (see Beck 2007:286-90).12 In other words, the social whole was a national imaginary that tended to be equated with the community of the nation-state. Now we ijind either that such concepts as “society” have become terms of ambivalence because they have become stretched between two contesting yet interdependent imaginaries: the national and the global. To summarize: thus far, we have suggested that ideologies of globalization are part of an extended family that translate a generalized global imaginary into competing political programs and agendas. Moving to the ijinal layer of our investigation of the dimensions of subjective globalization, we must grapple with ontological categories such as time and space. Ontologies We use “ontologies” here as a shorthand term referring to the most basic framing categories of social existence: temporality, spatiality, corporeality, epistemology and so on. These are categories of being-in-the-world, historically constituted in the structures of human interrelations. To talk of “being” in this way does not imply a given or unchanging human essence, nor is it conijined to the generation of meaning in the sphere of selfhood. If questions of ontology are fundamentally about matters of being, then everything involving ‘being human’ is ontological. Still, we are using the concept more precisely to refer to categories of existence such as “space” and “time” that on the one hand are always talked about, and, on the other, are rarely interrogated, analyzed, or historically contextualized except by philosophers and social theorists. A brief illustration of the themes of time and space will help bring this largely takenfor-granted connection between ontological categories and globalization to the surface. Let us start with the ontological category of spatiality. It is crucial, since ‘globalization’ is obviously a spatial concept. Indeed, the academic observation that to globalize means to “compress time and space” has long entered into public discourse. However, to be more historically speciijic, contemporary globalization is predominantly lived through a modern conception of spatiality 12 For a Beck-inspired attempt to inject a “cosmopolitan imagination” into the social sciences, see Delanty 2009. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 33 linked to an abstracted geometry of territory and sovereignty, rather than as a traditional cosmological sense of spatiality held together by God, Nature or some other generalized Supreme Being (see Sassen 2006). This is a claim about forms of dominance rather than a simple epochal shift from or replacement of an older form of temporality.13 It accords with Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s view of globalization generating new “hybrid” or “mélange” modernities anchored in changing conceptions of time and space (Canclini 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2009). For example, those ideological codiijiers who espouse a Jihadist or Pentecostalist variant of religious globalism tend to be stretched between a modern-territorial sense of space and a “neotraditional” sense of a universalizing umma or Christendom, respectively. In this neotraditional understanding, then, the social whole exists in, prior to, and beyond, modern global space.14 On the other hand, we also ijind instances of ambiguous modern spatialities sliding into “postmodern” sensibilities that relate to contemporary globalization. Take, for example, airline advertising maps that are post-territorial (postmodern) to the extent that they show multiple abstract vectors of travel—lines that crisscross between multiple city-nodes and travel across empty space without reference to the conventional mapping expressions of land and sea, nation-state and continental boundaries. To such a backdrop and with no global outline, an advertisement for KLM Airlines assures potential customers that, “You could fly from anywhere in the world to any destination” (Holland Herald 2002). Our point here is that one comfortably knows how to read those maps despite the limited points of orientation, and one also knows that they are global before reading the ijine print—“anywhere in the world”. At the same time, dominant representations of global spatiality often retain some modern features. But even for those (one example is Google Earth released in June 2005), we no longer need the old-style icons of planet Earth to know that the local and the global are deeply interconnected. Another promotion close to the aforementioned KLM advertisement presents us with a picture of a country lane and an old-fashioned British mail box. These images are used as the backdrop to the slogan, “It’s all about picking up your Email anywhere”. Nothing has to be said about the web being worldwide or the metal mail box with the royal emblem of Elizabeth Regina II (ER) being anachronistically local-national. 13 Thus, while sympathetic to the idea of “post”-modernity understood in relation to a gradual and uneven shift from a national to a global imaginary, we are sceptical of Martin Albrow’s (1996) claim that the evolution of the global imaginary occurs “beyond modernity”. 14 See Gill 2002:177-99 for a discussion of different dominant sensibilities of space in relation to Heidegger’s distinction between “world,” “earth,” and different ontologically-framed “worldviews.” 34 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 People living at the transition from a national to a global imaginary simply “know” how to read these images. The ontological category of temporality is also important to the contemporary global imaginary even if the notion of “time” does not seem to be contained in the concept of globalization. Modern time is the demarcated, linear, and “empty” time of the calendar and clock. But the ontological sense that time passes second-per-second is a modern convention rather than being intrinsically natural, scientiijically veriijiable, or continuous with older cosmological senses of time. Modern time is abstracted from nature, and veriijiable only within a particular mode of modern scientiijic enquiry—the Newtonian treatment of time as unitary, linear and uniform. It reached one of its deijining moments in 1974 when the second came to be measured in atomic vibrations, allowing the post-phenomenal concept of nanoseconds—one-billionth of a second.15 This sense of time-precision has been globalized as the regulative framework for electronic transactions in the global marketplace. It drives the billions of transactions on Wall Street just as much as it imposes a non-regressive discipline on the millions of bidders on eBay. This then is our ijirst point: a modern sense of time has been globalized and now overlays older ontologies of temporality without fully erasing them. Our second point is that ideological codiijiers tend to draw upon an assumed connection between modern time and globalizing processes to project their truth claims, which linked together such concepts such “progress,” “efijiciency,” “perfectibility,” and “just-in-time.” Indeed, concepts of “time” and “the global” are commonly used by market globalists to sell high-end commodities, from expensive watches and clothes to computers, mobile phones, and digital devices. Take, for example, an advertisement for New York’s Columbus Circle clothing stores: “6.10pm. Think globally. Act Stylishly”. These words are linked to an image framed by the outlines of a clock that show a woman jumping out of a taxi to go shopping (Where New York 2005). This image-text makes sense when you consider that the eight most commonly-used words in the English language today are time, person, year, way, thing, man, world (Australian 2006). And, of course, English itself is being globalized! In this context, let us note that we employ the concepts of “the traditional,” “the modern” and “the postmodern” as provisionally useful designations of ontological difference.16 Traditionalism can be characterized as carrying 15 ‘Postmodern’ time, including the time of relativity and quantum physics does not move in this way. According to Einsteinian relativity, for example, it moves in relation to the speed of the participant through space. 16 For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see James 2006. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 35 forward prior ontological forms from customary tribalism, but reconstituted in terms of universalizing cosmologies and political-metaphorical relations.17 An example here is the institution of the Christian Church. It may have modernized its practices of organization and become enmeshed in a modern monetary economy, but the various denominations of the Church, and most manifestly its Pentecostal variations, remain deeply bound up with a traditional cosmology of meaning and ritual. The truth of Jesus is not analytically relative or a question of modern proof. In this sense, a “return” to traditionalism characterizes many of the expressions of contemporary religious globalisms. Modernism carries forward prior forms of being, but fundamentally reconstituting (and sometimes turning up-side down) those forms in terms of technical-abstracted modes of time, space, embodiment and knowing. Time, as we noted above, becomes understood and practiced not in terms of cosmological connection with a capital “C” but through empty linear time-lines that can be ijilled with the details of the past and present as well as events made by us with an eye toward a “better” future. Indeed, one of the key dynamics of modernity is the continuous transformation of present time by political designs for the future. The consciousness of modernity arose as a vision that human beings can create community in a new image (Delanty 2009:8). What has changed with the emergence of the global imaginary is not this “modernist” vision itself, but the sense that “community” or “society” now refers to the entire “world” as much as to a particular “nation.” Modern space is territorialized and marked by abstract lines on maps—with places drawn in by our own histories. Modern embodiment becomes an individualized project separated out from the mind and used to project a choosing self. And modern knowing becomes an act of analytically dismembering and re-synthesizing information. In practice, modernism is associated with the dominance of capitalist production relations, commodity and ijinance exchange, print and electronic communication, bureaucratic-rational organization and analytic enquiry. Postmodernism, too, carries forward modern forms of being while at the same time altering ontological categories in the direction of new ideas and sensibilities of simultaneity, “real-time,” deterritorialization, relativization, and virtuality. We thus resist linear considerations of postmodernity as a stage that replaces the modern. We agree with Nestor Garcia Canclini that it is preferable to conceive of postmodernism as a mode of problematizing 17 Customary tribalism is deijined by the dominance of particular socially-speciijic modalities of space, time, embodiment, and knowing that can be characterized by analogical, genealogical, and mythological practices and subjectivities. This, for example, would include notions of genealogical placement, the importance of mythological time connecting past and present, and the centrality of relations of embodied reciprocity. 36 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 the ideologies, imaginaries, and ontologies of modernity established within traditions it attempted to exclude or overcome (Canclini 1995:9). In today’s globalizing world, we ijind different formations of traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism in complex intersection with each other. In spite of these continuities, however, it would be a serious mistake to close one’s eyes to the formation of new ideas, meanings, sensibilities, subjectivities. This novelty is perhaps most obviously in the proliferation of the preijix “neo” that has attached itself to nearly all major “isms” of our time: neoliberalism, neoconservatism, neo-Marxism, neofascism, and so on. In this article, we have suggested that there is, in fact, something new about political ideologies: a new global imaginary is on the rise. It erupts with increasing frequency within and onto the familiar framework of the national, spewing its ijiery lava across all geographical scales. Stoked, among other things, by technological change and scientiijic innovation, this global imaginary destabilizes the grand political ideologies codiijied by social elites during the national age. Thus, our changing ideational landscape is intimately related to the forces of globalization. Similarly, the preijix “post” has in the last few decades taken hold of many “isms”: post-Marxism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and so on. Some of these may not be full-blown political ideologies, but the ubiquity of this preijix clearly attests to people’s awareness of having moved “post” something. This marker may not be modernity per se, but it certainly looks like a new chapter of human history in which the modern sense of the “now” is increasingly linked to a growing global consciousness. Concluding Remarks: The Limitations of the Occupy Movement Ideologies of globalization make up an ideological family. Despite the existence of multiple points of contestation, these globalisms function as the political translators of an emergent global imaginary riding on slow-moving and intersecting ontologies. We contend that people from various socio-economic backgrounds around the world are developing a sense that their basic social categories, including “the person” and “the nation,” exist within in a social whole called “planet earth,” “the world” or “the globe.” The global imaginary remains in continuing intersection with prior dominant imaginaries such as “the national” and “the sacred order of things,” but is slowly reframing them. As the eruptions of the global continue to sear these conventional modes of understanding, they not only change the world’s economic infrastructure, but also transform our sense of self, identity, and belonging. This has profound consequences for politics, including the politics of protest and contention. M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 37 This is not to suggest, as Amitai Etzioni speculates, that we are witnessing an “emerging global normative synthesis” (Etzioni 2004:214-44). Our point is less utopian. Normative contestations around the national continue, but they tend to occur in the context of what Saskia Sassen sees as the collapse of the conventional nested hierarchies of scale that used to separate the global from the local, national, and regional (see, for example, Sassen 2007). Today, all of these formations, including the latest global rebellions from Wall Street to Tahrir Square contest the dominant terms of the global while at the same time internalizing and projecting the global as a common frame of reference. As the national and the global continue to rub up against each other in myriad settings and on multiple levels, they produce new tensions and compromises within a changing sense of modernity. At the same time different ontological formations intersect in complex ways. Older traditional and tribal ontological formations continue to ground the lives of many people, and a postmodern layer of temporality-spatiality has recently emerged. Nevertheless, the modern—read and reinterpreted through processes of globalization as both an objective and subjective set of social processes—still provides the dominant evolving social frame through which people around the world make sense of their complex lives. This taken-for-granted dominance of the modern is on display in the various manifestos of the Global Occupy Movement. While the ideology of justice globalism provides much conceptual coherence, it also limits Occupy’s political reach and depth. In a recent version, published in the British newspaper the Guardian, Occupy manifesto begins thus: We are living in a world controlled by forces incapable of giving freedom and dignity to the world’s population. A world where we are told “there is no alternative” to the loss of rights gained through the long, hard struggles of our ancestors, and where success is deijined in opposition to the most fundamental values of humanity, such as solidarity and mutual support. Moreover, anything that does not promote competitiveness, selfishness and greed is seen as dysfunctional. But we have not remained silent! From Tunisia to Tahrir Square, Madrid to Reykjavik, New York to Brussels, people are rising up to denounce the status quo. Our effort states “enough!” and has begun to push changes forward, worldwide. (The Guardian 2012) This statement’s emphasis is ijirmly on modern and universal rights. The modern ideology of freedom—along with the more ontologically ambiguous notions of “dignity” and “solidarity”—provides its point of departure. This singular dominance of the modern becomes clear in the long list of demands that follow. Practicality dominates and there is not a single demand for relief from the ontological dominance of modern practices and subjectivities that abstract, 38 M. B. Steger, P. James / PGDT 12 (2013) 17-40 codify, rationalize and objectify our lives. Though the ideals and demands made by Occupy are laudable, they are not that much different in form from the Millennium Goals of the United Nations. Instead, for example, of arguing for a remaking of the contemporary dominant relationship between culture and nature that has seen much of humanity alienated from nature as a source of being, the manifesto demands “the creation of international environmental standards, mandatory for countries, companies, corporations, and individuals. Ecocide (willful damage to the environment, ecosystems, biodiversity) should be internationally recognized as a crime of the greatest magnitude.” Instead of challenging the fetishism of consumption and the centrality of growth capitalism that has among other things contributed to a dual global crisis of work intensiijication and labor redundancy, the manifesto demands that a technical solution around sufijicient income be put in place: “Every human being should have access to an adequate income for their livelihood, so we ask for work or, alternatively, universal basic income guarantee” (ibid.). Our point here is not to consider modern life-ways are necessarily bad, but as an unremitting, colonizing and dominant formation that is skewing how we live as humans. Thus perhaps one of the most difijicult questions of our global age is how to balance our ontological and integrational needs. 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