Jones, M. (2004). Forging an ASEAN Identity: The Challenge to Construct a Shared Destiny In Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26(1), pp. 140-154. Forging an ASEAN Identity: The Challenge to Construct a Shared Destiny Michael E. Jones, Indiana University Abstract ASEAN has formulated a planned integration among its ten member nations and has challenged its citizens to embrace a regional identity. This article raises and attempts to answer the following questions: How might ASEAN develop strategies to enable citizens in transitioning from nation-state mentalities to regional and possible cultural citizenry? How will the regional and national governing bodies facilitate the necessary empowerment of diverse populations to form an ASEAN identity? What sorts of affiliations will engender the necessary social capital to develop civic-minded people with a sense of belonging together? How might education play a role in this process? These questions are raised on the basis of the argument that the call for ASEAN identity delivers a challenge to construct dynamic institutions and foster sufficient amounts of social capital. The underlying assumption is that the creation of a regional identity is of special interest to ASEAN and the intent of the of the 2020 Vision policy document was to reassert the belief in a regional framework designed as an action plan related to human development and civic empowerment. Accordingly, these assumptions will be the basis for recommendations and strategies in developing a participatory regional identity. 1 “We will not achieve harmony simply by outlawing discord.” – David Brazier, “The New Buddhism”1 Introduction: An Evolving Regional Identity In the last two decades, the world has seen the deepening of regional integration agreements among nations. The European Union, the most successful case of regional integration, has succeeded integrating a common market and laying down a foundation for the emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union with the installation of the Euro as a common currency. A similar, perhaps less ambitious, type of regional integration occurred in the Americas with the signing of the NAFTA and Mercosur agreements. In Southeast Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has formulated a planned integration among its ten member nations. ASEAN drew up its vision of its own future in the document ASEAN Vision 2020 2 at its annual summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This document outlines a number of objectives defining regional development. One of those directives was defined: “We envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity.” What ASEAN means by “a common regional identity” and how it will be achieved has only been vaguely alluded to, leaving an incomplete or unspoken vision to the concept of regional identity. In various public lectures3, Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN, has referred to ASEAN as a “cohesive mass that can come only from geographical propinquity” that requires member nations’ commitment to maintaining “ASEAN’s cohesion and strengthen its solidarity... ” Severino has further described an association with great diversity that is composed of “societies and political 2 constituencies… marshaled in the cause of ASEAN solidarity and cooperation, behind the validity of the ASEAN idea…” that aspires to… open trading and investment regimes. An increasing integrated market. Progressively more open societies. The increasing ascendancy of the rule of law… ” Although there has not been a clearly articulated vision of regional identity with time bound benchmarks, there is a historical precedent for a regional identity and it lies in the context in which ASEAN arose. Narine4 in describing the historical context of ASEAN explains that, in order to reduce further regional tensions, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines founded ASEAN in 1967 amidst uncertain regional security and certain poverty. The founders were seeking an association of Southeast Asian nations cooperating for a common good with peace and economic, social and cultural development as primary objectives. The organization has adopted a Malay cultural practice of consultation and consensus building as an operational process. This process has become a trademark response to all consultative matters and includes the hardened policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow members’ state affairs. This non-interference policy has defined political procedures of the organization and how it has chosen to deal with regional problems. At the annual summit meeting5 in Phnom Penh, an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was proposed, seemingly supporting Hew’s6 assertion that Vision 2020 was a document that “envisaged a stable, prosperous and highly competitive regional economic area.” However, beginning with the Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit7, ASEAN has been developing an Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), an abstract initiative with the intention of “giving direction to the focus of collective efforts to narrow the 3 development gap within… and between ASEAN and other parts of the world.” In ensuing years, ministerial meetings have further refined and developed the IAI with work plans, specific projects, and potential donors and resources. The IAI was endorsed and finally approved in the Phnom Penh summit as a six-year plan with a series of projects that addresses four priority areas: infrastructure development, information and communication technology, human resource development, and the promotion of regional economic integration. The initiative does emphasize economic development, but it cannot be assumed that this is the focus of achievement towards a regional identity. The projects in the plan are being approached in a more holistic manner than a mere prescriptive economic development plan. The plan itself is considered “rolling” and seems to indicate an evolving ascendancy pending the progress towards social solidarity. It is also significant to note that in ASEAN’s 2003 Social Development8 report, there has been a regional project to instill an awareness of ASEAN identity into primary education curricula. Assumptions Concerning ASEAN’s Regional Identity This analysis has as its underlying assumption that the creation of a regional identity is of special interest to ASEAN and vital to how its members conceive the future. A further assumption of this analysis is that the intent of the Vision policy document was to reassert the belief in a regional framework already sketched in the minds of member representatives and it was designed as an action plan related to human development and civic empowerment. At least this would be logical given ASEAN’s beliefs in consensus building, non-interference, and regional cooperation. This paper does not, however, make the assumption that economic welfare and omnipotent nation-states are the foundations of a robust region. Economic advancement and powerful governing 4 bodies are essential aspects of developing a dynamic region, but they do not guarantee social cohesion or open societies. This paper assumes that a strong participative, wellinformed public are the hallmarks of open societies and dynamic regional bodies. The far-reaching affects of globalization9 has reminded governments that their responsibility is no longer only to local constituencies, but is indeed subject to scrutiny and pressure by civic societies and donor partners worldwide. Another lesson is that regardless of the availability and quality of public and private goods, it is the strength in skills, knowledge, and health of the local populations and the recognition of a country’s diversity and inclusiveness that drives a nation towards sustainable development. This would assume that there is an essential need to involve those most affected by development changes in the decision-making process. Another assumption of this paper is that education, in the form of capacity building and knowledge management will be a fundamental means of achieving a shared regional identity. The development of educational initiatives will be successful only if education averts the tendency to stratify society and bolster an elite cadre of citizens. Accordingly, these assumptions will be the basis for recommendations in the form of educational implications and possible strategies in developing a participatory regional identity that is representative of ASEAN’s ideal of nations cooperating for a common good with peace and economic, social, and cultural development. Scope and Significance of the Problem Literature in the study of regional integration is very focused and devoted to the study of the political and economic arenas of the nation-state and its integration with other 5 states. Less attention has been paid to what it takes to integrate individual citizens of diverse cultural and ethnic identities into the wider regional identity or regional citizenship. It should be noted that the Vision emphasizes the region will be one in which “all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development” under the heading A Community of Caring Societies.10 As previously mentioned, ASEAN has had the intention of creating a regional identity since its inception and the entire Vision document and subsequent IAI plans appear to be dependent on citizens’ acceptance of a regional identity; or at least an awareness that beyond the nation-state to which they belong is a collective body that assures protection and comfort. The organization, in essence, is asking for all citizens to re-conceptualize how they think of themselves as citizens, to what community they belong, and how they relate to the wider set of communities regionally. It not only calls for setting wide goals for governing bodies, but it expects fulfillment of duties and responsibilities by civic-minded citizens. Large segments of the region’s population will need to cultivate public activity and personal empowerment. The Vision statement has included one specific policy element that directly relates to education: “Enhance human resource development in all sectors of the economy through quality education, upgrading of skills and capabilities and training.” It has references in other elements of the policy that speak of science and technology, and these generally appear to be aspects of economic development through education. There are a number of policy elements mentioned in the Vision that are not likely to be achieved without the aid of education and these are of primary interest to this analysis: “creating a Zone of Peace… respect for law and justice… economic development strategies in line with the aspirations of respective peoples… reduced poverty and 6 socio-economic disparities… governance with the consent and greater participation of the people…”11 These elements will be addressed on macro and micro levels in the recommendations, with wider issue blocks divided into these categories: • Education representational structure to guide regional education directions; • Civil education, including teaching/learning in a multi-cultural society; • Language and cultural issues. Implementation will accommodate national plans and build upon the relevant work of Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), UN agencies, and local NGOs. More comprehensive strategies will be addressed as the region and the recommended structures develop. Stakeholders ASEAN as a whole will have to enhance people’s capacity to construct bonds that were once national, but now must be regional. It will require societies with sufficient social capital and capable institutions to empower individual citizenry to consciously integrate into an ASEAN identity that is perceived to be a worthy course to shape their cultural, economic, political, and social lives. It is the contention of this analysis that the regional integration of political and economic systems will only be successful when citizens perceive it as the system they would strive to become part of and prosper within. The stakeholders therefore will include ASEAN ministers, country political representatives and ministry officials, representatives of educational task groups, local NGOs, and all member nation citizens, including ethnic minorities and rural communities. 7 Foundations in Regional Identity Formation Many countries within ASEAN suffer from the effects of social exclusion and underdevelopment. The effect of social exclusion and underdevelopment is that multiethnic and multi-cultural nations tend to have a high degree of inequality.12 Poverty is not an uncommon feature of ASEAN countries, particularly in rural populations, and evidenced even more within ethnic minority communities. The World Bank informs policymakers that the rural population faces the global demons of decreased opportunity, political and economic disempowerment, and general insecurity of food, social safety, political and legal representation, and financial well being.13 Educational opportunity for ethnic minorities has been in the past limited, but has increased over the last ten years. As exemplified in Vietnam, the number of ethnic minority children enrolled in primary school has increased over the last few years from 64% to 82%, and the number enrolled in upper secondary school has also increased from 2% to 8%. The discouraging news, however, is that in many ethnic minority communities, illiteracy ranges from 72 to 88%14. Unfortunately, many of these children become economic migrants, socially marginalized, and ill equipped to deal with the demands of a modern society. Reducing poverty is not merely a matter of the redistribution of wealth, but it is also a matter of empowerment through the enhancement of capacities – institutions and individuals - and the provision of safety nets. However, an essential aspect of poverty reduction policies is to redirect public benefits to the poor.15 Birdsall16 has asserted that … data on the distribution of education over time show inequality falling in all regions of the world; as average education levels rise, inequality declines. Still, in some countries, current inequality in the distribution of education 8 means most children of the currently poor are not acquiring enough human capital to exploit the new opportunities that market reforms and the arrival of an information age in their countries are creating. Capacity building in communities is also a crucial step in the empowerment of citizens. The building of coalitions and associations along with the capacity to create cultural identifications and links are primary functions of community capacity, or an active civil society.17 In a 2001 report, Citizens as Partners, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,18 the findings in a two-year study were that citizens not only wanted greater governmental accountability and transparency, but also wanted a greater ability to participate in the policy development process of their country. It is undeniable that citizens in most countries worldwide must rely on government decisionmaking processes and have limited ability to develop “civic virtue”19 - social capital. ASEAN nations, according to ministerial plans, are quite interested in developing social capital in its citizens, but have few projects yet that supports this interest. One model that is quite relevant in demonstrating effective citizen participation is the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA)20 that the government of Vietnam implemented for the development of its poverty reduction policy. In this PPA, representatives from poor rural and ethnic minority communities were asked to define the needs of their communities. Their recommendations were incorporated into the government’s Vietnamese Education and Training Development Strategy to Year 2010 for the Cause of Industrialization and Modernization of Vietnam.21 This is the sort of social capital initiated by nation-states that is crucial in setting the example for civilians to further develop civic processes. It has appeared to be an effective means to reduce poverty, 9 encourage social capital within the communities, and involved citizens in civic decisionmaking processes. Vietnam learned the lesson that exclusion from the political process means exclusion from citizenship rights and founding institutions. Exclusion from the economic process also means exclusion from market exchange. Without institutions that provide for democratic process or the opportunity to escape poverty, a state will neither grow nor flourish. Many countries are taking a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach developed jointly by The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).22 These countries have developed sound economic and development policies with a record of poverty reduction through the participative approach by its citizens. The participation of citizens in political decisions allows for them to take part in the designing of their lives and in creating the definition of what democracy means in their own local context. Democracy is, after all, more than voting; it is dependent on citizens voluntarily and unremittingly supporting the political process. And it “will remain stable and efficient only if it stands for the upkeep of cultural identity, economic soundness, social justice, and political tolerance.”23 But the democratic process, politics, is something people learn and is not something that comes intuitively. Democratic process requires education of individuals and of communities to understand the extent of its associated entitlements and responsibilities. Without the benefits afforded by social capital through education and civic procedures, a nation’s chance of becoming democratic, prosperous, and self-defining is minimized. Generally speaking, ASEAN’s poor communities lack the abilities to build coalitions, basic organizing skills, sending issues to local media, horizontal information sharing, 10 and other skills necessary to give representation to their concerns, needs, and abilities. It is not uncommon in ASEAN nations to find that the rural population is both poor and unfamiliar with civil society organizations; “instead they rely on a host of informal associations within their communities that often lack the ability to effect government decision making.”24 They are further isolated from civic-minded activities by rarely having the experience of connecting to another community civic group or state resources to assist in civic participation. A realistic educational model for many ASEAN communities is to be found in the concept of education-based community development (EBCD), whereby the student is expected to become a creative, intelligent individual, but within the context of learning in communities of practice.25 In other words, the goal of education is to … create individuals who understand that the essential meaning of being human derives from acknowledging our interdependency and therefore, accepting our mutual responsibility. It is the community then that benefits from education, and therefore must take responsibility for it.26 In this approach, youth are encouraged and given academic credit to participate in all facets of the community development process – business, infrastructure, education, finance, social services, public services, etc. This educational approach binds education, the community, and the individual to the wider network of national and regional communities. It is education for the purpose of living and presupposes life-long learning. It is fundamental knowledge necessary to create functional communities and identity. Most importantly, it is a commitment to development and motivates growth and change. 11 Many people are aware of the impact that globalization has had on developing countries. But those in undeveloped nations who aren’t aware are generally the citizens in rural areas – up to 80% of the population in ASEAN nations. The world has affected ASEAN nations in profound ways and is frequently stated as a factor and force with which to be reckoned in the Vision 2020 document. The world the ASEAN citizens live in is one of great change and opportunity and has demanded every nation to redefine its sense of culture and place in the world. ASEAN has called for its nations to share a regional identity. For the citizens of ASEAN to become regional, it will be necessary to know other cultures outside of their own community and country. Borders will be made “fluid” and citizens will be able to move much more freely in the region. But with this freedom, encountering those not considered the same or assumed to be the same will be a normal occurrence. The responsibilities to know others, how to be respectful of others, and how to extend empathetic cross-cultural communication to those not considered the same will require education as these, just like democracy and politics, never come intuitively. A broader view of the world and how to engage in it will be crucial tools for ASEAN regional citizens. ASEAN will likely have more migration and shifting of identities. Citizens will be looking for opportunities and new roots or renewal of old cultural bonds. Nations will have to deal with the confusion and conflicting nature of identity boundaries. The essential skills of dispute resolution accompanied by effective cross-cultural communications will play a large part in defining borders and values. If ASEAN wants to maintain its “Zone of Peace,” these skills will have to be major components of formal and non-formal education programs throughout the region. It is this area of peace, reconciliation, and 12 creation of boundaries that will take ASEAN to its limit and determine what sort of response is needed for the cohesion of the region. It will also tell ASEAN leaders what sort of job they have done in allowing a learning environment to grow and in providing the other essential “identity skills” necessary to survive in a modern world. The importance of ethnic identity will grow in significance due to the multi-cultural composition of the region. How does a region create a common identity when there are so many competing cultural identities? How can there be regional cohesion when there are minorities that are granted token national identity, and sometimes denied citizenship, goods of the state, and knowledge of civic processes or basic legal rights? In some countries, ethnic minorities are given the choice of either claiming identification with their culture or assimilating into a national citizenship. As Delgado-Moreira27 has pointed out in his work with European cultural citizenship “the melting pot analogy is the ideology of coercive assimilation into the nation-state.” The concept of cultural citizenship has become associated with political, civil, economic, and cultural rights and duties within nation-state and regional structures. While national identity seeks to determine the limits and boundaries of identity through consensus via public advocacy, cultural citizenship has support built into the community and emphasizes belonging to a distinct social environment that also shares a common ground with every citizen. Citizenship based on cultural identity, in theory, defends the right of diversity and the right to participate in the process of governance. It is not a coercive or reflexive response to the established norm, it is an expanded dynamism fueled by rights and responsibilities of engagement. 13 An appealing aspect of cultural citizenship and regional identity is that national governments can decentralize and centralize at the same time. Local citizenry would be given the responsibility of determining needs and responses to needs, while ministries, particularly education and social service branches, could concentrate on incorporating local knowledge and needs into national/regional policies. For many ethnic minorities, the autonomy provided to them through cultural citizenship would be welcomed and embraced. For the national governments, it should also be a relief in not having to be confrontational with policies that are ineffective and alienating. The sense of unity would likely be highlighted – both as a national body and a regional body. This leaves ASEAN and its member nations with the responsibility of addressing the issue of culture and how it relates to citizenship and the concept of borders – nationally and regionally. Are borders within ASEAN to be demarcations and signifiers of where one nation or entity ends and another begins or definitions of ethnicity, race, economy, or philosophy? Upon crossing borders, what shift of power will occur, will entities no longer have the same entitlements or relations, will individuals become strangers and visitors? Will borders represent communities possessing different value preferences and will there be strategies in place for the region to deal with the complexity of living together? The answer to these questions will determine whether ASEAN borders will represent separators from where one does not wish to go, a place one longs for, a place to escape the past, or a place to which one wishes never to return. To begin asking the questions is to begin the process of learning. ASEAN can begin the dialog by engaging the diverse communities within the region by establishing their rights and responsibilities, giving voice to their concerns, activating their potential, and affirming the opportunity to be engaged citizens of a dynamic region. 14 Regional Recommendation 1: Education Representation Structure ASEAN must have a regional representative structure to advise and guide the educational direction – herein labeled the Regional Education Board (REB). The REB is to be composed of each nation’s educational specialists and select subject-matter experts from other sectors (business, agriculture, technology, etc.) Within the region, there will be an “oversight force” that serves as a sub-regional educational and social services node to collect and provide information to REB. These should include satellite “ranger offices” (akin to agricultural offices) that further serve the communities on a very local level by giving support and disseminating and collecting information. The oversight forces will be referred to as the Educational Development and Social Services Office (EDSO). A mechanism to incorporate the recommendations from the region’s communities will be essential. In order to provide education within the context of the needs and level of each community, decisions must be made to develop economic standards and the sense of fulfillment to which each community aspires. Since economic stability is of vital importance, REB will have to consider if there is a balance between an emphasis on regional human resource development and on national development issues. REB will need to advise on issues such as how educational funding will be divided between the nations to foster development and to equalize the level of expertise or development. Local Recommendation 1: Education Outreach EDSO “outreach rangers”, the educational equivalent of agricultural extension agents, will advise and assist in the development of regional community groups. Each nation will 15 have a team identifying communities that are representative of intra-regional groupings, i.e., ethnic groups, culturally identified communities, and pre-established community groups. This could entail hundreds of communities in every nation. A socio-economic profile, including educational levels, would be vital data in reports from the representative of each community in order to provide measurement of growth for monitoring purposes. Additional factors and themes would be added to the profile as the EDSO assesses the needs and variations of aspiration in communities within their domain. Regional Recommendation 2 – Civil and Multi-Cultural Education ASEAN will have to create a structure to respond to communities and to make decisions regarding migration and issues of nationality and citizenship. How will ASEAN deal with the issue of citizenship, especially if it is defined by culture? As to the responsibility of REB in this area, they will be called on to develop guidelines for education issues related to migration, including: the socialization of new migrants, cross-cultural communication strategies and techniques; community diversity policies; curriculum that has provision for diversity issues; language program formats; and revision strategies and materials for teachers and parents. REB will also design a global citizen curriculum that addresses the meaning of being a citizen and member of a diverse community, and nation-region. Elements of this citizenship curriculum will include foundations in conflict resolution, multicultural perspectives, “universal” and regional values, media studies, community organizing, and civic responsibility. 16 Local Recommendation 2 – Civil and Multicultural Education The EDSO would be responsible for giving a series of workshops in civic and multicultural education, i.e., dispute resolution, cross-cultural communication, consensus building, participatory decision-making processes, and how/where to collect relevant information for the benefit of the community, i.e., markets, technologies, resources, etc. to representatives of all these communities. The content of these courses will mostly explain what is expected of every community and how they relate to their nation and to ASEAN and, likewise, how their nation and ASEAN can act as a resource and source of support. Formal education, with an adult education component, will incorporate a multicultural curriculum developed at the regional level. The local school system will adapt the curriculum to include local values and relevant knowledge of each community. There will be a prescribed non-formal educational element that would include experiential, constructivist learning approaches. Communities will be provided with a discretionary budget to allow members (on a rotational basis) to travel to other communities of their choice. Generally, these will be within national boundaries, but additional funding would be provided for at least one trans-boundary trip to another ASEAN nation (youth to be given an equal opportunity). These are to be considered “official trips” and must be registered through the EDSO. Village representatives are expected to gather some form of information regarding cultural, social, and technological knowledge. The EDSO outreach ranger will report back to the community about the visited community and what sorts of skills or technology they use, social norms and practices, and new ideas or existing commercial potentials. Outcomes from this activity may vary, but it is probable that it will likely lead to innovation, new cultural adaptations, and affiliations with other 17 communities. Communities will expand contacts and development associations. Other outcomes may be that people feel more aligned with other communities and decide to migrate. Regional Recommendation 3 - Language and Cultural Issues REB must decide what language issues will be of initial importance, as the number of languages will probably number in the hundreds. Initially, it may not be so important to determine a regional language because, at present, the common working business language is English. If ASEAN wishes to standardize English as a second language, this must be coordinated and implemented effectively, which to a large degree, is already being done in most ASEAN Nations. But, with the multitude of dialects within the region, the need for trained teachers that speak these dialects fluently is a major concern. REB will need to establish skill level standards so that workers who migrate will have a means of certifying their abilities. The academic levels and skills will also need to be measured so that students crossing borders will be able to continue their studies uninterrupted. Local Recommendation 3 - Language and Cultural Issues Local schools must decide whether they will teach in the language of the community or another language of the region. They will need to base this on whether the language fulfills their multiple needs and whether the nation will be able to provide qualified teachers and materials for the language of their choice, or whether they can find necessary alternatives. This will entail a community effort in the decision-making process and require a good deal of careful consideration. Extension support by the EDSO will be essential to reassure communities of their abilities to solve problems and 18 develop the sorts of decision-making processes that will sustain their objectives. These decisions may be made easier by the trips made to other communities to examine options and resource sharing possibilities. Conclusion The creation of a regional identity is ambitious and demands a substantial change by all. Politically and socially, this is an historic event whose success relies on no less than a cultural revolution. Ivan Illich spoke of the future of development when he said “Cultural revolution is a review of the reality of man and a redefinition of the world in terms which support this reality.”28 ASEAN citizens and leaders must re-evaluate their conceptions of identity rooted in the past and renew their common passions for a brighter future. A regional identity is the transformational intersection where tradition meets the future, aristocracy encounters service, and the common man elevates to senator. But, in order for it to be more than mere romantic revelry or another oppressive dream, all must be given responsibility to participate. The most common feature of ASEAN is the fact that each country is composed of diverse cultures. The irony of this feature, however, is that dominant groups have clutched onto power and limited the acceptance of a diverse citizenry. The dual efforts to eradicate poverty and encourage civic activity are important elements of a regional identity. Until citizenship becomes a concern and focus of all ASEAN nations, regional identity will be but an imposed super-structure with no facilities of governance. The governing structure will remain exclusionary, perhaps even elitist, and not representative of ASEAN ideals. The key to preventing domination from subverting dynamic societies is in educating the public in how to accept both its diversity and its 19 common heritage. Without the passion for developing a radically new vision of the future, the past will never be forgotten. 20 Endnotes 1 David Brazier, The New Buddhism (New York: Palgrave, 2002, c2001). 2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Vision 2020, (Kuala Lumpur: Policy Report from the 1997 ASEAN Summit Meeting, 15 December 1997). 3 Rodolfo C. Severino, “Asia Policy Lecture: What ASEAN is and what it stands for,” ASEAN Faces The Future (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2001) 10-22. 4 Shaun Narine, “Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN” World Affairs Volume 161, No. 1 (1998): 33-47. 5 ASEA Summit Meeting, 4 November, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 6 Denis Hew, “Towards an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020: Vision or Reality?” Viewpoints (Institute of South East Asian Studies) 16 June 2003, 28 December 2003 <http://www.iseas.edu.sg>. 7 Fourth ASEAN Informal Summit, 22-25 November 2000, Singapore. 8 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Social Development, 9 April 2003, 28 December 2003 <http://www.aseansec.org/14680.htm>. 9 Inge Kaul et al., “How to Improve the Provision of Global Public Goods,” Providing Global Public Goods, ed. Inge Kaul et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 21-58. 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Vision 2020, (Kuala Lumpur: Policy Report from the 1997 ASEAN Summit Meeting, 15 December 1997). 11 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Vision 2020, (Kuala Lumpur: Policy Report from the 1997 ASEAN Summit Meeting, 15 December 1997). 12 Adolfo Figueroa, “Social Exclusions and Rural Underdevelopment,” Paper prepared for the World Bank Conference on Evaluation and Poverty Reduction, (Washington, D.C., 14-15 June 1999). 1-12. 13 H. Alderman, L. Cord, N. Chaudhury, C. Cornelius, N. Okidegbe, C.D. Scott and S. Schonberger, “Rural Poverty,” Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook, Volume 2, (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002), 1-45. 14 Asian Development Bank, Health and Education Needs of Ethnic Minorities in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Manila, Philippines, 2001) 1-40+. 15 M. Govinda Gao, “Poverty alleviation under fiscal decentralization,” Paper presented at the Fiscal Policy and Poverty Alleviation Conference, organized by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Switzerland) and the World Bank Institute, (Gerzensee Conference Center, Switzerland, 28-31 January 2002), 1-23. 21 16 Nancy Birdsall, “Human capital and the quality of growth,” Development Outreach Winter 2001: Quality of Growth. 17 Mary McNeil, “Engaging the poor,” Development Outreach Winter 2002: Civil Society in Development. 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Citizens as Partners Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making,” OECD Governance October 2001, no. 25: 1-253. 19 Mark Smith, “Social Capital” The Encyclopedia of Informal Education, 2000 ed. 20 The Poverty Task Force, Ministry of Planning and Investment (PTF, MPI). Vietnam: Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy: Local Consultations in Lao Cai Province, Muong Khuong and Bao Thang Districts, Vietnam, (Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center, May 2002) 1-142. 21 Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). Vietnamese Education and Training Development Strategy to Year 2010 for the Cause of Industrialization and Modernization of Vietnam. [Final Draft], (Hanoi: Vietnam Development Information Center, 2002) 1-35. 22 International Monetary Fund & International Development Association (IMF & IDA), Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Main Findings, (IMF, Washington, DC, 2002). 1-27. 23 Josef Thesing, “Globalisation, Democracy and the Social Market Economy,” Panorama (1/2000), 14 October 2002 <http://www.kas-asia.org/Publication.htm>. 24 Mary McNeil, “Engaging the poor,” Development Outreach Winter 2002: Civil Society in Development. 25 Vachel Miller, “Meaning, purpose, and connection: spirituality in a learning society,” Vimukt Shiksha, Unfolding Learning Societies: Challenges and Opportunities, March 2000, 4 September 2002 <http://www.learndev.org/VimuktShikshaLearnSoc.html>. 26 Michael J. Shannon, “Education-Based Community Development,” Civic Practices Network, 1992, 24 November 2002 <http://www.cpn.org/cpn/sections/topics/youth/civic_perspectives/designed.html>. 27 Juan M. Delgado-Moreira, “Cultural Citizenship and the Creation of European Identity,” Electronic Journal of Sociology March 1997: Volume 2, Number 3. 3 September 2002 <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado.html>. 28 Ivan Illich, “A Constitution for Cultural Revolution.” Celebration of Awareness. (London: Calder & Boyas, 1971). 22