General’s Gospel

Last updated: September 30, 2010

Farooq Adil
Amidst the highly precarious situation all around – government’s inability to handle the situation, political mess, blame game and bad governance; the unabated Taliban terror, suicide hits and drone attacks; unprecedented flood devastation, near economic collapse and likely default situation – there seems in Pakistan the only ray of hope in the country’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who stands tall and alone as all eyes are on him to steer the country out of uncertainty and wilderness. Unlike the elected representatives, his timely reaching out to the people, affected by the most devastating floods in Pakistan’s history, has given further boost to the armed forces’ image, which the rival forces are now out to tarnish by calling for martial law, sending the corrupt democratic dispensation packing, or acting swiftly on judiciary’s call for help “to make the things right.”
Many criticise Kayani’s response at not-so-right time, which gave ‘lease’ to a corrupt dispensation in the country that has played havoc with the people, economy, education, decisions of judiciary and what not. Many call him for applying the Kakar formula and suggest to taking things directly in his hands. The US and western media, think-tanks and policymakers are highlighting the “powerful” military’s “political” role in the country, aimed at tarnishing its image, justifying their direct dealing with the General Headquarters as “it is army that calls shots in Pakistan.”
The question is whether Kayani kneels down to the pressure from inside, or what course he adopts if the need arises out of the judiciary’s call for help or otherwise. To answer this question, one will have to keep in mind Kayani’s concept of defence diplomacy in the realm of national and global security, and under the newly emerging geo-strategic realities.
The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) defines the defence diplomacy mission “to provide forces to meet the varied activities undertaken to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.” Thus three main ingredients of the British defence diplomacy are: to dispel hostility, build & maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces – all aimed at conflict prevention and resolution. The ultimate goal is to add to the national and global security.
Kayani is seen as an important pillar in the edifice of national security and the accepted chief of defence diplomacy, both at home and abroad. When he took over as army chief in 2007, contemporaries believed that he was a professional soldier and an apolitical personality both in perception and outlook. His initial actions validated this conjecture and also supported the notion of development of democratically accountable armed forces.
Five-dimensional acts and accomplishments during the tenure of his assignment heretofore can be termed as the Kayani Doctrine of Defence Diplomacy. These are: to restore the image of Pakistan Armed Forces both at home and abroad; cultivate trust with interior and exterior forces; boost the combat potential of the army; assume all means and measures needed for conflict prevention and resolution; and arbitrate between rival political forces to circumvent any political collision that could disturb the already drab national security landscape.
On the way of image-restoration in the aftermath of Musharraf era, Kayani gave a comeback call to all army officers serving in civil departments no sooner than he took over as army chief. He commanded that army personnel were not allowed to communicate with the politicians and himself, too, distanced noticeably from the country’s political power corridors. Even though General (retd) Musharraf was still the President of Pakistan when general elections were held on February 18, Kayani decreed that the army would not oversee the electoral process, squarely against what had been planned and pronounced by his predecessor. These steps worked well on the way of restoration of army’s image after nine years of political involvement.
As for building the trust with interior and exterior forces, the General acted like a democratically accountable army chief at home and nodded to every political decision on employment of army. Informed sources also saw him to be honest in his opinion on national security matters whenever asked for by the political high-ups. Abroad, Kayani enjoys the repute of a gentleman who thinks like a scholar and acts like a soldier. He is held in high esteem in Euro-American circles, People’s Republic of China and the Middle Eastern armies. His photograph had been added to the US Army International Hall of Fame on February 26, 2009. Leavenworth Times reported on February 27 that he was fourth Pakistan Army General to have attained this honour. The 2008 Time 100, while listing Kayani the 20th in hundred most influential leaders and revolutionaries in the world wrote, “…Kayani showed that his loyalty lay with the nation he had served for nearly four decades…soldiers, friends, diplomats and politicians all extol his reasoned thinking and tempered judgment.” BBC News in a November 27, 2007 report, “The Rise of Pakistan’s “Quiet Man” wrote: “…[Kayani] is noted for his patience, diligence, intelligence and sheer determination… has ability to keep a low profile when necessary while also being able to take decisive action when it’s needed… has a “can-do” image as a man who gets things done”. A New York Times report noted that “[Kayani] received high praise from the US for his military prowess and his commitment to disentangle the army from domestic politics.”
Kayani has also been mindful of the need to boost the combat potential of Pakistan Army. He declared year 2008 “Year of the Soldier” and Year 2009 “Year of Training”. Both soldiery and training went on well as Kayani was free from political involvement unlike his predecessor, oversaw every bit of it, which considerably added to the combat readiness of Pakistan military, the result of which the world as a whole saw in the all-encompassing, swift and result-oriented operations in Swat-Malakand Division, South Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur and Khyber Agencies, and in Tirah Valley. Defence observers, particularly the adversaries watching closely, had been waiting for the Pakistan Army being ditched in the Swat valley, where only in Peochar arms dumps of such a huge quantity were found during the operation, which in words of Pakistan Army General, could be used by the Taliban for years to engage and exhaust out the army. Likewise, the experts predicted a clear defeat of Pakistan Army in the most difficult and rugged terrain of South Waziristan, which had a more than two hundred years history of invincibility, but the General proved not only his prowess, but sent out a clear message to the world that the Pakistan military will never offer them an opportunity of weakness. This is why Kayani could be able to convince Pentagon, Brussels, the frequently visiting Admiral Mike Mullen, General David Petraeus, General McChrystal, as well as New Delhi and Kabul as to why launching an all-out operation in North Waziristan, coinciding with the Kandahar offensive, was not feasible. Probably this was one of the reasons of McChrystal’s unceremonious exit.
As for the conflict prevention and resolution, Kayani has taken hosts of measures. In response to post-Mumbai war rhetoric of India’s politico-military elite, Gen Kayani resorted to tri-pronged defence diplomacy, according the defence analyst Ehsan Mahmood Khan. Firstly, in a widely published statement, he desired that Pak-India conflict must be prevented. Secondly, he warned that Pakistan was prepared to strike back within minutes of an Indian strike. Thirdly, he took practical measures by deploying matching number of forces on eastern border in response to Indian military moves and to thwart any Indian misadventure. Up in the northwest, he complied with the political decision on military operations but at the same time supported political moves by facilitating peace agreements in Swat and Bajaur. On this account, he also enjoys good relations with the extra-regional forces operating in Afghanistan.
While the General manifestly remained in low key insofar as the political happenings in the country are concerned but when the time came to act during the days of long march by politico-judicial forces in March 2009, he did. He skillfully arbitrated and demonstrated the power of defence diplomacy. The country was saved from a political collision that could wreck the national security arrangement. He set the precedent of keeping the military institution subservient to the democratically elected government and took the initiative of giving briefings to the political leadership at the Presidency and in the Parliament, instead of inviting them to GHQ as his predecessors did in the past. He objected to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, but did not resist it.
In the light of discourse and discussion made on the Kayani Doctrine herein, we may chart out the Pakistani definition of defence diplomacy suiting our own national security needs. In Ehsan Khan’s words, “Defence diplomacy is the art of keeping the armed forces ready to act against internal and external threats, conflict prevention where possible and conflict resolution when needed, building trust with interior and exterior forces, and maintaining a professional and apolitical posture while interceding in unavoidable political brawls that could impinge upon the national security situation.” Thus the pressure on him for a political intervention must be seen in the light of his doctrine.
Author is an Islamabad-based defence & security analyst

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